The Watkins Company v. Estate of Storms Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 43649 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-29-2015
The Watkins Company v. Estate of Storms Clerk's
Record Dckt. 43649
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"The Watkins Company v. Estate of Storms Clerk's Record Dckt. 43649" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6122.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6122
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an ldaho limited liabil ity company, 















Case No. CY-20 I 0-5958 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an ind ividual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, fN C. ,an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND 
BREWHOUSE, 
Defendant/Counterclaimants/Respondents. 
_ _ _________________ ) 
Docket No. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonnevi lle 
43649 
HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON, District Judge. 
B.J. Driscoll 
PO Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Attorney for Appellant 
I DE:X 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Dean C. Brandstetter 
PO Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Date: 12/17/2015 
Time: 11 :32 AM 
Page 1 of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User Judge 
9/29/2010 SMIS SBARRERA Summons Issued Joel E. Tingey 
NCOC SBARRERA New Case Filed-Other Claims Joel E. Tingey 
NOAP SBARRERA Plaintiff: The Watkins Company Notice Of Joel E. Tingey 
Appearance B.J . Driscoll 
COMP SBARRERA Complaint Filed Joel E. Tingey 
SBARRERA Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Joel E. Tingey 
listed in categories B-H , or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Driscoll , B.J . (attorney for The 
Watkins Company) Receipt number: 0045750 
Dated: 9/29/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
The Watkins Company (plaintiff) 
10/1/2010 NOAP SOUTHWIC Notice Of Appearance -- Defs Michael Storms Joel E. Tingey 
and Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
NOAP SOUTHWIC Defendant: Storms, Michael Scott Notice Of Joel E. Tingey 
Appearance Dean C. Brandstetter 
NOAP SOUTHWIC Defendant: Brownstone Companies, Inc. Notice Joel E. Tingey 
Of Appearance Dean C. Brandstetter 
SOUTHWIC Acceptance of Service Joel E. Tingey 
MOTN SOUTHWIC Motion to Disqualify Without Cause Joel E. Tingey 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Order for Disqualification Joel E. Tingey 
HUNTSMAN Order of Assignment to Honorable Darren B. Darren B. Simpson 
Simpson 
MOTN SOLIS Motion For Temporary Restraining Order And Darren B. Simpson 
Application For Prejudgment Writ Of Attachment 
SOLIS Brief In Support Of Motion For Temporary Darren B. Simpson 
Restrain ing Order And Application For 
Prejudgment Writ Of Attachment 
AFFD SOLIS Affidavit Of Dane Watkins Darren B. Simpson 
AFFD SOLIS Affidavit Of Dane Watkins Darren B. Simpson 
10/5/2010 NOTC SOLIS Notice Of Filing Bond Darren B. Simpson 
10/7/2010 MINE QUINTANA Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
ORDR QUINTANA Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Darren B. Simpson 
Order and Order to Show Cause 
NOTH QUINTANA Notice Of Hearing Order to Show Cause Darren B. Simpson 
10/1 3/2010 MOTN SBARRERA Motion For Prejudgment Writ Of Attachment And Darren B. Simpson 
Prel iminary Injunction 
AFFD SBARRERA Affidavit Of B.J. Driscoll Darren B. Simpson 
SBARRERA Brief In Support Of Motion For Prejudgment Writ Darren B. Simpson 
Of Attachment And Prel iminary Injunction 
NOTH SBARRERA Notice Of Heari ng (10/14/201 0 1:30PM) Darren B. Simpson 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren 8 . Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User Judge 
10/14/2010 MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Hearing 
Hearing date: 10/14/2010 
Time: 2:33 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
10/18/2010 MEMO KBAIRD Memorandum of defentant's storms and Darren B. Simpson 
brownstone companies, inc 
10/20/2010 BRIF DOOLITTL Reply Brief Filed in Support of Motion for Darren B. Simpson 
Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Preliminary 
Injunction 
11/3/2010 MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
11/4/2010 DEOP SOUTHWIC Decision Denying Pl's Motion for Prejudgment Darren B. Simpson 
Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Pl's 
Request for a Preliminary Injunction 
11/9/2010 MOTN SBARRERA Motion For Reconsideration And Request For Darren 8 . Simpson 
Hearing On Preliminary Injunction Restraining 
Order 
MOTN LYKE Motion for Reconsideration Darren B. Simpson 
BRIF LYKE Brief Filed in Support of Motion for Darren B. Simpson 
Reconsideration 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Reconsideration Darren B. Simpson 
(12/03/10@10:30AM) 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Order Setting Aside Decision Granting in Part Pl's Darren B. Simpson 
Request for Preliminary Injunction 
11/10/2010 DEOP SOUTHWIC Decision Denying Pl's Motion for Prejudgment Darren B. Simpson 
Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Pl's 
Requesst for a Preliminary Injunction 
11/17/2010 DCHH SOUTHWIC District Court Hearing Held Darren B. Simpson 
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
11/26/2010 MINE DOOLITTL Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
MINE DOOLITTL Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
ORDR DOOLITTL Order Granting Prelinminary Injunction In Part Darren B. Simpson 
ORDR DOOLITTL Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(8) Darren B. Simpson 
Certificate 
12/1/2010 ANSW LYKE Answer (Dean C. Brandstetter for Michael Storms Darren B. Simpson 
and Brownstone Compan ies, Inc) 
12/13/2010 MINE QUINTANA Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
8/31/2011 MOTN SBARRERA Motion To Dismiss Darren B. Simpson 
NOTH SBARRERA Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendant's Motion To Darren B. Simpson 
Dismiss (1 0/05/2011 2:00PM) 
,.. 
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Page 3 of 15 Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User Judge 
9/6/2011 ORDR QUINTANA Order Vacating and Rescheduling Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
September 30, 2011 at 2:00 p.m. 
9/7/2011 HRSC QUINTANA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/30/2011 02:00 Darren B. Simpson 
PM) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
9/22/2011 NOTC DOOLITIL Notice Vacaing Hearing and Withdrawing Motion Darren B. Simpson 
to Dismiss 
HRVC QUINTANA Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Darren B. Simpson 
09/30/2011 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
9/28/2011 NOTC QUINTANA Notice of Proposed Dismissal for Inactivity Darren B. Simpson 
10/26/2011 MOTN LYKE Motion for Retention Darren B. Simpson 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit in Support of Motion for Retention Darren B. Simpson 
10/28/2011 AFFD LYKE Affidavit of BJ Driscoll Darren B. Simpson 
12/8/2011 AMCO TBROWN Amended Complaint Filed Darren B. Simpson 
12/18/2011 ORDR LMESSICK Order For Retention Darren B. Simpson 
12/22/2011 ORDR LMESSICK Order for Amended Complaint Darren B. Simpson 
12/27/2011 NTTD DOOLITTL Notice Of Intent To Take Default Darren B. Simpson 
1/3/2012 ANSW DOOLITTL Defendant's Michael Storms and Brownstone Darren B. Simpson 
Companies, Inc. Answer 
5/2/2012 NORT SBARRERA Note Of Issue/request For Tria l Darren B. Simpson 
5/8/2012 RRTS HUMPHREY Response To Request For Trial Setting Darren B. Simpson 
7/9/2012 NOTH LMESSICK Notice Of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
07/23/2012 10:00 AM) TELEPHONIC 
8/1/2012 NOTH LMESSICK Amended Notice of Hearing Darren B. Simpson 
8/7/2012 DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Darren B. Simpson 
on 08/07/2012 11:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Dan Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing 
estimated : TELEPHONIC 50 pages 
8/8/2012 MEDI LMESSICK Order Referring Case to Mediation Darren B. Simpson 
MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry: Telephonic Status and Scheduling Darren B. Simpson 
Conference 
ORPT LMESSICK Court Trial Scheduling Order Darren B. Simpson 
8/14/2012 HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Darren B. Simpson 
02/06/2013 01 :30 PM) 
HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Tria l 03/05/2013 09:00 AM) Darren B. Simpson 
10/25/2012 HRSC LM ESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/12/2012 01 :30 Darren B. Simpson 
PM) Summary Judgment 
11/8/2012 DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Witness Disclosures Darren B. Simpson 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 























































Notice Of Service - Defendant' Michael Storms' Darren B. Simpson 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to 
Plaintiff 
Notice Of Service - Defendant Brownstone Darren B. Simpson 
Compan ies lnc.'s Interrogatories to Plaintiff 
Notice Of Service {Plaintiff's 1st Set of Darren B. Simpson 
Interrogatories to Defendants Brownstone 
Companies, Inc. and Michael Storms and 
Plaintiff's 1st Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents to Defendants Brownstone 
Companies, Inc. and Michael Storms} 
Hearing result for Motion schedu led on Darren B. Simpson 
12/12/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Notice of Compliance RE: Witness Darren B. Simpson 
List 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Darren B. Simpson 
Plaintiff's Affidavit of Dane Watkins Darren B. Simpson 
Plaintiff's Brief Filed in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Darren B. Simpson 
Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing 1-9-13@ 1:30 p.m . Darren B. Simpson 
{Motion for Partial Summary Judgment} 
Plaintiff- Motion To Compel And To Stay Motion Darren B. Simpson 
For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Compel And To Darren B. Simpson 
Stay Summary Judgment Proceedings 
Notice Of Hearing 01 /30/2013 @1 :30 PM RE: Darren B. Simpson 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Service - Responses To Defendant Darren B. Simpson 
Michael Storms's Interrogatories And Requests 
For Production To Plaintiff and Responses To 
Defendant Brownstone Companies, Inc's 
Interrogatories To Plaintiff 
Defendant's Motion For Order Shortening Time Darren B. Simpson 
For Hearing 
Defendant's Motion For Partial Summary Darren B. Simpson 
Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing - 01/30/2013 @ 1 :30PM RE: Darren B. Simpson 
Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Notice Of Service {Defendant Michael Storms Darren B. Simpson 
and Brownstone Companies, Inc. Answers to 
Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production of Documents} 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Darren B. Simpson 
Plaintiff's Brief Filed in Opposition to Defendatns' Darren B. Simpson 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 









































Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 1-30-13 @ 1 :30 
p.m. {Motion to Compel} 
Motion For Order Shortening Time For 
Responding To Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Order Darren B. Simpson 
Shorten ing Time To Respond 
Defendant's Motion to Compel and to Stay Motion Darren B. Simpson 
for Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Darren B. Simpson 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Darren B. Simpson 
Compel and to Stay Summary Judgment 
Proceedings 
Defendant's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Darren B. Simpson 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Notice Of Hearing 1-30-13 @ 1 :30 Darren B. Simpson 
p.m. {Defendants' Motion to Compel and to 
Stay Motion for Summary Judgment} 
Notice Of Service - Supplemental Responses To Darren B. Simpson 
Defendant Michael Storm's Interrogatories And 
Requests For Production To Plaintiff 
Minute Entry: Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/30/2013 
Time: 1 :34 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
Notice Of Service - Defendant's Supplemental Darren B. Simpson 
Answers To Discovery 
Plaintiff - Motion To Amend Complaint Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing resu lt for Pretrial Conference scheduled Darren B. Simpson 
on 02/06/2013 01 :30 PM : Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 03/05/2013 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/19/2013 10:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) Summary Judgment 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 













































Amended Affidavit In Opposition To Plaintiffs Darren B. Simpson 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Amend Darren B. Simpson 
Complaint 2-19-13 @ 10:00 AM 
Notice Of Service {Plaintiffs 2nd Darren B. Simpson 
Suppolemental Responses to Defendant Michael 
Storm's Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production to Plaintiff} 
Plaintiffs Reply Brief Filed in Support of Motion Darren B. Simpson 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Affidavit of Dane Watkins Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Darren B. Simpson 
02/19/2013 10: 00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Daniel Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Summary Judgment 
Motion to Amend Complaint 50 pages 
Minute Entry Darren 8. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 2/19/2013 
Time: 10:15 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 4 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party : Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
Notice Of Service {3rd Supplemental 
Responses to Defendant Michael Storms's 
lnterogatories and Requests for Production to 
Plaintiff} 
Minute Entry: Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
03/13/2013 01 :30 PM) 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Darren B. Simpson 
on 03/13/2013 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Order Staying Decision on Plaintiffs MOtionf or Darren B. Simpson 
Partial Summary Judgment, Plaitniffs Motion to 
Amend Complaint and Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Notice Of Settlement Failure Darren B. Simpson 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Darren B. Simpson 
Summary Judgment and Granting in Part, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User Judge 
6/4/2013 MOTN DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Motion to Withdraw Darren B. Simpson 
NOTH DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 6-19-13@ 1:30 Darren B. Simpson 
p.m. {Motion to Withdraw} 
6/5/2013 NOTH LMESSICK Notice Of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
6/13/2013 MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry: Telephonic Status Conference Darren B. Simpson 
6/19/201 3 NOTC HUMPHREY Plaintiffs Notice Of Withdrawal Of Motion To Darren B. Simpson 
Withdraw 
6/20/2013 MOTN DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint Darren B. Simpson 
NOTH DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing 7-24-13@ 1:30 Darren B. Simpson 
p.m. {Motion to Amend Complaint} 
7/10/2013 MOTN SOLIS Plaintiff - Motion For Sanctions And Motion For Darren B. Simpson 
Attorney's Fees 
NOTH SOLIS Notice Of Hearing 07/24/2013 @1 :30PM Darren B. Simpson 
RE:Motion For Sanctions And Motion For 
Attorney's Fees 
7/24/2013 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/24/2013 01 :30 Darren B. Simpson 
PM) for sanctions/atty fees 
MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 7/24/2013 
Time: 2:02 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Dan Williams 




DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion schedu led on Darren B. Simpson 
07/24/2013 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dan Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 for sanctions/atty fees 
AFFD GWALTERS Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Sanctions and Darren B. Simpson 
for Attorney Fees obo Def. 
8/16/2013 ORDR LMESSICK Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Darren B. Simpson 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
8/21/2013 NOTC CARTER Notice Of Available Trial Dates Darren B. Simpson 
9/6/2013 COMP CEARLY Second Amended Complaint Filed Darren B. Simpson 
9/9/2013 NOTC CEARLY Plaintiff- Notice Of Available Trial Dates Darren B. Simpson 
9/19/2013 HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Darren B. Simpson 
01 /29/2014 01 :30 PM) 
HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/03/2014 09:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) 
NOTC LMESSICK Notice of Hearing: Pretrial Conference Jury Trial Darren B. Simpson 




Time: 11 :32 AM 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 




















































Notice Of Service - Defendant's Third 
Supplemental Answer To Discovery 
Defendant's Notice Of Unavailable Trial Dates 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Amended Notice of Hearing: Pretrial COnference Darren B. Simpson 
Court Trial 
Plaintiffs Notice Of Intent To Take Defau lt Darren B. Simpson 
Defendant's Answer to 2nd Amended Complaint Darren B. Simpson 
and Counterclaim 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/20/2013 01 :30 Darren B. Simpson 
PM) (PL) Motion to Strike 
Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney Of 
Record 
Darren B. Simpson 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For Leave To Darren B. Simpson 
Withdraw As Attorney Of Record 11 -20-13 @ 
1:30 PM 
Defendant's Response to Motion to Strike Darren B. Simpson 
Counterclaim of Defendants 
Reply Brief In Support Of Objection And Motion Darren B. Simpson 
To Strike Counterclaim 
Notice Of Service Defendant's Fourth Darren B. Simpson 
Supplemental Answers To Discovery 
Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 11/20/2013 
Time: 1 :39 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Dan Williams 




Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Darren B. Simpson 
11/20/2013 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Dan Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated : under 50 (PL) Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Darren B. Simpson 
Plaintiffs Brief Filed in Support of Motion for Darren B. Simpson 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing 1-8-14@ 1:30 Darren B. Simpson 
p.m. {Motion for Partial Summary Judgment} 
Notice Of Intent To Take Default Darren 8 . Simpson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/08/2014 01 :30 Darren B. Simpson 
PM) Summary Judgment 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User 
1/8/2014 DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
01/08/2014 01 : 30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dan Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Summary Judgment 50 pages 
MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/8/2014 
Time: 1 :37 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc. , Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J . 
Driscoll 
1/10/2014 DOOLITTL Plaintiff's Reply to Counterclaim 
1/29/2014 NOTC LMESSICK Notice Vacating and Rescheduling Pretrial 
Conference 
2/5/2014 DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled 
on 02/05/2014 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Dan Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing 
estimated: 50 pages 
MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 2/5/2014 
Time: 11 :09 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc. , Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
2/12/2 014 ORDR LMESSICK Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
2/28/2014 NOTC CEARLY Notice Of Filing Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 
MOTN CEARLY Defendant - Motion For Enlargement Of Time To 
File Exhibits 




Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User 
2/28/2014 NOTC QUINTANA 
3/3/2014 NOTC CEARLY 
3/4/2014 MEMO CEARLY 
3/18/2014 TLST LMESSICK 
MINE LMESSICK 
3/19/2014 MINE LMESSICK 
3/20/2014 MINE LMESSICK 
Notice of Compliance Pre-Trial Order 
(Defendant) 
Notice Of Compliance RE: Exh ibits 
Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum 
Judge 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 03/18/2014 Darren B. Simpson 
09:00 AM : Trial Started 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Trial - Day 1 
Hearing date: 3/18/2014 
Time: 9:12 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Trial - Day 2 
Hearing date: 3/19/2014 
Time: 9:04 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Trial - Day 3 
Hearing date: 3/20/2014 
Time: 9:10 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Will iams 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 5 
Party: Brownstone Compan ies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
Darren B. Simpson 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
The Watkins Company vs . Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User 
3/21/2014 MINE LYKE Minute Entry 
Hearing type: 
Hearing date: 3/21/2014 
Time: 8:51 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Lyke 
Tape Number: 
4/1/2014 HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Trial 04/25/2014 09:00 AM) 
HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Trial 05/02/2014 09:00 AM) 
4/1 1/2014 ORDR LMESSICK Order Denying Defendant Michael Storms' and 
Defendant Brownstone Companies, lnc.'s Motion 
to Dismiss 
4/15/201 4 STIP CEARLY Stipulation 
4/21/2014 ORDR LMESSICK Order Approving Stipulation 
4/25/2014 DCHH LM ESSICK Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 04/25/2014 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Dan Williams 
Number of Transcri pt Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 pages 
MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Trial - Day 5 
Hearing date: 4/25/2014 
Time: 9:1 3 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk : Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney : B.J. 
Driscoll 
4/28/2014 HRSC LMESSICK ; Hearing Scheduled (Trial 05/15/2014 09:00 AM) 
5/6/2014 MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Trial - Day 6 
Hearing date: 5/6/2014 
Time: 9:07 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
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Date: 12/17/2015 
Time: 11 :32 AM 
Page 12 of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
The Watkins Company vs . Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User 
5/6/2014 DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 05/06/2014 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Daniel Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 200 pages 
5/30/2014 LMESSICK Notice of Hearing 
6/10/2014 MOTN CEARLY Plaintiff - Motion To Continue Trial Date 
6/1 8/2014 NOTC BIRCH Defendants' Notice Of Available Trial Dates 
6/19/2014 ORDR LMESSICK Order Vacating and Resetting Trial Date 
7/29/2014 MINE PADILLA Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Trial-Day 7 
Hearing date: 7/29/2014 
Time: 7:47 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Maria Padilla 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 07/29/2014 
09:00 AM : District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Number of Transcript Pages for 
this hearing estimated: 
9/11/2014 MOTN CEARLY Defendants - Motion For Extension Of Time to 
File Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions 
Of Law 
ORDR LMESSICK Order Extending Time to File Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ORDR LMESSICK Order Extending Time for Plaintiff to File Closing 
Argument and Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
9/19/2014 BIRCH Plaintiff's Proposed Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law 
BIRCH Plaintiffs Closing Argument 
BIRCH Defendants Storms And Brownstone Companies, 
Inc., Proposed Findings Of Fact. Conclusions Of 
Law And Argument 
11/20/2014 LMESSICK Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
JDMT LMESSICK Judgment 
11/21/2014 CDIS LMESSICK Civil Disposition entered for: Brownstone 
Companies, Inc., Defendant; Burggraf, Kathy, 
Defendant; Storms, Michael Scott, Defendant; 
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Date: 12/17/2015 
Time: 11 :32 AM 
Page 13 of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User Judge 
11/21/2014 STATUS LMESSICK Case Status Changed: Closed Darren B. Simpson 
12/3/2014 HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 01 /07/2015 10:00 Darren B. Simpson 
AM) Objection to Memorandum of Costs 
STATUS LMESSICK Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Darren B. Simpson 
action 
MOTN BIRCH Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs Darren B. Simpson 
MEMO BIRCH Memorandum Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Darren B. Simpson 
AFFD BIRCH Affidavit In Support Of Memorandum Of Darren B. Simpson 
Attorney's Fees And Costs 
NOTH BIRCH Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing - January 7, 2015 W Darren B. Simpson 
10AM 
MOTN HUMPHREY Plaintiffs Motion To Alter Or Amend The Darren B. Simpson 
Judgment 
BRIF HUMPHREY Brief Filed In Support Of Motion To Alter Or Darren B. Simpson 
Amend The Judgment 
CARTER ***PLACE ALL FILINGS IN FILE 4*** Darren B. Simpson 
12/17/2014 MOTN BIRCH Plaintiffs Motion To Disallow Costs And Darren B. Simpson 
Attorney's Fees 
NOTH BIRCH Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing - January 7, 2015@ Darren B. Simpson 
10AM 
12/23/2014 BRIF BIRCH Plaintiffs Brief In Support Of Motion To Disallow Darren B. Simpson 
Costs And Attorney's Fees 
12/30/2014 NOTH CARTER Amended Notice Of Hearing - RE: Motion To Alter Darren B. Simpson 
Or Amend The Judgment 02/1 1/2015 
1:30PM 
2/11/2015 DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Darren B. Simpson 
02/11/2015 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Daniel Williams 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Objection to Memorandum of Costs 
50 pages 
MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Hearing 
Hearing date: 2/11/2015 
Time: 1 :40 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
4/9/2015 ORDR LMESSICK Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Darren B. Simpson 
Judgment 
6/1/2015 BIRCH Mutual Satisfaction Of Judgments Darren B. Simpson 
8/6/2015 MOTN BIRCH Defendants' Motion For Substitution Of Party Darren B. Simpson 
NOTH BIRCH Defendants' Notice Of Hearing - August 26, 2015 Darren B. Simpson 
@ 1:30 PM 
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Page 14 of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User Judge 
8/7/2015 HRSC CARTER Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/26/2015 01 :30 Darren B. Simpson 
PM) Def. Motion for Substitution 
8/19/2015 BRIF BIRCH Plaintiffs Brief In Opposition To Motion For Darren B. Simpson 
Substitution Of Party 
8/26/2015 MINE CARTER Minute Entry Darren B. Simpson 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 8/26/2015 
Time: 1 :33 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Daniel Williams 
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter 
Tape Number: 
Party: Brownstone Companies, Inc., Attorney: 
Dean Brandstetter 
Party: Michael Storms, Attorney: Dean 
Brandstetter 
Party: The Watkins Company, Attorney: B.J. 
Driscoll 
8/27/2015 DCHH CARTER Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Darren B. Simpson 
08/26/2015 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Def. Motion for Substitution 
9/15/2015 ORDR CARTER Order Substituting The Estate of Michael Storms Darren B. Simpson 
and Granting Attorney Fees and Costs 
JDMT CARTER First Amended Judgment Darren B. Simpson 
STATUS CARTER Case Status Changed: Closed Darren B. Simpson 
9/22/2015 BASINGER Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Darren B. Simpson 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Cox Ohman Brandstetter Receipt number: 
0040859 Dated: 9/22/2015 Amount: $1 .50 
{Check) 
BASINGER Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Darren B. Simpson 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Cox Ohman Brandstetter Receipt number: 
0040859 Dated: 9/22/2015 Amount: $1 .00 
(Check) 
9/29/2015 APSC HUMPHREY Appealed To The Supreme Court Darren B. Simpson 
HUMPHREY Fil ing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Darren B. Simpson 
Supreme Court Paid by: Smith, Driscoll & 
Associates Receipt number: 0041772 Dated: 
9/29/2015 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: The 
Watkins Company (plaintiff) 
NOTC HUMPHREY Plaintiffs Notice Of Appeal Darren B. Simpson 
10/14/2015 BNDC PADILLA Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 43969 Dated Darren B. Simpson 
10/14/2015 for 200.00) 




Time: 11 :32 AM 
Page 15 of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0005958-0C Current Judge: Darren B. Simpson 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, etal. 
The Watkins Company vs. Michael Scott Storms, Kathy Burggraf, Brownstone Companies, Inc. 
Date Code User 
10/14/2015 CERTAP PADILLA Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
APSC PADILLA Appealed To The Supreme Court 
11/25/2015 MOTN JNICHOLS Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellant's Motion For 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THEW ATKINS COMP ANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, 
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; collectively doing 
business as BROWNSTONE 
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants. 




COMES NOW the plaintiff, THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC ("Plaintiff'), and 
as and for a cause of action against the defendants, states, alleges, and avers as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND BACKGROUND 
1. Plaintiff is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
COMPLAINT - Page 1 
f ;\CLIENTS\BJD\8315 - Watkins v. Storms.lI\Pleadings\001 Complaint.doc 
18
2. The defendant, Michael St01ms ("Stonns"), is and at all times relevant 
hereto was an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
3. The defendant, Kathy Burggraf (hereafter, "Burggraf'), was at all times 
relevant hereto an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
4. The defendant, Brownstone Companies, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with its 
principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
5. On or about May 30, 1997, St01ms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies, 
Inc. filed a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to 
conduct business under the name, "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." As of the 
filing of this complaint, the certificate has never been amended or revoked. 
6. Unless otherwise indicated, Storn1s, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies, 
Inc. are collectively refened to herein as "Defendants." 
7. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were the partners, agents, 
employees, and servants of each other and at all times mentioned herein acted within the 
business, course, and scope of their partnership, agency, employment, service, and 
master-servant relationship. 
8. Venue is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 5-401 , or in the alternative, Section 5-404. 
9. On July 31 , 1996, Storms and Burggraf executed a "Commercial Lease 
and Deposit Receipt" ("Original Lease") with Watkins for the lease of real prope1iy 
located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho ("Premises") . 
10. In November 2008, Watkins filed Bonneville County Case No. 08-7258 
against Storms and Burggraf for breach of the Original Lease, and other claims. 
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11. On April 21, 2010, following trial by the court, Watkins received a money 
judgment against Storms and Burggraf for past rent, and a judgment terminating the 
Original Lease and authorizing Watkins to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises. 
12. Following entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, the Defendants retained 
possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month basis. 
13. On August 15 and 16, 2010, Watkins served Defendants with a letter and a 
copy of the Original Lease (the letter and Original Lease hereafter referred to as 
"Notice") notifying Defendants of the changes to the terms of the patiies' month-to-
month lease that would take effect at the end of the month of August 2010. 
14. The Notice incorporated the terms of the Original Lease, plus explained 
that (1) Defendants would thereafter be responsible for all roof repairs, (2) the rent would 
be due the first day of the month, (3) Defendants would pay the annual food and drink 
credit of $3,000 on November 1st each year and the credits would be good for 12 months, 
(4) Defendants would have no right to use Space #16 or the upstairs storage or the 
sidewalk area, and (5) the lease would expire on October 31, 2027, which was the 
expiration date of the Original Lease. 
15 . Defendants continued in possession of the Premises on and after 
September 1, 2010. 
16. By providing written notice to Defendants of the change in lease terms set 
forth in the Notice at least 15 days before the expiration of the month, and by Defendants 
continuing to hold the Premises after September 1, 2010, the Notice and continued 
possession operated and effectually created ai1d established as a part of the lease, the 
terms, rent and conditions specified in the Notice ("New Lease"). 
COMPLAINT - Page 3 
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1 7. Plaintiff has satisfied all the conditions, covenants, and promises required 
on its part under the New Lease as outlined herein. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of Contract) 
18. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if 
set forth in ful l. 
19. Under the terms of the New Lease set forth in the Notice, rent is due the first 
day of each month. 
20. Paragraph 2 of the New Lease provides, "In the event rent is not paid within 
2 days after the due date, Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1 % per 
month on the delinquent amount." 
21. The rent for September 2010 came due on September 1, 2010. 
22. On September 16, 2010, Defendants delivered the rent payment for 
September 2010 to Watkins. 
23. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to timely deliver the 
September 2010 rent payment to Watkins. 
24. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the late fee 
required by the New Lease. 
25 . Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the interest on 
their delinquent payment as required by the New Lease. 
26. Paragraph 16 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part, "Lessee shall 
not vacate or abandon the premises at any time during the term hereof ... " 
27 . By letter dated September 15 , 20 10, Brownstone Companies, Inc. gave 
notice of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010. 
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28. Defendants have breached the New Lease by notifying Watkins of the 
intention to vacate the Premises prior to the expiration of the te1m of the New Lease. 
29. Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term 
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee 
may, upon termination hereof remove all his trade fixtures, but shall 
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises 
occasioned by removal. 
30. Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any 
other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises. 
31. Paragraph 22 of the New Lease provides among other things that upon 
Defendants ' breach of the New Lease, Watkins is entitled to recover the amount of all 
future rent due under the New Lease through the end of the lease term subject to the 
amount of the lost future rents that the Defendants prove could be reasonably avoided. 
32. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease 
as herein alleged, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $976,975.85, or such other 
amount as may be proven at trial. 
COUNT TWO 
(Injunctive Relief) 
3 3. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if 
set forth in full. 
34. Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term 
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee 
may, upon termination hereof remove all his trade fixtures, but shall 
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises 
occasioned by removal. 
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35. Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any 
other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises. 
36. · Watkins seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and 
permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from removing any item from the 
Premises if the removal of that item would cause injury to the Premises. 
COUNT THREE 
(Accounting) 
37. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if 
set fo1ih in frill. 
38. Addendum "A" to the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows : 
Lessor will be entitled to 5% of the gross sales of the entire operation 
(on premises) for the previous month or the base rent indicated above, 
whichever is greater. By the 1 O'h of each month, Lessee will provide Lessor 
the monthly sales figures for the previous month - if a percentage rent is 
due, Lessee will pay the Lessor the difference owed by the J S'h of that month. 
This addendum will act as a power of attorney for Lessor to check sales 
figures with Idaho State Sales Tax Commission in Idaho Falls. In no event 
will the monthly rent be less than the base rent. 
39. Defendants have breached th New Lease by failing to provide Watkins with 
" the monthly sales figures" showing the "gross sales of the entire operation ( on premises)" 
covered by the New Lease in order for Watkins to detennine the alternative rent owed under 
the tem1s of the New Lease. 
40. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants ' breach of the New Lease 
as herein alleged, Watkins seeks an order requiring Defendants to specifically perform 
their duty under Addendum ' A" to the New Lease by providing Watkins with the gross 
monthly sales figures of the entire restamant and microbrewery operation on the premises 
from September 1, 2010 to the present, and for an accounting of the same. 
COMPLAINT - Page 6 




41. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if 
set fo1th in fi.tll. 
42. As a result of Defendants breaches of the New Lease outlined herein, 
Watkins seeks an order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the Premises. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Attorney's Fees) 
43. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Complaint as if 
set forth in full. 
44. Watkins has been required to seek the legal services of the firm of Smith, 
Driscoll & Associates, PLLC to prosecute this action and has incurred attorney's fees and 
costs because of Defendants ' wrongful conduct as alleged herein, entitling Watkins to 
recover an award ofreasonable attorney ' s fees and costs as herein alleged pursuant to the 
New Lease, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121 , and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in th amount of 
$976,975.85, or such other amount as may be proven at trial; 
2. For injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from removing any items 
of tangible personal property from the Premises if removal would cause injury to the 
Prerruses 
3. For a judgment and order requiring Defendants to specifically perform 
their duties under the New Lease to provid Watkins with the gross monthly sales figures 
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. . . .. 
( 
of the entire operation on the Premises from September 1, 2010 to the present and for an 
accounting of the same; 
4. For a judgment and order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the 
Premises and delivering possession of the Premises to Watkins; 
5. For judgment awarding Watkins prejudgment interest; 
6. For judgment awarding Watkins its reasonable attorney' s fees incurred 
herein as provided by the New Lease, Idaho Code Section 12-120 and 12-121 , and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500.00) if this matter is uncontested, and otherwise in such amounts as the court may 
determine; 
7. For judgment awarding Watkins its costs of suit incurred herein as 
provided by the Lease and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and 
8. For such other and further relief as appears just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this # day of September, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC 
By ~~ : J. Driscoll 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" STREET 
P.O. BOX 51600 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600 
(208) 522-8606 
Fax: (208) 522-8618 
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
B ' . cou; TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho Case No. CV-10-5958 
Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, ANSWER 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KA THY 
BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing 
business as BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT 
AND BREWHOUSE, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael Storms and Brownstone Companies, Inc., by and 
through their attorney, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq., and answers the Complaint of the Plaintiff by 
denying each and every allegation contained in said Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, haying fully answered the Complaint of the Plaintiff, Defendants pray 
that the same be dismissed, that the Plaintiff take nothing by way thereof, and that Defendants 
recover their attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the within matter. 
ANSWER-1 
S:IOEAN\Clients\Storms. Michael\Second Cause\Answer.wpd 
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DATED this __l_ day of December, 2010. 
~h .. .: 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the_\_ day of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct 
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting as set forth below. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
Smith, Driscoll and Associates 
414 Shoup 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Fax: 529-4166 
ANSWER-2 
S:\DEAN\Clicnts\S1onns Mich3el\Second Causc\Answer wpd 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
[ ~ By facsimile transmission 
[ ] By Cotuthouse Box 
~g -DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
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SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Fa lls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY 
BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND 
BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-5958 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC ("Watkins"), and as and 
for a cause of action against the defendants, states, alleges, and avers as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND BACKGROUND 
1. Watkins is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
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2. The defendant, Michael Storms ("Storms"), is and at all times relevant 
hereto was an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
3. The defendant, Kathy Burggraf (hereafter, "Burggraf"), was at all times 
relevant hereto an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
4. The defendant, Brownstone Companies, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with 
its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
5. On or about May 30, 1997, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies, 
Inc. filed a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to 
conduct business under the name, "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." As of the 
filing ofthis amended complaint, the certificate is current. 
6. Unless otherwise indicated, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies, 
Inc. are collectively referred to herein as "Defendants." 
7. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were the partners, agents, 
employees, and servants of each other and at all times mentioned herein acted within 
the business, course, and scope of their partnership, agency, employment, service, and 
master-servant relationship. 
8. Venue is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 5-401, or in the alternative, Section 5-404. 
9. Watkins may seek several forms of relief in the alternative or of different 
types. 
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10. On July 31, 1996, Storms and Burggraf executed a "Commercial Lease and 
Deposit Receipt" ("Original Lease") with Watkins for the lease of real property located at 
455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho ("Premises"). 
11. In November 2008, Watkins filed Bonneville County Case No. 08-7258 
against Storms and Burggraf for breach of the Original Lease, and other claims. 
12. On April 21, 2010, following trial by the court and a decision holding 
Storms and Burggraf had breached the Original Lease, Watkins received a judgment 
against them for money damages for past rent, terminating the Original Lease, and 
authorizing Watkins to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises . 
13. Following entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, the Defendants retained 
possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month basis. 
14. On August 15 and 16, 2010, Watkins served Defendants with a letter and 
a copy of the Original Lease (the letter and Original Lease hereafter referred to as 
"Notice") notifying Defendants of the changes to the terms of the parties' month-to-
month lease that would take effect at the end of the month of August 2010. 
15. The Notice incorporated the terms of the Original Lease, plus explained 
that (1) Defendants would thereafter be responsible for all roof repairs, (2) the rent 
would be due the first day of the month, (3) Defendants would pay the annual food and 
drink credit of $3,000 on November 1st each year and the credits would be good for 12 
months, (4) Defendants would have no right to use Space #16 or the upstairs storage or 
the sidewalk area, and (5) the lease would expire on October 31, 2027, which was the 
expiration date of the Original Lease . 
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16. Defendants continued in possession ofthe Premlses on and after 
September 1, 2010. 
17. By provlding written notice to Defendants of the change in lease terms 
set forth in the Notice at least 15 days before the expiration of the month, and by 
Defendants continuing to hold the Premises after September 1, 2010, the Notice and 
continued possession operated and effectually created and established as a part of the 
lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified ln the Notice {"New Lease"). 
18. Watkins has satisfied all the conditions, covenants, and promises 
required on its part under the Original Lease and the New Lease as outlined herein. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of Contract) 
19. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
20. Under the terms of the New Lease set forth in the Notice, rent is due the 
first day of each month. 
21. Paragraph 2 ofthe New Lease provides, "In the event rent is not paid within 
2 days after the due date, Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1% 
per month on the delinquent amount." 
22. The rent for September 2010 came due on September 1, 2010. 
23. On September 16, 2010, Defendants delivered the rent payment for 
September 2010 to Watkins. 
24. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to timely deliver the 
September 2010 rent payment to Watkins. 
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25. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the late fee 
required by the New Lease. 
26. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the interest on 
their delinquent payment as required by the New Lease. 
27. Paragraph 16 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part, "Lessee shall 
not vacate or abandon the premises at any time during the term hereof .. . " 
28. By letter dated September 15, 2010, Brownstone Companies, Inc. gave 
notice of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010. 
29. Defendants have breached the New Lease by notifying Watkins of the 
intention to vacate the Premises prior to the expiration of the term of the New Lease. 
30. Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as fol lows : 
Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term 
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee 
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall 
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises 
occasioned by removal. 
31. Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any 
other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises. 
32. Paragraph 22 of the New Lease provides among other things that upon 
Defendants' breach of the New Lease, Watkins is entitled to recover the amount of all 
future rent due under the New Lease through the end of the lease term subject to the 
amount of the lost future rents that the Defendants prove could be reasonably avoided . 
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33. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease 
as herein alleged, Watkins has been damaged in the amount of $976,975.85, or such 
other amount as may be proven at trial. 
COUNT TWO 
(Injunctive Relief) 
34. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
35. Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term 
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee 
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall 
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises 
occasioned by removal. 
36. Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any 
other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises. 
37. Watkins seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and 
permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from removing any item from the 
Premises if the removal of that item would cause injury to the Premises. 
COUNT THREE 
(Accounting) 
38. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
39. Addendum "A" to the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Lessor will be entitled to 5% of the gross sales of the entire operation 
(on premises) for the previous month or the base rent indicated above, 
whichever is greater. By the 10th of each month, Lessee will provide Lessor 
the monthly sales figures for the previous month - if a percentage rent is 
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due, Lessee will pay the Lessor the difference owed by the 15th of that 
month. This addendum will act as a power of attorney for Lessor to check 
soles figures with Idaho State Sales Tax Commission in Idaho Falls. In no 
event will the monthly rent be less than the base rent. 
40. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to provide Watkins 
with "the monthly sales figures" showing the "gross sales of the entire operation (on 
premises)" covered by the New Lease in order for Watkins to determine the alternative 
rent owed under the terms of the New Lease. 
41. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease 
as herein alleged, Watkins seeks an order requ iring Defendants to specifically perform 
their duty under Addendum "A" to the New Lease by providing Watkins with the gross 
monthly sales figures of the entire restaurant and microbrewery operation on the 
premises from September 1, 2010 to the present, and for an accounting of the same. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Eviction) 
42. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
43. As a result of Defendants' breaches of the New Lease outlined herein, 
Watkins seeks an order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the Premises. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Attorney's Fees) 
44. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in ful l. 
45. Watkins has been required to seek the legal services of the firm of Smith, 
Driscoll & Associates, PLLC to prosecute this action and has incurred attorney's fees and 
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costs because of Defendants' wrongful conduct as al leged herein, entitling Watkins to 
recover an award of reasonab le attorney's fees and costs as herein alleged pursuant to 
the Original Lease, the New Lease, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54. 
COUNT SIX 
(Breach of Contract/Covenant to Repair) 
46. Plaintiff realleges al l previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in fu ll. 
47 . Under Paragraph 7 and the other terms ofthe Original Lease and the New 
Lease set forth in the Notice, Defendants agreed, "at [their] own expense and at al l times, 
[to] maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate class, electrica l 
wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the 
premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as 
received, normal wear and tear excepted," and agreed that they "shall be responsib le for 
al l repairs requ ired." 
48. Defendants have breached the Original Lease and the New Lease by failing 
to maintain the Premises in good and safe condition and to surrender possession of the 
Premises in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted . 
49. As a direct and proximate resu lt of Defendants' breach as herein alleged, 
Watkins has been damaged in such amount as will be proven at trial. 
II 
II 
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50. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
51. Defendants received the benefit of remaining in possession of the Premises 
for approximately three months, or such other time as may be established at trial, during 
which time they paid no rent. 
52. Defendants appreciated the benefit of remaining in possession of the 
Premises beyond the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises by 
continuing business operations for a time, then ceasing business operations and then 
slowly vacating the Premises at their leisure over the course of several weeks. 
53. Under the circumstances, allowing Defendants to retain these benefits 
without payment to Watkins in an amount to be proven at trial would be inequitable and 
unjust in light ofthe fact that Defendants paid no rent during this time and Watkins was 
unable to rel et the Premises while Defendants retained possession of the Premises for 
several weeks after the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$976,975.85, or such other amount as may be proven at trial; 
2. For injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from removing any items 
of tangible personal property from the Premises if removal would cause injury to the 
Premises 
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' . 
3. For a judgment and order requiring Defendants to specifically perform 
their duties under the New Lease to provide Watkins with the gross monthly sales 
figures of the entire operation on the Premises from September 1, 2010 to the present 
and for an accounting of the same; 
4. For a judgment and order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from 
the Premises and delivering possession of the Premises to Watkins; 
5. For judgment against Defendants for damages caused by Defendants' 
breach of contract and the covenant to repair and maintain the premises; 
6. For judgment against Defendants for the amount by which they have 
been unjustly enriched by possession of the Premises without payment to Watkins; 
7. For judgment awarding Watkins prejudgment interest; 
8. For judgment awarding Watkins its reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
herein as provided by the New Lease, Idaho Code Section 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500.00) if this matter is uncontested, and otherwise in such amounts as the court 
may determine; 
9. For judgment awarding Watkins its costs of suit incurred herein as 
provided by the Lease and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and 
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DATED this ___k_ day of December, 2011. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC 
" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this D ay of December, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT t o be served, by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. [~ S. Mail 
COX, O_HMAN & [ ] Fax 
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD [ ] Overnight Delivery 
P.O. Box 51600 [ ] Hand Delivery 
510 " D" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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( 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & AsSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1 SEP -6 PM i. . 02 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY 
BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND 
BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-5958 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC ("Watkins"), and as and 
for a cause of action against the defendants, states, alleges, and avers as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND BACKGROUND 
1. Watkins is an Idaho limited liabi lity company with its principal place of 
business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT- Page 1 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\8315 - Watkins v. Storms.ll\Pleadings\051 Second Amended Complaint.doc 
39
2. The defendant, Michael Storms ("Storms"), is and at all times relevant 
hereto was an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
3. The defendant, Kathy Burggraf (hereafter, "Burggraf"), was at all times 
relevant hereto an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
4. The defendant, Brownstone Companies, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with 
its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
5. On or about May 30, 1997, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies, 
Inc. filed a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to 
conduct business under the name, "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse." As ofthe 
filing of this second amended complaint, the certificate is current. 
6. Unless otherwise indicated, Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone Companies, 
Inc. are collectively referred to herein as "Defendants." 
7. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants were the partners, agents, 
employees, and servants of each other and at all times mentioned herein acted within 
the business, course, and scope of their partnership, agency, employment, service, and 
master-servant relationship. 
8. Venue is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 5-401, or in the alternative, Section 5-404. 
9. Watkins may seek several forms of relief in the alternative or of different 
types. 
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10. On July 31, 1996, Storms and Burggraf executed a "Commercial Lease and 
Deposit Receipt" ("Original Lease") with Watkins for the lease of real property located at 
455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho ("Premises"). 
11. In November 2008, Watkins filed Bonneville County Case No. 08-7258 
against Storms and Burggraf for breach of the Original Lease, and other claims. 
12. On April 21, 2010, following trial by the court and a decision holding 
Storms and Burggraf had breached the Original Lease, Watkins received a judgment 
against them for money damages for past rent, terminating the Original Lease, and 
authorizing Watkins to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises. 
13. Fol lowing entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, the Defendants retained 
possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month basis. 
14. On August 15 and 16, 2010, Watkins served Defendants with a letter and 
a copy of the Original Lease (the letter and Original Lease hereafter referred to as 
"Notice") notifying Defendants of the changes to the terms of the parties' month-to-
month lease that would take effect at the end of the month of August 2010. 
15. The Notice incorporated the terms of the Original Lease, plus explained 
that (1) Defendants would thereafter be responsible for all roof repairs, (2) the rent 
would be due the first day of the month, (3} Defendants wou ld pay the annual food and 
drink credit of $3,000 on November 1st each year and the credits would be good for 12 
months, (4} Defendants would have no right to use Space #16 or the upstairs storage or 
the sidewalk area, and (5} the lease would expire on October 31, 2027, which was the 
expiration date of the Original Lease. 
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16. Defendants continued in possession of the Premises on and after 
September 1, 2010. 
17. By providing written notice to Defendants of the change in lease terms 
set forth in the Notice at least 15 days before the expiration of the month, and by 
Defendants continuing to hold the Premises after September 1, 2010, the Notice and 
continued possession operated and effectually created and established as a part of the 
lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified in the Notice ("New Lease"). 
18. Watkins has satisfied all the conditions, covenants, and promises 
required on its part under the Original Lease and the New Lease as outlined herein. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of Contract) 
19. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
20. Under the terms of the New Lease set forth in the Notice, rent is due the 
first day of each month. 
21. Paragraph 2 of the New Lease provides, "In the event rent is not paid within 
2 days after the due date, Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1% 
per month on the delinquent amount." 
22. The rent for September 2010 came due on September 1, 2010. 
23. On September 16, 2010, Defendants delivered the rent payment for 
September 2010 to Watkins. 
24. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to timely deliver the 
September 2010 rent payment to Watkins. 
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25. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the late fee 
required by the New Lease. 
26. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay the interest on 
their delinquent payment as required by the New Lease. 
27. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to pay rent for each 
month they remained in possession of the Premises. 
28. Paragraph 16 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part, "Lessee shall 
not vacate or abandon the premises at any time during the term hereof . . . " 
29. By letter dated September 15, 2010, Brownstone Companies, Inc. gave 
notice of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010. 
30. Defendants have breached the New Lease by notifying Watkins of the 
intention to vacate the Premises prior to the expiration of the term of the New Lease. 
31. Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term 
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee 
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall 
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises 
occasioned by removal. 
32. Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any 
other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises. 
33. Paragraph 22 of the New Lease provides among other things that upon 
Defendants' breach of the New Lease, Watkins is entitled to recover the amount of all 
future rent due under the New Lease through the end of the lease term subject to the 
amount of the lost future rents that the Defendants prove could be reasonably avoided . 
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34. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease 
as herein alleged, Watkins has been damaged in the amount of $976,975.85, or such 
other amount as may be proven at trial. 
COUNT TWO 
(Injunctive Relief) 
35. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
36. Paragraph 18 of the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Any and all improvements made to the premises during the term 
hereof shall belong to Lessor, except trade fixtures of the Lessee. Lessee 
may, upon termination hereof, remove all his trade fixtures, but shall 
repair or pay for all repairs necessary for damages to the premises 
occasioned by removal. 
37. Idaho Code Section 55-308 prevents the Defendants from removing any 
other fixtures if such removal would cause injury to the Premises. 
38. Watkins seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and 
permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from removi ng any item from the 
Premises if the removal of that item would cause injury to the Premises. 
COUNT THREE 
(Accounting) 
39. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
40. Addendum "A" to the New Lease provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Lessor will be entitled to 5% of the gross sales of the entire operation 
(on premises) for the previous month or the base rent indicated above, 
whichever is greater. By the 10th of each month, Lessee will provide Lessor 
the monthly sales figures for the previous month - if a percentage rent is 
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due, Lessee will pay the Lessor the difference owed by the 15th of that 
month. This addendum will act as a power of attorney for Lessor to check 
sales figures with Idaho State Sales Tax Commission in Idaho Falls. In no 
event will the monthly rent be less than the base rent. 
41. Defendants have breached the New Lease by failing to provide Watkins 
with "the monthly sales figures" showing the "gross sales of the entire operation (on 
premises)" covered by the New Lease in order for Watkins to determine the alternative 
rent owed under the terms of the New Lease. 
42. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the New Lease 
as herein alleged, Watkins seeks an order requiring Defendants to specifically perform 
their duty under Addendum "A" to the New Lease by providing Watkins with the gross 
monthly sales figures of the entire restaurant and microbrewery operation on the 
premises from September 1, 2010 to the present, and for an accounting of the same. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Eviction) 
43. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
44. As a result of Defendants' breaches of the New Lease outlined herein, 
Watkins seeks an order authorizing eviction of the Defendants from the Premises. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Attorney's Fees) 
45. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
46. Watkins has been required to seek the legal services of the firm of Smith, 
Driscoll & Associates, PLLC to prosecute this action and has incurred attorney's fees and 
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costs because of Defendants' wrongful conduct as alleged herein, entitling Watkins to 
recover an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs as herein alleged pursuant to 
the Original Lease, the New Lease, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho Ru le of 
Civil Procedure 54. 
COUNT SIX 
(Breach of Contract/Covenant to Repair) 
47. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
48. Under Paragraph 7 and the other terms of the Original lease and the New 
Lease set forth in the Notice, Defendants agreed, "at [their] own expense and at all times, 
[to] maintain the premises in good and safe condition, including plate class, electrical 
wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or equipment upon the 
premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as 
received, normal wear and tear excepted," and agreed that they "shall be responsible for 
all repairs required." 
49. Defendants' possession of the Premises imposed on them an implied 
contractua l duty to maintain the Premises in good and safe condition. 
50. Defendants have breached the Original Lease, New Lease, and implied 
contractua l duty by failing to maintain the Premises in good and safe condition and to 
surrender possession of the Premises in as good condition as received, normal wear and 
tear except ed. 
51. As a direct and proximate resu lt of Defendants' breach as herein al leged, 
Watkins has been damaged in such amount as wi ll be proven at trial. 
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52. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations contained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
53. Defendants received the benefit of remaining in possession of the Premises 
for approximately three months, or such other time as may be established at trial, during 
which time they paid no rent. 
54. Defendants appreciated the benefit of remaining in possession of the 
Premises beyond the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises by 
continuing business operations for a time, then ceasing business operations and then 
slowly vacating the Premises at their leisure over the course of several weeks. 
55. Under the circumstances, allowing Defendants to retain these benefits 
without payment to Watkins in an amount to be proven at trial would be inequitable and 
unjust in light of the fact that Defendants paid no rent during this time and Watkins was 
unable to rel et the Premises while Defendants retained possession of the Premises for 
several weeks after the date identified in their notice of intention to vacate the Premises. 
COUNT EIGHT 
(Waste) 
56. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations cont ained in the Second Amended 
Complaint as if set forth in full. 
57 . While Defendants were in possession of the Premises, they were under a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in the use and care of the Premises and to commit no 
unreasonable injury or waste thereon. 
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58. Defendants breached this duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in the 
use of the Premises and by committing unreasonable injury and waste thereon. 
59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach as herein alleged, 
Watkins has been damaged in such amount as will be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$976,975.85, or such other amount as may be proven at trial; 
2. For injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from removing any items 
of ta ngible personal property from the Premises if removal would cause injury to the 
Premises 
3. For a judgment and order requiring Defendants to specifically perform 
their duties under the New Lease to provide Watkins with the gross monthly sales 
figu res of the entire operation on the Premises from September 1, 2010 to the present 
and for an accounting of the same; 
4. For a judgment and order authoriz ing eviction of the Defendants from 
the Premises and delivering possession of the Premises to Watkins; 
5. For judgment against Defendants for damages caused by Defendants' 
breach of contract and the covenant to repair and maintain the premises; 
6. For judgment against Defendants for the amount by which t hey have 
been unjustly enriched by possession of the Premises without payment to Watkins; 
7. For judgment against Defendants for the damages arising from the 
unreasonable inju ry to and waste committed on the Premises. 
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8. For judgment awarding Watkins prejudgment interest; 
9. For judgment awarding Watkins its reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
herein as provided by the New Lease, Idaho Code Section 12-120 and 12-121, and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 in the amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) if this 
matter is uncontested, and otherwise in such amounts as the court may determine; 
10. For judgment awarding Watkins its costs of suit incurred herein as 
provided by the Lease and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and 
11. For such other and further relief as appears just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this ___{o__ day of September, 2013. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC 
\ 
By ~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of September, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD 
P.O. Box 51600 
510 "D" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
District Judge 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 N. Maple, #310 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] _?,ernight Delivery 
[v(Hand Delivery 
[/JU. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ } Hand Delivery 
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CJS ~IC COUiH 
M :,GIS l ~ :, f [ n, '15101~ 
P '.~k ~L V ILL l C:'."'d Y. 1"1 ,\ HJ 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETIER, ESQ. 
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETIER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" STREET 
P.O. BOX 51600 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600 
(208) 522-8606 
Fax: (208) 522-8618 
Idaho State Bar No. 2960 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS BROWNSTONE 
COMPANIES, INC., AND MICHAEL STORMS 
13 OCT 23 PM t.: 34 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMP ANY, LLC, an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, 
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing 
business as BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT 
AND BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-5958 
ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael Storms (hereinafter referred to as "Storms") and 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. , (hereinafter referred to as "Brownstone") by and through their 
attorney, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. , and answers the Second Amended Complaint of the 
Plaintiff as follows. 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Pursuant to the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches and estoppel, Plaintiff is precluded 
from asserting claims contrary to those which are waived, and timely made and/or contradictory 
to earlier positions. Further that Plain tiff has unclean hands and is therefor not entitled to the 
relief requested in the Complaint. Plaintiff is guilty of inequitable conduct and comes to the 
Court with unclean hands. As such, Plaintiff should be equitably estopped from recovering on 
any equitable theory including estoppel, detrimental reliance, and/or unjust enrichment. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
As a separate further answer and defense, Defendants Storms and Brownstone allege 
(without waiving any liability and specifically denying liability) that Plaintiff has failed to 
reasonably mitigate damages and that Plaintiff may not recover for damages that could have been 
reasonably avoided. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
As a separate further answer and defense, Defendants Stonns and Brownstone allege that 
the "New Lease" alleged in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is barred by reason of the 
Statute of Frauds, particularly Idaho Code§ 9-505(1) and/or Idaho Code § 9-505(4). 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to provide an effective and proper notice of changes to the claimed 
tenancy of Brownstone and/or Storms as required by Idaho Code § 55-307. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
No tease from month to month existed between Plaintiff and Brownstone and/or Storms 
and as such Idaho Code § 55-307 does not apply to effectuate changes in the relationship 
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between Plaintiff and Brownstone and/or Storms. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Without admitting that a "New Lease" was ever created and specifically denying the same 
in the event a "New Lease" was created, Plaintiff breached the "New Lease" by failing to provide 
appropriate parking spaces in compliance with the requirements of the City ofldaho Falls and the 
roof of the premises was in a state of disrepair and leaked. As such, the Plaintiff is guilty of 
breach of contract thereby relieving the Defendants of any responsibility for the alleged "New 
Lease" between Plaintiff and Brownstone and/or St01ms. 
ANSWER 
1. Answering paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, 
Storms and Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein. 
2. Answe1ing paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit each and eve1y allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Stonns and Brownstone allege that Plaintiff had specific and actual knowledge 
that commencing in 2005 Burggraf had no further interest in Brownstone was no longer a 
shareholder officer or agent of Brownstone and was not conducting business under the name of 
Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and 
Brownstone asse1t that Plaintiff at least by April 21 , 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone 
was the exclusive entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that 
neither Storms or Burggraf was doing business under such name. 
3. Answering paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Stonns and 
Brownstone asse1t that such paragraph is not an allegation or averment but is a maru1er of 
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pleading facts and as such is not required to be admitted or denied but to the extent a response is 
required thereto Storms and Brownstone deny each allegation contained therein. 
4 . Answering paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Defendant 
denies each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense and/or 
allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege that Plaintiff had specific and actual knowledge that 
commencing in 2005 Burggraf had no further interest in Brownstone, was no longer a 
shareholder, officer or agent of Brownstone and was not conducting business under the name of 
Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and 
Brownstone asse1t that Plaintiff at least by April 21, 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone 
was the exclusive entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that 
neither Storms or Burggraf was doing business under such name. By way of futther affirmative 
defense and/or allegation Storms was the authorized registered agent of Brownstone, was its 
president, and sole shareholder but after 2005 did not maintain or establish any partnership, 
employment, partnership, agency, service, or master-servant relationship with Brownstone or 
Burggraf which fact was well known to Plaintiff. By way of further affirmative defense and/or 
allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that on or about June 5, 2006, Storms as landlord 
subleased the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho to Brownstone. 
Thereafter, Brownstone was the sole entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and 
Brewhouse. 
5. Answering paragraph 8 of Plaintiff' s Second Amended Complaint, Stonns and 
Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein. 
6. Answering paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
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Brownstone assert that such paragraph is not an allegation or averment but is a manner of 
pleading facts and as such is not required to be admitted or denied but to the extent a response is 
required thereto Stoims and Brownstone deny each allegation contained therein. 
7. Answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege the interest and rights of Sto.rms and Burggraf 
in the Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt lease were forfeited and terminated and Storms 
and Burggraf were evicted from the premise located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho by 
order of the Court entered in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258 on or about March 25, 
2010. 
8. Answering paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, 
Storms and Brownstone admit the allegations contained therein. 
9. Answering paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege the interest and rights of Storms and Burggraf 
in the Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt lease were forfeited and terminated and Storms 
and Burggraf were evicted from the premise located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho by 
order of the Court entered in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258 on or about March 25, 
2010. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that 
Brownstone was the only entity conducting buisness and occupying the premise located at 455 
River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho and Brownstone paid rent to Plaintiff with Plaintiff accepting 
the rent paid by Brownstone for each of the months of April, May, June, July, August and 
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September 2010. By way of additional affirmative defense and allegation Storms and 
Brownstone allege that neither Storms or Burggraf paid rent to Plaintiff. By way of further 
affirmative defense Storms and Brownstone allege that no month to month tenancy or lease was 
created as result of the occupancy of the premise by Brownstone with the apparent and actual 
consent of Plaintiff. At no time did Brownstone or Storms come to any form of implied or actual 
lease or agreement to occupy the premise with Plaintiff nor did the parties come to any 
agreement as to any lease or occupancy terms including but not limited to the amount of any rent. 
10. Answering paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone denies each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the 
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
paragraphs. Storms and Brownstone further allege that any notice served on Burggraf was of no 
effect, force or consequence on Storms and Brownstone. By way of further affirmative defense 
and/or allegation no lease or tenancy from month to month existed between Plaintiff and Storms 
and/or Brownstone and/or Burggraf after March 25, 20 IO and before the service (if made or 
effected) of the Notice alleged in such paragraph such that such Notice was of no force, effect, or 
consequence as to Storms and/or Brownstone. By way of further and alternative affirmative 
defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that proper notice was not given or 
served upon Storms and/or Brownstone. By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation 
Storms and Brownstone allege that Idaho Code § 55-307 does not authorize a Notice to 
effectuate or create a tenancy for a term of years. By way of additional and alternative 
affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege any claim for accelerated 
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rent is baned by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel by vi rtue of the court' s 
findings, conclusions, and judgment entered in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258. 
11. Answering paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny that any new lease was entered into, but admits what the Notice attempted to 
do and what the notice said. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and 
Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or 
allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of additional 
and alternative affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that 
Brownstone was not a named or contemplated party to the "New Lease", that Burggraf was not in 
possession and was not leasing, or occupying the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho 
Falls, Idaho and Storms was never provided proper notice of the contemplated terms of the "New 
Lease" and such is of no force or effect as to Storms and Brownstone. 
12. Answering paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit that Brownstone remained in possession of the Premise on and after 
September 1, 2010 by virtue of the actions of Plaintiff in serving the Defendants with orders 
probhibiting the removal of the property of Storms leased to Brownstone. Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every other allegation contained in said paragraph. By way of 
affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this 
reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to 
the preceding paragraphs. 
13. Answering paragraphs 17 and 18 of Plaintiff' s Second Amended Complaint, 
Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative 
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defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each 
of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
14. Answering paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-18 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
15. Answering paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23 , 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint, Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. 
By way of affi rmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and 
incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any 
of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. 
16. Answering paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit each and every allegation contained therein. 
17. Answering paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Stonns and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the 
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
18. Answering paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and 
Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purpo1ts to 
allege the te1m of the "New Lease' . By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Sto1ms 
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and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses 
and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. 
19. Answering paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege that I.C. § 55-308 is not quoted correctly. 
20. Answering paragraphs 33 and 34 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, 
Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or 
Storms and Brownstone and as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation 
which purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease". By way of affirmative defense and/or 
allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the 
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
21. Answering paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-34 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
22. Answering paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and 
Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purports to 
allege the terms of the "New Lease" . By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms 
and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses 
and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of 
additional affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that Brownstone 
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and/or Stonns vacated the premises on or about December 30, 2010 after issuance of the court's 
Order in this matter on November 24, 20 IO in compliance therewith despite no obligation on the 
part of Storms or Brownstone to comply with paragraph 18 of the non-existent "New Lease". 
23. Answering paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone allege that the Plaintiff has failed to quote the statute 
correctly. 
24. Answering paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Stonns and 
Brownstone admit that Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
but deny each and every other allegation contained in such paragraph and further denies that 
Plaintiff is entitled to such. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and 
Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or 
allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. 
25. Answering paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-38 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
26. Answering paragraphs 40, 41 and 42 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, 
Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or 
Storms and Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which 
purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease". By way of affirmative defense and/or 
allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the 
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
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paragraphs. By way of additional affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone 
allege that all business activities of Brownstone ceased on or about October 1, 20 l O as a direct 
result of Plaintiff's initiation of the within proceedings and no sales were made after that date. 
By way of additional affirmative defense and/or allegation the claimed obligation to pay 
rent for the month of September was genuinely disputed by the parties, Brownstone tendered 
payment for all rent due for the month of September, 2010 on September 15, 2010, such tender in 
full satisfaction was clear and conspicuous and Plaintiff negotiated and accepted such tender, by 
reason of such the parties reached an accord and satisfaction for such month. 
27. Answering paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-42 
of Plaintiff's Complaint as previously stated. 
28. Answering paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the 
Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every 
allegation which purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease". By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone real lege and incorporate by this reference each of the 
affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
paragraphs. By way of additional and alternative affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms 
and/or Brownstone vacated the premises on or about December 30, 2010 and have not thereafter 
claimed a right to possess the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
29. Answering paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
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Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-44 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
30. Answering paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein. Storms and Brownstone deny that 
there was any "New Lease" entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such 
Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purports to allege the terms of the 
"New Lease". By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege 
and incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in 
any of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, 
Storms and Brownstone allege that Storms and Brownstone are entitled to recover their attorney 
fees and costs in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, 12-123 and 
Idaho Rule of Procedure 54. 
31. Answering paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-46 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
32. Answering paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone denies each and every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense 
and/or allegation, Brownstone is not and never was bound by the original lease or the new lease; 
Storms is not bound by the provisions of the alleged "new lease". Plaintiff is collaterally 
estopped and baITed by res judicata as a result of the proceeding in Bonneville County Case No. 
CV-2008-7258. Storms and Brownstone deny that there was any new lease entered between the 
Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such Storms and Brownstone deny each and every 
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allegation which purports to allege the terms of the "New Lease'. By way of affinnative defense 
and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this reference each of the 
affinnative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
33. Answering paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein, further Stonns and Brownstone 
deny that possession by either created any implied contractual duty and/or that if the law implies 
a contractual duty by mere possession that Plaintiff has failed to set fmih the correct duty. By 
way of affirmative defense and/or allegation torms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by 
this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers 
to the preceding paragraphs. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and Brownstone assert 
that Plaintiff at least by April 21, 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone was the exclusive 
entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that neither Storms or 
Burggraf was doing business under such name. By way of further affirmative defense and/or 
allegation Storms was the authorized registered agent of Brownstone, was its pr sident and sole 
shareholder but after 2005 did not maintain or establish any partnership employment, 
paiinership, agency, service, or master-servant relationship with Brownstone or Burggraf which 
fact was well known to Plaintiff. By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms 
and Brownstone allege that on or about June 5 2006, Stonns as landlord subleased the premises 
located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho to Brownstone. Thereafter, Brownstone was 
the sole entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of additional 
affirmative defense, Storms' possession of the property ended as early as June 5 2006 but at 
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least by April 21, 20 10. During all times of Storms' possession, Storms at all time complied 
with any implied contractual duty. By way of additional affirmative defense, Brownstone 
obtained possession of the property as early as June 5, 2006 but at least by April 21, 2010, and 
during all times of Brownstone's possession, Brownstone at all times complied with any implied 
contractual duty . 
34. Answering paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained in such paragraph and further deny that 
there was any new lease entered between the Plaintiff and/or Storms and Brownstone as such 
Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation which purports to allege the terms of the 
"New Lease". By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation Brownstone was never a 
party to the original lease, and is in no way obligated to comply with the terms thereof. By way 
of additional affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reaJlege and 
incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any 
of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. 
35. Answering paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained in such paragraph. By way of additional 
affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this 
reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to 
the preceding paragraphs. 
36. Answering paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-5 1 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
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37. Answering paragraphs 53, 54 and 55, Storms and Brownstone deny each and 
every allegation contained therein. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms 
and/or Brownstone were prohibited from vacating the premises on or before October 15,2010 by 
the Plaintiffs actions in seeking and obtaining Temporary Injunctive relief from October 1, 2010 
until November 24, 2010. When Brownstone was finally able to remove its possessions from the 
premises, weather conditions were such that substantially greater time was necessary to 
effectuate the removal. Brownstone and/or Storms ceased business operations on October 1, 
2010 and if anything Brownstone and/or Storms were denied the use of the equipment, and 
denied the ability to undertake sales and profits from the period October 15, 2010 until January 1, 
2011. By way of affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and 
incorporate by this reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any 
of the answers to the preceding paragraphs. By way of additional affirmative defense and/or 
allegation Storms and Brownstone allege that all business activities of Brownstone ceased on or 
about October 1, 20 10 as a direct result of Plaintiff s initiation of the within proceedings and no 
sales were made after that date. 
38. Answering paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Storms and 
Brownstone admit and deny such allegations by incorporating their response to paragraphs 1-55 
of Plaintiffs Complaint as previously stated. 
39. Answering paragraph 57, 58, and 59 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, 
Storms and Brownstone deny each and every allegation contained therein, and by way of 
affirmative defense and/or allegation, Storms and Brownstone reallege and incorporate by this 
reference each of the affirmative defenses and/or allegations contained in any of the answers to 
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the preceding paragraphs. By way of further affirmative defense Storms and Brownstone assert 
that Plaintiff at least by April 21, 2010 had actual knowledge that Brownstone was the exclusive 
entity doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse and that neither St01ms or 
Burggraf was doing business under such name. By way of further affirmative defense and/or 
allegation Storms was the authorized registered agent of Brownstone, was its president, and sole 
shareholder but after 2005 did not maintain or establish any partnership, employment, agency, 
service, or master-servant relationship with Brownstone or Burggraf which fact was well known 
to Plaintiff. By way of further affirmative defense and/or allegation Storms and Brownstone 
allege that on or about June 5, 2006, Storms as landlord subleased the premises located at 455 
River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho to Brownstone. Thereafter, Brownstone was the sole entity 
doing business as Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse. By way of additional affirmative 
defense, Storms' possession of the property ended as early as June 5, 2006, but at least by April 
21, 2010. During all times of Storms' possession, Storms at all time exercised reasonable care in 
the use and possession of the premises and at the end of his possession the premises had suffered 
no unreasonable injury or waste during his occupancy and in fact Storms substantially improved 
the property. By way of additional affirmative defense, Brownstone obtained possession of the 
property as early as June 5, 2006 but at least by April 2 1, 2010. During all times of 
Brownstone' s possession, Brownstone at all time exercised reasonable care in the use and 
possession of the premises and at the end of its possession the premises had suffered no 
unreasonable injury or waste during its occupancy. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Second Amended Complaint of the Plaintiff, 
Storms and Brownstone pray that the same be dismissed, that the Plaintiff take nothing by way 
ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM - 16 
S:\DEAN\Clients\Storms. Michael\Second Cause\Answer Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim wpd 
66
thereof, and that Storms and Brownstone recover their attorney' s fees and costs incurred in 
defending the within matter and as set forth in the Counterclaim. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael. Storms (hereinafter referred to as "Storms") and 
Brownstone Companies, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Brownstone") by and through their 
attorney, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq., and for a Counterclaim against Plaintiff, The Watkins 
Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as "Watkins") alleges as follows: 
1. On or about April 21, 20 10 the court in Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-7258 
entered judgment te1minating a lease agreement between Storms and Kathy Burgraff, and 
Watkins. 
2. Between April 1, 20 10 and September 30, 2010, Storms and/or Brownstone 
occupied the premises located at 455 River Parkway (hereinafter referred to as the "Premises") in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
3. On September 15, 20 10 Storms and/or Brownstone through counsel, notified 
Watkins of Brownstone's intent to vacate the premises on October 17, 2010. 
4. On September 29, 20 10, Watkins filed suit against Storms and Brownstone 
seeking, in part, a pre-judgment writ of attachment and preliminary injunction. On October 1, 
2010 the comt entered a Order Granting Watkins Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
directed that Watkins post a $10,000 bond for the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order. 
Such order prohibited Storms and Brownstone from removing any property from the Premises. 
5. A bond was fi led with the court on or about October 5, 2010 for the purpose of 
paying all costs and damages which Storms and Brownstone sustained by reason of the issuance 
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of the Temporary Restraining Order. 
6. A hearing was held on Watkins' application for prejudgment writ of attachment 
and preliminary injunction on October 14,20 10 and the court entered a Decision Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Plaintiffs Request 
for a Preliminary Injunction on November 4, 2010. Such decision determined that Watkins had 
failed to show a reasonable probability that it would prevail on the merits of its case pertaining to 
the alleged creation of a new lease and as a result denied the Motion for Prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment. The court did grant a Preliminary Injunction restraining Storms and Brownstone 
from removing from the Premises: 
a. Brewing equipment and all components 
b. Brick structures and divider walls 
c. Staircase and suspended structures 
d. Kettle, fermentation tanks, framing, piping, ventilation components, air 
conditioners, mills, sinks, dishwashers, boilers, ovens, stoves, coolers, freezers, 
signs, lighting, and racks. 
7. Such Preliminary Injunction was amended by order of the court dated November 
24, 2010 to prohibit the removal of a limited number of items to which the parties had stipulated 
and two outdoor poles and directed Watkins to post a bond for the issuance of a Preliminary 
Injunction in the amount of $10,500.00. No such Preliminary Injunction Bond was subsequently 
filed with the court by Watkins. 
8. Brownstone shut down all operations of the restaurant, bar and brewing facil ity on 
October 1, 20 10 in anticipation of vacating the premises pursuant to its notice of September 15, 
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201 0 and Brownstone and Storms were prohibited from removing equipment, property, and trade 
fixtures from October 1, 2010 through November 24, 2010. 
9. Despite Brownstone's intention to vacate the premises on October 17, 2010 and as 
a result of the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order and the other actions of Watkins, 
Brownstone was forced to remain in possession of the premises and continued to pay insurance 
on the premises, and/or its contents for the months of October, November and December 2010 to 
the damage of Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the time of trial. 
10. Despite the intention to vacate the premises on October 17, 2010 and as a result of 
the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order and the other actions of Watkins, Brownstone 
was forced to remain in possession of the premises and continued to pay power and other utilities 
for the premises for the months of October, November and December 2010 to the damage of 
Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the ti me of trial. 
11 . Storms and Brownstone had rented storage facilities to store the equipment, 
property and trade fixtures which were to be moved by October 17, 2010 and had to maintain the 
availability of the same for the months of October, November and December 201 0 to the damage 
of Storms and Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the time of trial. 
12. As a result of the application fo r Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and the 
temporary restraining order the starting date of the move from the premises was delayed from 
October 1, 2010 until November 24, 2010. The delay resulted in significantly greater moving 
expenses than it would have cost if Brownstone and Storms would have been allowed to move 
and vacate in October. Further, it took 19 more days than the anticipated 17 days to vacate the 
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premises to the damage of Storms and Brownstone in an amount to be determined at the time of 
trial. 
13. Stom1s and Brownstone incurred attorney fees and costs in an amount to be 
determined at the time of trial but in the sum of not less than $15 ,000.00 solely in defending the 
application for prejudgment writ of attaclunent and the application for a temporary and 
preliminary injunction pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 8-803 and Rule 65(c) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and is entitled to recover such sum from Watkins or its surety. 
WHEREFORE Defendants pray that judgment be entered against Watkins and in favor of 
Stonns and/or Brownstone on their Counterclaim in an amount to be dete1mined at the time of 
trial together with additional reasonable attorney fees and costs and such other relief as the court 
deems just. 
L-1 
DATED this ~ '$ day of October, 2013 . 
DEA C. BRAND~ . ~ 
Attorney for Defendants Storms and Brownstone 
Defendant and Counterclaimant 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
MICHAEL STORMS being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: That he is one 
of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the above cause; that he has read the foregoing 
Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, knows the contents thereof; and that 
the same is true and correct as he verily believes. 
SUBSCR1BED AND SWORN to before me this "?-3 ..L' of October, 2013. 
~£> 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at:..2~ 6?'? 
My Commission Expires: ...r fe ;/.t.,,/J ~ · 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
,-,4 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 23 day of October, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct 
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting as set forth below. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
Smith, Driscoll and Associates 
414 Shoup 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Fax: 529-4166 
Hon. Darren B. Simpson 
District Judge 
Bingham County Courthouse 
50 1 N Maple #3 10 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
Fax: 785-8057 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
[ L-j By facsimile transmission 
[ ] By Courthouse Box 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
[ L---] By facsi1nile transmission 
[ ] By Courthouse Box 
~--DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -158 #7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P .0. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DIS rR ICl CJUr<J 
MAG1Sl RMF l11V 1S!0N 
flO NH[VIL L~ C,_ :., 1./ I Y. IJ,\H . 
14 JAN IO PH ~: 28 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY 
BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND 
BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-5958 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, The Watkins Company, LLC ("Watkins"), and in reply 
to defendant's Counterclaim, admits, denies, alleges, and avers as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Defendant's Counterclaim fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - Page 1 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Plaintiff denies each and every allegation of said defendant's 
Counterclaim not herein specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
3. In answer to paragraph 1 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
the court in said case entered an Amended Judgment on April 21, 2010, but denies the 
remaining allegations. 
4. In answer to paragraph 2 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
the same. 
5. In answer to paragraph 3 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
the same. 
6. In answer to paragraph 4 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
the same. 
7. In answer to paragraph 5 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
that Watkins filed a bond on October 5, 2010, but denies the remaining allegations of 
paragraph 5. 
8. In answer to paragraph 6 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
t he sam e. 
9. In answer to paragraph 7 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff admits 
the same. 
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10. In answer to paragraph 8 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff is 
without sufficient knowledge of when the defendants ceased their business operations 
and therefore denies the same. Plaintiff denies the balance of said paragraph 8. 
11. In answer to paragraph 9 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies 
the same. 
12. In answer to paragraph 10 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies 
the same. 
13. In answer to paragraph 11 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff is 
without sufficient knowledge of defendants' alleged rental of storage facilities and 
therefore denies the same. 
14. In answer to paragraph 12 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies 
the same. 
15. In answer to paragraph 13 of Defendant's Counterclaim, plaintiff denies 
the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. As a separate and further defense, plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants/Counterclaimants failed to mitigate their damages, and that any and all 
damages, as alleged by the Defendants/Counterclaimants, which are expressly denied, 
resulted from said failure to mitigate damages. 
2. As a separate and further defense, plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims should be reduced or discharged by the doctrine 
of setoff. 
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3. As a separate and further defense, plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
4. As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants/Counterclaimants are estopped from asserting the claims herein, or have 
waived said claims. 
5. As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by !aches. 
6. As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that the Counterclaim 
and each and every separate cause of action contained therein is barred in whole or in 
part by reason of Defendants' /Counterclaimants' unclean hands. 
7. As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by unjust enrichment. 
8. As a separate and further defense, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' claims are barred by force majeure. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
(1) That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed and that he take nothing 
thereby; 
(2) That Plaintiff recover its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
defending defendant's Counterclaim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3); and 
(3) For such other and further relief as to the Court appears just and 
equitable in the premises. 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - Page 4 
F:\CLI ENTS\BJD\ 8315 - Wat kins v. Storms. ll\ Pleadings\062 Reply to Countercla im.doc 
76
.. 
DATED this /tf) day of January, 2014. 
I 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of January, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM to be served, by placing the 
same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or 
hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER, CHTD 
P.O. Box 51600 
510 "D" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
District Judge 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 N. Maple, #310 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
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[ ] )J. S. Mail 
[ v(Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] )J. S. Mail 
[0 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
'\ 
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:D fN CHAMBERS AT BLACKFOOT, 
B:VGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO • 
{Yt!IKP/v L1 J Ji21¥ 
b Cj=~Jq,J1.1:c.,~ 
D · N B. IMPSON 
01STR1CT JUDGE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an 










MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, ) 
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and ) 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing ) 
business as BROWNSTONE ) 





CASE NO. CV-2010-5958 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. STATEMENT OF Tl-IE CASE 
Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
(hereinafter "Watkins"), filed this breach of contract, breach of covenant to repair, unjust 
enrichment, and waste action against Defendants Michael Storms, an individual 
(hereinafter "Storms"); Kathy Burggraf, an. individual (hereinafter "Burggraf'); 
Brownstone Companies, Inc., an Idal10 Corporation (hereinafter the "Brownstone"); and 
Storms Burggraf, and Brownstone collectively doing business as the Brownstone 
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Restaurant and Brewhouse (hereinafter the "Restamant").1 Watkins also requested 
injunctive relief, an accounting, eviction, and attorney's fees. 2 Storms and Brownstone 
asse1t ed affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for storage rental moving, utility and 
insurance expenses, together with attorney fees. 3 
A Co urt Trial was held on March 18-21 , April 25, May 6, and July 29 of 2014.4 
Having reviewed the record, the evidence presented at trial, and the relevant authorities 
the following find ings of fact and conclusions of law are appropriate. 
II. ISSUES 
Watkins presented evidence in supp01t of his theories of breach of the covenant to 
repair (Count Six) unjust enrichment (Count Seven) and waste (Count Eight). 5 Watkins 
requests attorney fees pursuant to the original lease between the parties, the "New 
Lease," Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-12 1 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.6 
Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed that Watkins pre ented Storms and 
Brownstone from vacating the Premises for approximately six (6) weeks, causing Storms 
and Brownstone to incur unnecessary storage rental expenses "significantly greater 
1 Second Amended Complaint, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-
20 I 0-5958 (filed September 6, 2013) (hereinafter the ''Second Amended Complaint"). 
2 Second Amended Complaint at pp. 6-8. 
3 Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, 
Bonnevil le County case no. CY-2010-5958 (filed October 23 20 13) (he reinafter the "Answer and 
Counterclaim'). 
4 Minute Entry [for March 18, 2014 Court Trial] The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville 
County case no. CV-201 0-5958 (fri ed March 21, 2014); Minute Entry [for March .19 , 2014 Court Trial] , 
The Watkins Company, lLCv. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed March 21 2014); 
Minute Entry [for March 20, 2014 Court Trial], The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County 
case no . CV-20 10-5958 (fi led March 2 1, 20 14); Minute ntry [for March 2 1, 2014 Co UJt Trial] , The 
Watkins Company. llC v. Storms , Bonnevi ll e County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed May I, 20 14); Minute 
Entry [fo r April 24, 2014 Cou1i Tri a l] The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storm Bonneville County case no. 
CY-20 I 0-5958 filed May l 20 14). This Couii notes that the Bonneville County Cle rk has not prepared a 
minute entry for the July 29 2014 hearing as of the date of thee findings and conclusions. 
5 See: Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 8- 10. 
6 Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 7-8 . 
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moving expenses "7 power and utilities for the rental property located at 455 River 
Parkway Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereinafter the "Premises"), insurance expenses and 
attorney fees. 8 Storms and Brownstone also claim affirmative defenses of unclean hands, 
and failure to mitigate damages.9 Storms and Brownstone request attorney fees and costs 
under Idaho Code § 8-803 , and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c) for defending against 
the temporary restraining order and the reque ted writ of attachment. 10 
Based upon the record, the evidence presented at trial, and the relevant 
authorities, the following issues require adjudication: 
l. Did the terms of the Lease carry over into Storms' and Brownstone's 
tenancy at will? 
2. Did Storms and/or Brownstone breach the covenant to repair in the Lease? 
3. What amount of money, if any, should be awarded to Watkins for cleaning 
or repair of the Premises as a result of Storms' and/or Brownstone's breach? 
4. Were Storms and Brownstone unjustly enriched by possession of the 
Premises from ovember 25, 2010 to December 30, 2010 without paying rent? 
5. Have Storms and Brownstone shown themselves entitled to recover 
storage rental expenses, additional moving expenses, insurance expenses, utility 
expenses, and attorney fees as damages for the temporary restraining order entered 
against them? 
7 Answer and Counterclaim at p. 19 ,r 12. 
8 ~: Answer and Counterclaim, at pp. 17-20. 
9 An wer and Counterclaim at p. 2. 
10 Answer and Counterclaim, at p. 20. 
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6. What amount of money if any, should be awarded to Storms and 
Brownstone on their claims for expenses and fees incurred as a result of the temporary 
restraining order entered against them? 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Watkins owns commercial real estate located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho 
Falls, Idaho (the Premises). 11 Dane Watkins, Sr. is Watkins' managing partner. 12 
2. On April 18, I 996, Brownstone was incorporated in the State of Idaho. 13 
Storms is the president and registered agent for Brownstone.14 Brownstone's address is 
listed on its Certificate of Incorporation as "455 River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho 
83402." 15 This is the address of the Premises. 16 
3. On July 31 , 1996, Storms and Bmggraf, as individuals, entered into a 
thirty (30) year commercial lease agreement with Watkins (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Lease") to lease the Premises for the operation of a microbrewery and restaurant. 17 
4. Paragraph 7 of the Lease reads as follows: 
MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, ALTERATIONS: Lessee acknowledges 
that the premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated 
herein. Lessee shall , at his own expense and at all times maintain the 
premises in good and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical 
11 Defendants' Trial Exhibit P, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnev ille County case no. CV-
20 I 0-5958 (admitted March 18, 2014) (herei nafter "Trial Exhibit P"), at p. l. On March 18 20 J 4 tbe 
first day of tr ial, the parties stipulated to the admission of the following tria l ex hibits: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-
28, and 32-39; Defendants' Exhibits A - U. Defendants' Exhibit T.98A was admitted on March 19, 2014. 
Defendants' Exhibit V was admitted for demonstrative purposes on April 24, 20 14. Defendants' Exhibits 
AA, AA! , AA2, AA3 V, W, X, Z and ZI were admitted on May 5 2014. Each ofthese exhibits shall 
here inafter be refe1Ted to as "Trial Exhibit" followed by the designated exhibit number. 
12 Tria l Exhi bit P, at p. I. 
13 Exhibit I, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (admitted 
by tipulation October 14 2010) (hereinafter "TRO Exh ibit 1") at p. 1. 
14 TRO Exhibit l at p. 2. 
is Id. 
16 Exh ibit 14, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (admitted 
by sti pulation October 14 20 I 0) (hereinafter "TRO Exhibit 14") at p. 2. 
17 Tr ial Exhibit I, at p. l . ~ 3. 
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wmng, plumbing and heating installations and any other system or 
equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same at tem1ination 
hereof, in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted. 
Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, See Addendum B 
which shall be maintained by Lessor. Lessee shall also maintain in good 
condition such portions adjacent to the premises, such as sidewalks 
driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be 
maintained by Lessor. 
No improvement or alteration of the premises shall be made 
without the prior written consent o the Lessor. Prior to the 
commencement of any substantial repair improvement or alteration, 
Lessee shall give Lessor at least two (2) days written notice in order that 
Lessor may post appropriate notices to avoid any liabil ity for liens. 
Lessee shall not commit any waste upon the premises, or any 
nuisance or act which may disturb the quiet enjoyment of any tenant in the 
b "ld' 18 . Ul mg. 
5. Addendum B to the Lease details the particular maintenance 
responsibilities assigned to the tenant and to the Iandlord. 19 The tenant's maintenance 
responsibilities include glass breakage. 20 
6. Addendum B also sets forth the parties' agreement that: 
Le ee plans to spend a minimum of $400 000.00 on remodeling of the 
premises and installation of the microbrewery system. Lessee will furnish 
checks and invoices to see the $400,000.00 has been paid.21 
7. After executing the Lease with Watkins, Storms and Burggraf gutted the 
building22 and renovated it to accommodate a microbrew pub and restaurant. 23 They tore 
out the drop ceilings, 24 sandblasted and stained the original beams, 25 installed new 
18 Trial Exh ibit 1, atp. l ,~ 7. 
19 Trial Exh ibit I at p. 4. 
20 Id. 
21 ]d. 
22 See: Tr ial Exhibits T.1 through T.13, T.15 through T.17. 
23 See: Trial Exhibits T. 19 through T.26. 
24 See: Trial E 'hibit T.16. 
25 See: Trial Exhibit T.20. 
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plumbing,26 tore out the old and installed new electrical services, removed walls,27 and 
reconfigured the interior of the Premises. 
8. On May 30, 1997 Storms, Burggraf, and Brownstone filed a certificate of 
assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary of State to conduct business under the 
name "Brownstone Restaurant and Brewhouse."28 
9. During the thirteen (13) year operation of the Restaurant, employees were 
expected to undertake routine cleaning of their stations. Furthermore, an annual cleaning 
day took place wherein equjpment was removed and pressure washed and the Pr mises 
including the outside brick work, was cleaned by Restaurant employees. The kitchen 
hood system was maintained by a commercial service on an annual basi and inspected 
by the fire marshal. The Restaurant was never cited by the Health Deprutment or the Fire 
Department for any violations. 
10. Burggraf ceased to take pa1i in the day-to-day operations of the Restaurant 
in 2002 and sold her interest in the Brownstone in 2005 .29 
11. In 2005, Storms approached Dane Watkins about the Restaurant's roof, 
which extended over other businesses in the Eagle Rock commercial complex. Storms 
wanted to replace the roof because it was old and its shingles were falling off. Storms 
understood that he was responsible to pay for one-half of any repairs to the roof over the 
Restaurant. After speaking to Mr. Watkins, Storms understood that both he and Mr. 
Watkins would solicit bids from roofers for the repair of the roof. 
26 See: Trial Exhibit T.15. 
27 -;: Trial Exhibit T.17. 
2 Complaint, The Watkins Company, LlC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (fi led 
September 29, 20 I 0) (hereinafter the "Complaint"), at p. 2, 1 5. See also: Exh ibit 3, The Watkins 
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12. In the fall of 2005, not long after speaking with Mr. Watkins about the 
roof Storms arrived at the Restaurant to see a roofing contractor working on the area of 
the roof to the west of the Restaurant. Mr. Watkins had hired Briggs Roofing to repair 
the entire roof including the portion over th Restaurant. After meeting with Mr. 
Watkins, Storms ultimately agreed to allow Briggs Roofing to repair the roof over the 
Restaurant, and paid Mr. Watkins by December of 2005, $6,780.00 for Storms' portion 
of the cost. Storms never saw a bid or an invoice from Briggs Roofing. 
13. In April of 2006, Briggs Roofing returned to finish the portion of the 
roofing over the Restaurant. A crew arrived and tore off the lay rs of old shingles 
pushing the old shingles off the roof and into a dump truck.30 The dump truck was 
moved around the Restaurant as the roofers moved around the roof. In so doing, the 
roofers tore the Restaurant's window awnings and popped the handicap ramp out of the 
cement by the 1101th entrance. 
14. One Friday afternoon, after the Briggs Roofing crew exposed the roof 
down to the wood on the Restaurant ' s south side stacked new shingles four feet high on 
the roof, and left for the weekend, a heavy rain set in and continued throughout the 
weekend. Storms received a telephone call from the Restaurant manager, infom1ing him 
that the roof leaked in numerous places, water was causing the paint on the walls to 
bubble and tape was hanging down from the ceiling. Storms alerted Mr. Watkins to the 
problem. 
Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonne vi II County case no. CY-20 I 0-5958 (admi tted by stipulation October 14 
20 10). 
29 Trial Exhibit P. 
30 See: Defendan t's Trial Exhibits T.34 and T.35 . 
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15. The following Monday, the roofers from Briggs Roofing returned. Over 
the course of the next several weeks, ending in early May 2006, Briggs Roofing finished 
the Restaurant's new roof. In the process, one of the roofers broke through the 
Restamant's ceiling, spilling debris into the Restaurant and onto a customer. 
Approximately one week later, Mr. Watkins approached Storms at the Restaurant and 
requested an additional $2,000.00 for new wood placed on the roof. Storms refused to 
pay additional money without proof of new wood actually being laid onto the roof. Mr. 
Watkins abandoned his request. 
16. Storms could not get Mr. Watkins to address the water-leak repair issues 
inside the Restaurant. Finally, in the Fall of 2006, Storms threatened to decrease the 
amount of monthly rent paid for the Premises. Soon thereafter, an employee of Waters 
Construction appeared at the Premises and announced that he had been hired by Dane 
Watkins to fix the interior of the Restaurant. After assessing the interior damage, Waters 
Construction began making repairs. However, when a heavy rain fell in late September 
or early October of 2006, Waters Construction contacted Storms to say that leaks were 
occurring all over the Premises and, without repairs to the roof, any additional work on 
the interior was pointless, since the water leaks were degrading the repair-work. A 
Waters Construction employee took Storms up on the roof to demonstrate where the 
leaks were occurring. Thereafter, Waters Construction did not undertake any additional 
repairs to the Premises. 
17. The damaged rain gutter was replaced some time in 2007. 
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18. In August of 2007, Waters Construction sued Watkins and Storms for 
failure to pay for services rendered. 31 Almost one year later, in July of 2008 judgment 
was entered in favor of Waters onstruction as against Watkins.32 Waters Construction's 
claim against Storms was d nied because Storms had no contractual relationship with 
W C · 33 aters onstrnct10n. 
J 9. On November 19 2008, Watkins sued Storms and Burggraf, in Bonneville 
County case no. CV-2008-7258 (hereinafter the "2008 Lawsuit"), and alleged that Storms 
and Burggraf breached the Lease by failing to pay rent, and failing to provide monthly 
sales reports. 34 Watkins sought to evict Storms and Burggraf from the Premises.35 
Watkins further requested accelerated rent late fees costs of roof repair, rent for the 
upstairs storage space, unjust enrichment, and food and drink credits.36 
20. On March 16 20 10 in the 2008 Lawsuit, Judge Joel Tingey held that 
Burggraf no longer ovmed an interest in the Brownstone.37 Judge Tingey found that 
Storm materially breached the Lease by withholding rent (without pe1mission for such 
action under the Lease) and determined that Watkins was entitled to evict Storms from 
the Premises.38 
21. On April 21 2010, Watkins received a judgment in the 2008 Lawsuit 
terminating the Lease. 39 Following the entry of the April 21, 2010 judgment, Storms and 
Brownstone retained possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-month 
3 1 Trial Exhibit N . 
32 Trial ExhibitN, at p. 00019. 
33 Tria l Exhibit N , at pp. 00004, 00019 . 
34 Tria l Exhibit P, at pp . 00001 -00009. 
35 Tr ial Exhibi t P, at p. 00009. 
36 Trial Exh ibit P, at pp. 00009 - 00017. 
37 Trial Exh ibit P, at p. 00002. 
38 Trial Exhibit P, at pp. 00006 - 00009. 
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ba is.40 Th reafter, the parties disagreed as to whether or not the Lease applied to their 
l · h" 41 re atlons 1p. 
22. Storms became a tenant-at-will, possessing the Premises with Watkins' 
consent, but without fixed lease tenns.42 
23. In August of 2010, in response to encouragement from Dane Watkins, 
Gerald Mitch 11 (owner of White Water Grill and Wasabi Japanese Restaurant) inspected 
the Premises in consideration of opening a restaurant there. 
24. On August 15, 2010, a process server delivered a letter from Watkins, 
dated August 13 2010 (hereinafter the "August 13 Letter"), to Burggraf by delivering a 
copy of the August 13 Letter to Burggraf at her home.43 
25. On August 16, 2010, a process server delivered the August 13 Letter to 
van Bowman, assistant manager of the Restaurant by delivering a copy thereof to Evan 
B lp · 44 owman at t 1e rem1ses. 
26. The August 13 Letter, addressed to "Mike Storms, Brownstone Restaurant 
and Brewhouse 999 South Lee, Idaho Falls Idaho 83404 " stated: 
I have tried to talk to you several times over the last few weeks about the 
rent and other responsibilities the Watkins Company LLC expects from 
you and the Brownstone as tenants. I regret that we till have not been 
able to agree on the te1ms of the lease so this letter is to notify you of the 
39 Complaint, at p. 3, ~ I I. 
4° Comp laint, at p. 3, i112. 
41 Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Granting in Part Plaintiffs 
Request for a Preliminary Injunction, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. 
CV-20 I 0-5958 ( filed ovember 4, 20 l 0) (hereinafter the "Partial Preliminary lnju11ctio11"), at p. 12. 
42 Partial Prelimina,y Injunction, at p. I I· Order Granting Preliminar Injunction in Part The Watkins 
ompany, LLC v. Storms Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led ovember 24, 2010) 
(hereinafter the "Second Partial Prelimimuy /11j1111ctio11" ), at p. 8. 
43 Affidavit of Dane Watkins, The Watkin Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-
201 0-5958 (filed October l, 20 I 0) (hereinafter the "Watkins I Affidavit"), at Exhibit C, p. 3. 
44 Watkins I Affidavit, at Exhibit C. 
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changes to the lease. 1 hese changes will take effect at the end of tl1is 
month. 
The terms of the lease between you and Watkins Company will be the 
same as the old lease that I have attached to this letter, except you will 
now be responsible for I 00% of the roof repairs, the rent will be due the 
1st day of the month, you will pay the annual food and drink credit of 
$3 ,000 on November 151 of each year and the credits will be good for 12 
months, and you have no right to use Space # 16 or the upstairs storage or 
the sidewalk area. The lease will expire 10/31 /20207 [sic]. 45 
27. On September 13 2010 Dane Watkins, on behalf of "Watkins & 
Watkins" sent a letter addressed to Storms at the Premises address (hereinafter the 
"September 13 Letter"). 46 The September 13 Letter informed Storms that he was in 
default in his payment to Watkins & Watkins under the lease for the rent of the 
Restaurant and demanded payment within three days under penalty of eviction.47 
28. On September 14, 2010, Dane Watkins, this time writing on behalf of 
Watkins, sent another demand Jetter, at.h.lressetl lo Storms (at the Premises address), 
Burggraf (at her home), the Restaurant (at the Premises address) and Brownstone (at the 
Premises address) (the "September 14 Letter").48 The September 14 Letter not d that the 
recipients were in default under the Lease with Watkins demanded payment within three 
days, and threatened eviction for non-payment.49 The September 14 Letter also stated 
that it superseded the September 13 Letter. so 
29. The parties stipulated that Storms had no actual notice of the August 13 
Letter until September 14, 20 10. 
~ T RO Exl1ibit 14, at p. l. 
46 Exhibit 15. The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bon nevi lie County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (admitted 
b stipulation October 14, 2010). 
47 Id . 
48 Exhibit 16, The Watkins Company, LLCv. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (admitted 
by stipulat ion October 14, 2010). 
49 .l_Q. 
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30. By letter dated September 15, 2010, counsel for Brownstone informed 
Watkins of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17 2010. 51 Storms' and 
Brownstone's operated the Restaurant for the Jast time on September 30 20 10. 
31. Herbert Rockhold agreed to help Storms move everything that belonged to 
Storms and Brownstone out of the Premises and into storage. They discussed an 
approximate fee for Rockhold 's services in the amount of $2,500.00 to $3 ,500.00. On 
October 1, 20 10, Rockhold began moving small items out of the Premises for a few hours 
b fore being directed to stop by Storms due to the Tempora,y Restraining Order. In 
addition to friends and family members, mployees of the Brownstone were on hand to 
help · ith the move. 
32. On October 1, 2010, Watkins moved for a temporary restraining order 
prohibiting Storms and Brownstone from removing any property located in or on the 
Premises.52 Watkins' Motion was granted and the parties were directed not to remove 
any property fro m the Premises unti I a decision issued on Watkins' application for a 
prejudgment writ of attachment. 53 
33. On November 4 20 10 Watkins ' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment was denied, but his request for a preliminary injunction was partially 
granted. 54 Storms and Brownstone were enjoined from removing brewing equipment, 
brick structures and divider walls, staircases a loft seating area, kettles fenn entation 
50 Id. 
1 Watkin I Affidavit, at Exhibit E. 
2 Motion fo r Temporary Restraining Order and Appl ication for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment The 
Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. CY-2010-5958 (tiled October I , 2010) 
(herei nafter "Watkins' Motion"). 
53 Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, The Watkins 
Company, llC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (ti led October 7, 20 I 0) (hereinafter 
the "Temporary Restraining Order"). 
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tanks, framing, p1pmg, ventilation components, air conditioners mills, sinks 
dishwashers, boilers, ovens stoves coolers and freezers , signs lighting, racks physically 
connected to the floors, walls and exposed trusses on the Premise . 55 
34. On November 9, 2010, Watkins moved for reconsideration of the Partial 
Preliminary Injunction, because the "New Lease" issue had not been briefed by the 
· 56 parties. to1ms and Brownstone also moved for reconsideration of the Partial 
Preliminary Injunction based upon a premature decision on the preliminary .inj unction 
issue without appropriate briefing or evidence.57 This Court set aside the Partial 
Preliminary b1junction on the same date. 58 
35. On November 9, 2010 at 10:41 o'clock a.m., counsel for Watkins sent 
counsel for Storms and Brownstone the following e-mail: 
Thanks, Dean. 
Also Mr. Watkins contacted me this morning and said that Mr. Storms 
and a few other men are over at the building trus morning starting to 
remove property from the premises. Mr. Watkins approached them and 
asked what they were doing ince the court entered the preliminary 
mJunction. Mr. Storms said no one had told him of any preliminary 
injunction. So my client contacted me. I called your office but they said 
you were in court in Madison County. In the meantime, I gave Mr. 
Watkin a copy of the court's order issuing the preliminary injunction and 
I believe Mr. Watkins is going to take the copy over to Mr. Storms. I trust 
your client will comply with the injunction, but I wanted to keep you 
informed of what my client is reporting to me. 59 
54 See: Partial Pre/imina,y fnjunclion. 
55 Partial Prelimina,y Injunction, at p. 14. See also: Watkins Affidavit, at p. 4, 1 I 6a.-d. 
56 Motion for Reconsideration, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnevill e County case no. CV-
20 l 0-5958 (fi led November 9, 20 l 0) (here inafter "Watkins' Reconsideration Motion"). 
57 Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction/Restra in ing Order, The 
Watkin Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville Coun ty case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed November 9, 20 l 0) 
(hereinafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Reconsideration Motion"). 
58 Order Sett ing Aside Decision Granting in Part Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary InjW1ction, The 
Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed November 9, 201 0) 
(hereinafter the "Set Aside Order"). 
59 Trial Exhib it A at p. 000025. 
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36. On November 24, 2010 at 3:21 o'clock p.m. this Court again granted 
Watkins a partial preliminary injunction applicable only to the outdoor poles in the 
vicinity of the Premi.ses. Storms and Brownstone were not enjoined from removing other 
disputed fixtures, including the wooden bar, the signs affixed to the poles, and the 
awnings on the east and north walls of the Premises.60 On the san1e date, and at the same 
time, this Court denied Watkins' request for an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 
certificate of a final judgment as to this Court's denial of Watkin's Reconsideration 
Motion.61 
37. Rockhold returned to the Premises in late November or early December 
2010 to move equipment out of the Restaurant. Few if any former employees of the 
Brownstone were available for the disconnection and moving of goods and equipment. 
Snow and ice made the move difficult. Rockhold finished Lhe move on December 30 
2010. 
3 8. Rockhold made sure the Premises were clean as items were moved out 
inc luding sweeping and mopping the floors and cleaning dirty areas on the walls. 
39. As a result of the additional time required to move out, Rockhold charged 
Storms and Brownstone $5 500.00 for his services.62 Rockhold testified that had he been 
able to move Storms and Brownstone out of the Premises in October of 20 IO the price 
would have been around $3 500.00. 
60 econd Partial Preliminaty Injunction, at p. 11. 
61 Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) Certificate, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, 
Bonne ille County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed ovember24, 2010). 
62 ~ : Trial xhibit K, at p. 16. 
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40. Storms and Brownstone hired Alan Flores to deep clean the Premises. 
Flores finished his work in late December of 2010. 
41. Upon fully vacating the Premises, Storms and Brownstone left behind a 
br ken vestibule window pane, a broken crash bar on the north entrance door grease in 
the kitchen's grease trap, and dust on the fans and beams above the brewing equipment 
and dining area. 
42. In January of 2011 , Watkins hired Blaise Kauer to go through the 
Premises and make it electrically safe to show potential tenants. Kauer spent seven (7) 
hours to assure that any loose wires were safe, repair lights, replace light bulbs 
43. On or about January 31, 2011, Dan Carter owner of Bennett's Paint and 
Glass, inspected the Premises to determine what issues with the doors needed to be 
addressed. He replaced the panic bar system on the northeast door and the closer on one 
of the entrance doors. Cai.ter also installed new lock rods on the exterior French doors in 
the vestibule. 
44. Gerald Mitchell testified that he began to seriously consider moving into 
the Premises "in the first part of 2011." He engaged in lease negotiations with Dane 
Watkins approximately three (3) months before he opened the Snow Eagle G1ill and 
Brewery. 
45. On April 4 20 11, Mitchell signed a "Commercial Lease and Deposit 
Receipt" with Watkins for rental of the Premises. 63 
46. After renovation and reconfigmation of the Premises Mitchell opened the 
now Eagle Brewing and Grill in the former Restaurant Premises on July 4, 2011. 
63 Trial Exhibi t 2. 
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47. Watkins never served Burggraf with this lawsuit. Therefore Watkins 
hall take nothing by its Second Amended Complaint or any previous allegations, against 
h r. 
48. Watkins' Count One breach of contract claim, as it related to a document 
Watkins referred to as the ''New Lease," was summarily adjudicated in Storms' and 
Brownstone's favor. 64 Watkins shall take nothing by its Count One (breach of contract) 
claim against the defendants. 
49. Watkins' Count Two request for injunctive relief (which addressed 
removal of furnishings and fixtures from the Premises) was granted in part and denied in 
part in prior rulings.65 Storms and Brownstone vacated the Premises as of December 30 
201 0. 66 Thus Watkins' request is now moot. 
50. Watkins' Count Three request for an accounting was summarily 
adjudicated in Storms' and Brownstone's favor. 67 Watkins shall take nothing from the 
defendants based upon its request for an accounting. 
51. Watkins' Count Four request for eviction is now moot since Storms and 
Brownstone vacated the Premises in 2011. 68 
64 ~: Second Amended Complaint at pp. 4-6; Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and Granting in Patt Defendants' Mot ion for Partial Summary Judgment, The Watkins 
Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed May 13. 2013) (hereinafter the 
"Summary Judgment Order") at p. 14. 
6 - ~ : Second Amended Complaint, at p. 6· Summaiy Judgment Order, at pp. 14-J S. 
r,6 Affidavit of Dane Watkins, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no . CV-
20 I 0-5958 (fi led December 12, 20 12) (hereinafter the "Watkins II Affidavit"), at p. 4, § l 7; Summa,y 
Judgment Order, at p. 14. 
67 ~: Summa1y Judgment Order, at p. 14 D. I. 
68 ~ : Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 6-7 ; S11mmaiy Judgment Order at pp. 15-1 6. 
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52. Storms and Brownstone were granted summary judgment as to Watkins ' 
Count Six claim for breach of contract and the covenant to repair to the extent such claim 
alleged damages under the "New Lease."69 
53. St01ms' and Brownstone's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth affirmative 
defenses all relate to Watkins' claims under the alleged "New Lease."70 This Comt 
previously determined that the "New Lease" never came into effect between the parties. 71 
Thus Storms' and Brownstone's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth affirmative defenses are 
moot. 
IV. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
A. Tenancy at Will 
1. When a lessee holds over after his tenancy for a fixed tem1 of years 
expires the lessor must elect to either treat the lessee as a trespasser or hold him to a new 
tenancy. 72 If he treats the lessee as a trespasser, the lessor may bring an action for 
unlawfu l detainer. 73 If, however the lessor seek , implicitly or explicitly, to hold the 
lessee to a new tenancy, a new lease arises by operation of law. 74 The tenant's right to 
possession, if any, is not based upon the original lease but upon a new tenancy created 
by law.75 
69 Sum111c11y .Judgment Order, at p. 16. 
70 Answer and Counterclaim, at pp. 2-3 . 
71 Partial Prelimina,y Injunction, at p. 12. 
72 Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho 640, 644-5, 7 18 P.2d 55 1, 555-6 (Ct. App. 1985) 
[ci ti ng: R. chosh insk i, American Law of landlord and Tenant§ 2:23 (1980); Annot. , 45 A.L.R.2d 827 
(1956)). 
73 Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Jdaho at 645, 718 P.2d at 556 [citing: Idaho Code 6-
303]. 
74 Lewiston Pre-11/!ix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde 110 Idaho at 645, 7 18 P.2d at 556. 
75 ]Q. 
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2. A court must look to the lessor's intent, as revealed by either his words or 
his actions to determine whether a new tenancy results. 76 If a lessor demands or accepts 
rent from the lessee, he will be presumed to have elected to hold the lessee to a new 
tenancy absent a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.77 
3. The terms of the original. lease are usually carried over into the new 
tenancy. 78 
B. Standard of Review - Breach of Contract/Covenant to Repair. 
1. The elements necessary to claim a br ach of contract include: 
(a) the existence of a contract; 
(b) the breach of the contract; 
( c) the breach caused dan1ages; and 
( d) the amount of those damages. 79 
2. A lease, like any other contract, is to be construed to give effect to the 
intention of the parties. In so doing, the courts generally hold that covenants for 
maintenance and repair and covenants to surrender in good condition are to be construed 
together, and so construed the covenant to surrender in good condition, wear and tear 
due to reasonable use excepted. 80 
3. The general force and effect of a covenant by the lessee to make all repairs 
to the leased premises during the term of the leas is restricted and limited by a surrender 
76 Id. 
77 ld. 
7R Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho at 645, 718 P.2d at 556 [citing: Yachts America, 
Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 356, 230 Ct.Cl. 26 ( 1982)]. 
79 /11/osell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Company, Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013). 
so Millerv. Belknap, 75 Idaho 46, 52-3, 266 P.2d 662, 665-6 (1954). 
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clause containing an exception as to ordLnary wear and tear. 81 The two provisions are 
construed together to impose upon the lessee an obligation to make all such repairs as 
may be necessary for the preservation of the premises in the condition in which the lessee 
received them from his lessor, except repairs required by reason of ordinary weaJ and 
tear. 82 Ordinary wear and tear includes any usual deterioration from the use of the 
premises and by lapse of time. 83 
4. The landlord bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the condition of the premises when the tenant took possession or to establish 
specific acts of waste or damage during the tenancy. 84 
5. The measure of damages for breach of covenant to repair when the lease 
term has expired is the cost of putting the premises in repair. 85 
C. Standard of Review - Unjust Enrichment. 
l. The elements of unjust enrichment mclude: 
(a) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(b) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and 
(c) it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit 
without payment of the valu of the benefit. 86 
2. Unjust enrichment, also refe1Ted to as an implied-in-law contract, ts an 
equitable remedy. 87 
81 Miller v. Belknap 75 Idaho at 53 , 266 P.2d at 665-6 [citing: 45 A.LR. Annotation 70]) . 
sz Id . 
SJ Id. 
84 Poe y v. Closson, 84 Idaho 549, 553 374 P.2d 710, 712 ( 1962) [ci ti ng: Millerv. Belknap, 75 Idaho at 51, 
266 P.2d at 665]. 
85 Santillanes v. Property Manageme/11 Services, Inc. 110 Idaho 588, 591 , 7 16 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. App. 
1986) . 
86 Indian Springs, LLC v. Andersen, 154 Idaho 708 , 7 J 2, 302 P.3 d 333 , 337(2012). 
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3. An implied-in-fact contract exists where there is no express agreement 
between the parties, but their conduct implies an agreement from which an obligation in 
· 88 contract exists. 
4. An award for unjust enrichment may be proper even though an agreement 
exists. 89 This occurs when the express agreement is found to be unenforceable.90 
5. The application of equitable remedies is a question of fact because it 
requires a balancing of the parties' equities.91 
6. The party who has conferred the benefit and who is seeking the return of 
the full amount thereof has the burden of proving that it would be unjust for the recipi nt 
to retain any part of the benefit.92 
D. Standard of Review - Waste. 
1. "Waste" is defined as 
[a]ction or inaction by a possessor of land causing unreasonable injury to 
the holders of other estates in the same land. An abuse or destructive use 
of property by one in rightful possession. Spoil or destruction, done or 
permitted, to lands houses, gardens, trees, or other corporal 
bereditaments, by the tenant thereof, to the prejudice of the heir or of him 
in reversion or remainder.93 
2. "Waste" has also been defined as "the permanent or lasting injury to the 
estate by one who has not an absolute or unqualified title thereto. "94 
87 Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228 232, 280 P.3d 731 , 735(20 12). 
88 Clayson v. Zebe 153 Idaho at 232 280 P.3d at 735. 
89 Buku Properties, LLC v. Clark 153 Idaho 828,291 P.3d l 027 (2012) [citing: Bates v. Seldin 146 Idaho 
772, 776, 203 P.3d 702, 706 (2009)]. 
90 Id . 
91 Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho at 232, 280 P.3d at 735 [ citing: Farrell v. Whiteman, 152 Idaho 190, 194 268 
P.3d 458 462(2012). 
92 Toews v. Funk 129 Idaho 316 322,924 P.2d 217 223 (Ct. App. 1994). 
93 Black's Law Dictionary 1589-90 (61h ed. 1990) [as cited with approval in: Kimbrough v. Reed 130 Idaho 
512, 5 I 4 943 P.2d 1232 1234 ( 1997)]. 
9-1 Consolidated AG of Curry, inc. v. Range11. inc., 128 Idaho 228,230 912 P.2d 11 5, 11 7 ( 1996). 
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3. Idaho Code§ 6-201 authorizes a suit for waste by a "tenant for ... years." 
Tr bl damages may be awarded upon a finding that the waste was wilfully wantonly, or 
maliciously committed.95 
E. Expert Testimony. 
1. The admissibility of expert testimony 1s governed by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 702, which provides that an expert witness may testify and offer opinions 
regarding specialized knowledge that will "assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... "96 
2. To be admissible, "[t]he information, theory or methodology upon which 
the expert's opinion is based need not be commonly agreed upon by experts in the field , 
but it must have sufficient indicia of reliability to meet [Rule] 702 requirements."97 
F. Standard of Review - Unclean Hands. 
l. "The clean hands doctrine 'stands for the proposition that a litigant may be 
denied relief by a court of equity on th ground that his conduct has been inequitable 
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue. "'98 
2. The doctrine of "unclean hands , is based on the maxim that, "he who 
comes into equity must come with clean hands. "99 
3. The conduct must be intentional or willful, rather than merely negligent. 100 
95 Pearson v. Harper, 87 ldaho 245, 258 392 P.2d 687, 694 ( 1964) . 
96 Pocatello Ho.spital, LlC v. Quail Ridge Medical lnve.s·tor, llC 156 Idaho 709, 330 P.3d I 067, I 073 
(20 14) [ci ting: Idaho Ru le of Evidence 702] . 
97 Pocatello Hospital, LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC 156 Idaho at _, 330 P.3d at l 073 
(citing: City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 ldaho 580 585, 130 P.3d 1118, 1123 (2006)· State v. Konechny, 134 
Idaho 410. 4 17, J P.3 d 535 542 (Ct. App. 2000)] . 
98 Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC. 145 Idaho 360, 370, 179 P. 3d 323, 333 
2008) [citing: Gilbert v. Nampa School Di trict No. I 31, I 04 Idaho 137, 145, 657 P.2d 1, 9 ( 1983)]. 
99 Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 25 1, 92 P.3d 492, 50 I (2004) [ citing: Gilbert v. Nampa chool District 
No. /3 / , 104 Idaho at 145 , 657 P.2d at 9] . 
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4. The clean hands doctiine is not one of absolutes and should be applied in 
the court's di cretion, so as to accomplish its purpose of promoting public policy and the 
· · f h IOI mtegnty o t e courts. "' quity will consider the conduct of the adversary, the 
requirements of public policy, and the relation of the misconduct to the subject matter of 
the suit and to the defendant. 102 
5. A proper exercise of discretion reqmres this Court to "(a) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (b) act within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
availabl to it; and ( c) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." 103 
G. Standard of Review - Failure to Mitigate Damages. 
1. The doctrine of avoidable consequences, or the duty to mitigate, 1s an 
affirmative defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a defendant proves 
that it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the full extent of 
the damages caused by the defendant's actionable conduct. 104 
2. W11ere an injured party takes st ps to mitigate the damages caused by 
another, she i enti tled to the costs she reasonably incurs in avoiding those damages. 105 
100 Grazer v. Jone , 154 Idaho 58, 68, 294 P.3d 184 194 (2013). 
10 1 Ada County Highway Distric1 v. Total Success Inve tments, LLC, 145 Idaho at 370, 179 P.3d at 333 
2008) [ citing: Gilbert v. Nampa School District No. J 31, I 04 Idaho at 145-6 657 P.2d at 9-1 OJ. 
102 Id. 
103 Ada County Highway Districl v. Total Success Investment , LLC, 145 Idaho at 370, 179 P.3d at 333 
2008) [cit ing: Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 76 1,765, 86 P.3d 475 , 
479 (2004)]. 
104 McCormick International USA , Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 924, 277 P.3d 367 371 (2012) [citing: 
Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, .A., 115 Idaho 169, 170 765 P.2d680 681 (1988)]. 
105 McCormick International USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Jdaho at 924,277 P.3d at 371 [citing: Casey v. ampa 
& Meridian irrigation District, 85 Idaho 299 305, 379 P.2d 409, 412 ( 1963)]. 
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3. The doctrine of avoidable consequences seeks to "discourage even persons 
again t whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic loss 
which could be averted by reasonable efforts .... " 106 
4. Whether it is reasonable to expect a plaintiff to perform specific acts of 
· · , · · f ~ 107 1mt1gat10n 1s a quest10n o .1act. 
5. he defendant bears the burden of proving that the proposed means of 
mitigation were reasonable under the circumstances, could be accomplished at a 
reasonable cost and were within the plaintiffs ability. 108 Proof of the latter of these three 
requires more than a mere suggestion that a means of mitigation exists. 109 
H. Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction - Damages. 
l . The plaintiff to an action upon a contract for the direct payment of money 
may, at the time of issuing the summons or any time afterwards, mak application to 
have the property of the defendant attached in accordance with Title 8, Chapter 5 of the 
Idaho Code.110 
2. In lieu of an immediate issuan.ce of a writ of attachment, a court may issue 
such t mporary restraining orders directed to the defendant prohibiting acts with respect 
to the property at issue as may appear to be necessary for the preservation of the rights of 
the parties and the status of the property. 111 
106 McCormick International USA . Inc. v. Shore. J 52 Idaho at 924, 277 P.3d at 371 [citing: Indus/rial 
Leasing Corporation v. Thomason, 96 Idaho 574, 577, 532 P .2d 916, 919 ( 1974)]. 
107 Mc ormick International USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho at 924 277 P.3d at 37 1 [citi ng: Casey v. Nampa 
& Meridian Irrigation Dis1rict, 85 Idaho at 307 379 P.2d at 413]. 
108 Jd. 
109 M Connick l111ernationaf USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 ldaho at 924, 277 P.3d at 371 [citing: lark v. 
lniernalional Harve ter Company, 99 Idaho 3.26, 34 7 58 1 P.2d 784, 805 ( 1978)]. 
1 iO Idaho Code§ 8-50 I. 
11 1 Idaho Code § 8-502(d) . 
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3. lf the defendant recovers judgment, or if the attachment was wrongfully 
issued, the plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to the defendant, and all 
damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum 
specified in the bond. 11 2 And if the attachment is discharged on the ground that the 
plaintiff was not entitled thereto under Idaho Code § 8-501 , the plaintiff will pay all 
damages which the defendant may have sustained by reason of the attachment, not 
exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking. 11 3 
I. Temporary Restraining Order 
1. Idaho Rule of ivil Procedure 65( c) reads, in pertinent part: 
o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the 
giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, 
for the payment of such costs and damages including reasonable attorney's 
fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred or suffered by any party 
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
2. Rule 65(c) allows the trial court to award costs and reasonable attorney 
fees to any patty who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 114 
3. Tf a party requesting a temporary restraining order ultimately fails on the 
merits of the basis for the restraining order, then the "wrongfully enjoined or restrained 
paity" may recover its damages. 115 
4. The recoverable attorney fees under Rule 65(c) are those incurred in a 
proceeding to dissolve a temporai·y restraining order or a preliminary injunction, rather 
than those earned through defending the merits of the action. 116 
112 Idaho Code § 8-SOJ(a). 
113 Id . 
114 Durrani v. Christensen 117 Idaho 70 73785 P .2d 634. 637 ( 1990). 
w See: McAtee v. Faulkner Land & livestock, Inc .. 113 Idaho 393, 395-6, 744 P.2d 121, 123-4 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
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5. Recovery of damages costs and attorney fees occasioned by the 
temporary restraining order is limited to the amount of the bond. 11 7 
J. Standard of Review - Reasonableness of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
1. The factors to be considered in determining an award of attorney fees, as 
set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(e)(3), include: 
(a) the time and labor required; 
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(c) the skill requisite to pe1form the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
(d) the prevailing charges for like work; 
(e) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 




the amount involved and the results obtained; 
the undesirability of the case· 
(i) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
(j) awards in similar cases; 
(k) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if th court finds it 
was reasonably necessary in preparing a pmiy's case; and 
(1) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular 
case. 118 
11 6 Devine v. Ch{[f, 110 Idaho 1, 3, 7 13 P.2d 437, 439 (Ct. App. 1985) 
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2. Although a court must consider the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when detem1ining the amount to award in attorney fees 
the court need not demonstrate how it employed any of the factors in reaching an award 
amount. 11 9 The court need not specifically address each of the factors, as long as the 
record indicates that it considered them all. 120 
V. ANALYSES 
A. Leasehold Tenancy at Will. 
Watkins continued to accept rental payments from Brownstone following Judge 
Tingey's April 2010 judicial termination of the Lease in the 2008 Lawsuit. 121 Dane 
Watkins affied that Storms paid rent of $4 000.00 per month for May, June, July August 
and September of 2010.122 From Watkins' Affidavit, it can be infen ed that Mr. Watkins 
accepted Storms' rent payments for May, June, July, August, and September of 2010. 
However, the parties could not agree as to the terms of their relationship after 
April of 2010. They con ti nu d to do business with each other as "Lessor-Lessee," 
without formulating the precise terms of their agreement. Thus, despite tennination of 
the Lease, the relationship between Watkins, as lessor, and Storms and Brownstone as 
lessee, continued. This Court previously determined that Storms and Brownstone 
became tenants at will after April of 2010. 123 
At trial, both parties relied upon term of the Lease in arguing their relative 
positions with regard to Watkins' claims and Storms and Brownstone's defenses and 
11 7 McA tee v. Faulkner land & Livestock, Inc., I 13 Idaho at 402 744 P.2d at 130. 
118 I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
119 In re Univer ·ity Place/Idaho Waler Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199 P.3d l 02, l 19 (2008). 
iw Id. 
121 Watkin s II Affidavit, at p. 3, 19. 
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counterclaims. The parties' conduct suggests that the terms of the Lease carried over to 
Storms and Brownstone's tenancy at will. Therefore, this Court shall apply the t rms of 
the Lease to determine the merits of Watkins' claims and Storms and Brownstone's 
defenses. 
B. Breach of the Covenant to Repair. 
At trial, Dane Watkins presented evidence of specific areas within the Premises 
which he found dirty or in disrepair. In its written closing argument, Watkins clarified 
the specific repairs or cleaning it sought as damages for Stonns' and Brownstone's 
alleged breach of the covenant to repair found in paragraph 7 and Addendum B of the 
Lease. 124 Each of Watkins ' claims for damages shall be analyzed seriati..m. 
1. Cracked Vestibule Glass. 125 
Upon surrender of the Premises one of the arched glass windows in the vestibule 
of the Restaurant's main enh·a.nce was cracked. 126 Watkins seeks damages in the amount 
of $440.00 from Stonns and Brownstone for the replacement of the cracked glass. 127 
Stmms and Brownstone admitted that the window was cracked at some point 
during the defendants' occupancy of the Premises. 128 Stom1s and Brownstone did not 
deny that the covenant to repair under the Lease required the tenant to repair broken glass 
122 Id . 
123 Partial Prelimina1J Injunction, at p. 12; econd Partial Prelimina,y injunction at p. 8. 
124 ~: Plaintiffs Closing Argument, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. 
CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed September 19 2014) (hereinafter "Watkins' Closing Argument"). 
125 See: rial Exhibits 3 .23 and 3.25. 
126 ee: Tr ial Exhibits 3.23, 3.25. and 38.10. 
127 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 11; Trial Exhibit 21. 
128 D fendants Storms and Brownstone Companies, Inc. , Proposed Findings of Fact, Conc lusions of Law 
and Argument. The Watkins Company, LL v. torms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed 
eptember 19, 20 14) (hereinafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Argument"), at p. 31 1 134. 
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on the Premises. However Storms and Brownstone argued they should not pay for 
tempered glass, when the broken glass was non- tempered. 
Storms testified that Watkins or its hired contractor installed the window, depicted 
in Trial Exhibit 3.23, on the Premises. The window was in existence when Stonns took 
possession of the Premises. Storms understood that, at the time the window was 
installed, tempered glass was required by the requisite building codes. Dane Watkins 
testified that the broken glass in Trial Exhibit 3.23 was not tempered glass. Mr. Watkins 
explained that he was required by the 201 1 building code to replace the vestibule window 
with tempered glass. Whether or not tempered glass was ever required by the 
contemporaneous building codes was never proved at trial by either party. The evidence 
did show, however, that Watkins replaced untampered glass in the vestibule with more 
costly tempered glass. 
The only proof of the cost of repair submitted by Watkins was Trial Exhibit 21 an 
invoice from Cherry Glass and Aluminum, I.nc. 129 Trial Exhibit 21 shows a charge for 
the removal of two, arched vestibule windows and the installation of new, tempered 
glass windows. 130 Nothing in the evidence shows the cost of replacing one tempered 
glass, arched window with non-tempered glass. 
Thus the evidence supports a finding that Storms and Brownstone breached their 
at-will relationship with Watkins, as exemplified by the former Lease by failing to 
replace the cracked vestibule window. In the alternative, the record reflects that Stonns 
and Brownstone committed waste on the Premises by failing to replace the broken 
window pan . The cost of repairing the broken window glass is not properly established 
119 Trial Ex.h ibit 2 1. 
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m the evidence, however. Therefore, Watkins shall take nothing by its claim for 
replacement of the cracked, vestibule window. 
2. Broken Mezzanine Window. 131 
Watkins seeks damages in the amount of $1 100.00 for a broken window in the 
mezzanine. 132 Dane Watkins testified that the sign in the mezzanine window, which 
read: "Do NOT attempt to open this window. It is broken." existed when he retook 
possession of the Premises. Mr. Watkins did not know what was wrong with the 
window only that it would not close. Storms testified that after Briggs Roofing finished 
replacing the roof shingles and during periods of rain or snow melt leaks occurred at or 
around the outside wal 1 and windows of the mezzanine. 
The evidence infers that the window depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .4 7 was exposed to 
water. The mezzanine was mentioned as one of the areas requiring paint and drywall 
repair in the Small Claims lawsuit between Waters Construction and Watkins/Storms.133 
The wood frame around the window in Trial Exhibit 3 .4 7 became swollen from the water 
leaking into the Premises from the faulty 2006 roof repair. 
For these reasons, Watkins' mezzanine window repair claim shall be denied. The 
dysfunctional frame around the window resulted from water leaking from the roof. 
Watkins hired Briggs Roofing without input or agreement by Storms. Watkins did not 
address the roof leak issues after Briggs Roofing finished the roof, despite notice and 
complaints by Storms. Therefore, Watkins shall recover nothing for the broken window 
depicted in T1ial Exhibit 3.47. 
130 Trial Exhibit 2 1. 
131 See: Trial xhibits 3.45, 3.46 and 3.47. 
132 Watkins Closing Argument, at p. 12; Trial Exhibits 3.47 and 23 . 
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In addition, the invoice for the repair of the window shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .4 7 
states: 
Brownstone: Repair drywall , fix nail holes water damage to drywall, 
install drywall up stairs and tape. Repair broken windows. Framed wall 
in back haJlway for door. installed door and drywall. Replace door knob 
on back door, installed new emergency exit latch on garage door, installed 
new door closure and tumbler for lock on front door. Replace panic bar on 
side door. 
Labor only $1 100.00 134 
The Labor cost fo r the repair of the broken windows is not separated from the labor costs 
of the other repair work described in Exhibit 23. Mr. Watkins did not know the amounts 
charged for each of the repair items. Even if the broken window, illustrated by Trial 
Exhibit 3.47, was the responsibil ity of Storms and Brownstone, Watkins ' claim for repair 
damages fails for lack of specificity. 
3. Drywall Damage. 135 
Watkins complains that Storms and Brownstone left significant drywalJ damage 
to the Premises.136 Watkins complains of holes filled in the drywall without repainting, 
and unfilled holes in the unpainted drywall. 137 Watkins argues that "[u]sual deterioration 
from L1Se and Lapse of time would not cause the damage illustrated in the photographs or 
. . . h 11 "138 require repamtmg t e wa s. 
Under the former Lease, Storms agreed to "at his own expense and at all times, 
maintain the premises in good and safe condition ... and shall surrender the same, at 
termination hereof, in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted. 
133 Trial Exh ibi t N, at p. 00008 . 
134 Trial Exhibi t 23. 
135 See: Trial Exhibits 3.1 1 through 3.17, 3.57 through 3.62, 3.67 through 3.72, 3.94, 3. 107, and 3.132. 
136 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 13. 
137 Id. 
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Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required [which included Storms' responsibility 
for interior walls] which shall be maintained by Lessor." 139 Ordinary wear and tear 
includes any usual deterioration from the use of th premises and by lapse of time. 
The question raised by the parties became whether the drywall highlighted by 
Watkins resulted from normal wear and tear or from damage by Storms and Brownstone 
which should have been repaired. Unfortunate! Watkins offered no expert testimony as 
to what kind of norn1al wear and tear can be expected from a conunercial tenant who has 
used a building for thirteen (13) years as a restaurant. Although specialized knowledge 
might not be necessary in determining normal wear and tear in a residential lease 
commercial leases and pa1ticularly the wear and tear expected in a building used as a 
restamant over a thirteen year period, are not within a factfinder's common knowledge. 
Watkins points to Trial Exhibits 3.11 through 3.17, and 3.57 through 3.64 as 
examples of holes in the drywall which Storms and Brownstone filled without repainting 
the wall. All of these exhibits show what appear to be nail or hanger holes in the drywall 
which have been filled. The holes do not appear to be anything other than use of the 
walls to han0 pictures or other decorations. The fom1er Lease did not require Storms to 
return the Premises in like-new condition. Herbert Rockhold testified that the paint on 
the walls was old and could not be easily matched. 
Requiring Storms and Brownstone to repaint walls subjected to ordinary use does 
not comport with the terms of the former Lease. either do nail holes in a wall, without 
evidence that such holes are not normal wear and tear in a commercial leasehold, support 
138 Jd. 
139 Trial Exh ibit J, at pp. I , 4. 
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a :finding of a breach of Storms' and Brownstone' s at-will tenancy with Watkins or 
committed waste upon the Premises. 
In the alternative, if expert testimony is not necessary to establish abuse versus 
normal wear and tear to the walls, or if Mr. Watkins' testimony equates to expertise given 
his experience as a commercial lessor, the holes in the walls exhibited in Trial Exhibits 
3. l I tlu·ough 3. I 7, and 3.57 through 3.64 show normal wear and tear rather than abuse. 
Watkins also underscores Trial Exhibits 3.68, 3.92, 3.94, 3.107, 3.111 , and 3.132 
as examples of walls with unfilled holes. Trial Exhibit 3.68 depicts round holes that 
apparently anchored a towel dispenser. The new lessee, Gerald Mitchell , testified that 
Trial Exhibit 3.68 depicted the men's bathroom. Witness Herbert Rockhold, who 
assisted Storms' move from the Premises, observed a towel dispenser sitting on the floor 
of the men's bathroom, and a working towel di spenser, seen on the right-hand side of 
Exhibit 3.68, on the wall. Rockhold testified that the holes in the wall shown in Exhibit 
3.68 resulted from the removal of the towel dispenser found on the floor. If expert 
testimony is not required to establish abuse versus normal wear and tear to the walls, or if 
Mr. Watkins' testimony satisfies the expert witness requirement, the holes in the wall 
shown in Trial Exhibits 3.68 are the product of show normal wear and tear rather than 
abuse. 
Trial Exhibit 3.92 reveals a nail head swrnw1ded by the torn surface of drywall. 
No testimony was offered identify ing Trial Exhibit 3.92. Trial Exhibit 3.92 fai ls to 
support Watkins' allegations of breach of the covenant to repair or waste for lack of 
identification. 
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Trial Exhibit 3.94 shows a round hole in drywall. Dane Watkins could not 
identify the location of the wall in the picture. Trial Exhibit 3.94 also fails to supp011 
Watkins' allegations of breach of the covenant to repair under the former Lease or waste 
for lack of identification. 
Trial Exhibit 3.107 appears to be gashes in the surface of drywall. Dane Watkins 
identified the wall depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .107 as an upstairs storage area (referred to 
by Jared Hatfield, who painted the wall as an upstairs office). 140 Other than Jared 
I at:field's invoice for painting the walls (Trial Exhibit 25), no other evidence of the cost 
of repair to the storage area wall was admitted. 
As noted above, the former Lease did not require Storms to leave the Premises 
like new. Instead, Storms and Brownstone were required to make repairs necessary to 
keep the Premises in a good and safe condition. Furthermore, Storms agreed under the 
former Lease to leave the Premises in as good condition as received, normal wear and 
tear excepted. All of the trial exhibits underscored by Watkins as evidence of damage, 
ave for Trial Exhibit 3.107, do not prove that the condition of the wall went beyond 
what might be expected from the use of the Premises over a thitteen-year period. 
Without expert testimony to suggest that old paint is not normal wear and tear to a 
commercial bui lding, Wat.kins has not shown that repainting old walls amounts to repair 
work. In the alternative, this Court finds that old paint in a commercial building typifies 
normal wear and tear. 
Although the gashes shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .107 are not normal , ear and tear 
nothing in the record identifies the cost to repair the drywall shown in the pictme, other 
140 Sec: Trial Exh ibit 25. 
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than Jared Hatfield 's fee to paint the drywall. Repainting walls does not hint of repair 
work, but of aesthetic appeal. Without a specific showing of the costs incurred to repair 
the drywall in Trial Exhibit 3.107, Watkins claim fo r damages to that wall fai l for lack of 
specificity. 
Trial Exhibit 3. 111 illustrates a light fixture hanging from , rather than attached to, 
a ceiling. Electrical contractor Blaise Kauer could not identify the location of the light 
fixture seen in Trial Exhibit 3.111. He testified, however that for a light fixture in the 
condition seen in Trial Exhibit 3.1 11 , he would have simply reattached the light fixture to 
the ceiling. Herbert Rockhold testified he did not see or observe a light fixture hanging 
in the condition depicted in Trial Exhibit 3. 111. Storms did not recognize the light 
fixture and testified it did not exist on the Premises when he and Brownstone vacated the 
building. The fo undation of the evidence being too vague, Watkins has not shown a 
breach of the covenant to repair, exemplified by the former Lease, in its Trial Exhibit 
3.111. Neither has Watkins shown waste to the Premises. 
Trial Exhibit 3.132 shows two holes in brown drywall. Dane Watkins thought the 
photograph was taken in the upstairs area of the Premises. Without a solid identification 
of the location of the wall in Trial Exhibit 3 .132, a finding of a breach of the covenant to 
repair, carried over from the former Lease, cannot be made. Neither can a finding of 
waste be suppo1ted. Furthermore, nothjng in the evidence suggests whether or not such 
holes, if they existed on the Premises when Storms and Brownstone vacated the building, 
were normal wear and tear. In the alternative, this Court finds such holes are normal 
wear and tear to commercial walls over the period of thirteen years. For these reasons, 
Watkins has not shown a breach of the covenant to repair or waste by Trial Exhibit 3.132. 
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In his closing argument, Watkins identified Trial Exhibit 17 as evidence of costs 
for damage repair to the drywall on the Premises. Trial Exhibit I 7 consists of two 
receipts from The Home Depot, dated January 12 and 13 of 2011, for tape, ready mix, 
knives, a sander head and drywall. Other items on the receipts are unidentifiable. Dane 
Watkins testified that he bought the items listed on the receipts and gave them to his 
handyman Jared Hatfield. Mr. Watkins frniher testified that he could see that Jared 
Hatfield was using the tape, the texture, and all of the items Mr. Watkins pmchased. 
Jared Hatfield did not testify at trial. Nothing in the evidence shows that Hatfield 
or anybody else actually repaired the damage shown in Trial Exhibit 3.107, the only 
photograph showing recognizable damage (as opposed to normal wear and tear) to 
drywall. ven if an inference could be made that the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.07 was 
repaired, no evidence was presented to indicate the cost of repair to the wall shown in 
Trial Exhibit 3.07. The purchase of supplies which were apparently used throughout the 
Premises cannot be charged to Storms and Brownstone, since the specific uses of the 
supplies were never identified. 
Dane Watkins also identified Trial Exhibit 34 as what he believed to be painting 
supplies provided to Jared Hatfield. Watkins has not shown that painting old walls is a 
necessary repair or that walls in need of painting after thirteen years of business are not 
expected normal wear and tear to a building. Indeed this Court finds that repainting 
interior walls in a commercial structure u ed as a restaurant for thirteen years is expected 
wear and tear. Furthermore, Gerald Mitchell testified that he did not like the wall colors 
used by Burggraf and Storms and painted the walls with colors to suit his tastes. For 
these reason Watkins shall not recover the expenses charged in Trial Exhibit 34. 
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Watkins argues that "some of Jared Hatfield's labor charges are on Ex. 23 
mentioned above plus additional charges for $350.00. See Ex. 25." 141 Trial xhibit 23 
cited above consists of the $1 100.00 "labor only" invoice from Hatfield Construction 
for numerous tasks . The invoice does not break down the charges or time spent on the 
various efforts undertaken by Hatfield. Without more detail as to the amounts charged 
for Hatfield's labors, Trial Exhibit 23 cannot be attributed to repairs necessitated by 
failures of Storms and Brownstone. Trial Exhibit 25 applies to paint work which 
Watkins has not shown to be a recoverable repair item. 
Watkins then adds Trial Exhibit 3.8 as evidence of alleged damage to dJywall 
cau ed by Storms and Brownstone. Trial Exhibit 3.8 reveals what appear to be filled nail 
holes in a wall. Dane Watkins testified that Jared Hatfield did not paint the wall shown in 
Trial Exhibit 3.8. Mr. Watkins later testified that repairs to the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.8 
would have been part of Simon Gisin's invoice, Trial Exhibits 12 and 13 . Once again, 
however, nothing in the evidence showed what part of Trial Exhibits 12 or 13 contributed 
to repair work, if any, to the wall depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.8. Watkins' claim for 
damages to the wall in Trial Exhibit 3 .8 fails for lack of specificity. 
4. Broken Doors 
Watkins alleges that Storms and Brownstone left a broken door in the northeast 
corner of the Premises because the door was missing the crash bar and closer. 142 Watkins 
submitted evidence that Dan Carter the owner of Bennetts Eastside Paint, sold a crash 
1·11 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 13. 
142 Watkins ' Closing Argument, at p. 14. See also: Trial Exhibits 3.1, 3.2 3.3, and 38.12. 
FIND INGS OF FACT AND CONCLU IONS OF LAW 36 
113
bar and closer to Snake River Equipment Company.143 Carter testified that the crash bar 
and closer were used to repair the doors located on the Premises. 
a. Crash Bar on the North Public Entrance144 
Restaurant employee Katie Williams testifi d that the crash bar 
(alternately referred to as a panic bar) on the northeast door was in operation when she 
became employed at the Restaurant in 2006. Williams did not know when the crash bar 
went missing. Restaurant employee Ryan Getsinger recalled that some screws on one 
side of the crasg bar had come loose, causing the bar to sag. In order to keep the crash 
bar from breaking or pinching patrons, employees removed the sagging bar. This 
occurred approximately one month prior to closing of the Restaurant. Getsinger recalled 
that the screws had probably been stripped and required repair. 
Storms acknowledged that on the date he and Brownstone vacated the Premises 
the crash bar had come off the northeast door. Storms testified that he found a 
replacement part on the internet which was less expensive than replacement of the entire 
system, but he provided no proof of his findings, no evidence that the crash bar he 
discovered was the same make or model as the device on the northeast door, and no 
testimony that the crash bar system on the 11011h ast door was capable of repair rather 
than replacement. 
Dan Carter testified that replacement of the crash bar alone (as opposed to the 
entire system) might cost 35.00 to $40.00. However nothing in the evidence suggested 
that the existing crash bar system could be repaired with a replacement crash bar alone. 
1~3 See: Trial xhibi t 33. 
IH See: Tr ial xhibits 3. l and 3.2 . 
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Thus, Storms failed to prove his claim that Watkins did not mitigate its damages with a 
cheaper crash bar replacement. 
Since the fom1er Lease provided that the tenant was responsible for maintenance 
of doors on the Premises, 145 and since the vidence suggests the crash bar on the 
nmiheast door was missing at the time Storms and Brownstone vacated the Premises 
Watkins has shown that Storms breached his at-will tenancy exemplified in the terms of 
the form r Lease, by failing to maintain the crash bar system on the nm1heast door. In 
the alternative, Watkins has shown that Storms and Brownstone committed waste by 
failing to leave the crash bar in working condition. Watkins shall recover the cost to 
replace the crash bar system $259.09, plus six percent (6%) interest of $15.55 , for a total 
recovery of $274.64. 
b. Closer on the Inside Doors to the Main Entrance146 
The closer at i sue was identified by Dan Carter as attached to one of the 
main entrance doors to the Premises, not the northeast door (where Dane Watkins placed 
it). Although Carter testified that the closer was not functioning he did not personally 
inspect the door or the mechanism. Employee Tamara Metcalf clarified that the closer 
existed on the inside main entrance door. She testified that the closer was functional 
throughout the time she worked at the Restaurant, from 2002 until April of 2010. Storms 
recalled that the closer was fully functional when he and Brownstone vacated the 
Premises. 
Given the lack of foundation for Dan Carter s observation about the inside main 
entrance door Watkins has not shown that Storm and Brownstone breached its at-will 
w Trial xhibit 1, at p. 4. 
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tenancy, premised upon the former Lease by failing to maintain the door closer on the 
in ide main entrance door. either has Watkins shown waste to the Premises by its 
evidence regarding the door closer on the main entrance door. 
c. Lock Rods on the Outside Main Entrance Doors 147 
Watkins further alleges that Storms and Brownstone sunendered the 
Premi es without a functional locking front door. 148 Instead, Storms and Brownstone 
us d a chain and padlock to secure the front entrance doors. 149 
Dane Watkins testified that the front entrance doors would not work properly and 
needed repairs. Dan Carter testified that the lock rods were worn out. He stated that the 
area where the Jock rods entered the threshold and the header was full of di1i and debris. 
Restaurant employee Katie WilJiams recalled that the front entrance doors were 
chained and padlocked every night for security during her entire tenure as an employee 
for Storms and Brownstone from January to May 2006 and again from May 2007 until 
the Restaurant closed in September of 2010. Storms testified that there were no issues 
with the lock rods when he and Brownstone vacated the Premises. He recalled that the 
lock rod secured into the top of the door jamb (referred to by Carter as the "header") but 
not into the bottom threshold. He explained that from the outset of his occupancy of the 
Premises the door had "play" in it of two to three inches, even after the lock rod had 
been secured into the door jamb (or header). Although Storms saw no issue with the lock 
rod other than instability, Storms secured the front doors with chain and lock each night 
for added safety. He further testified that he received no photographs depicting problems 
146 ee: Trial Exh ibit 3 .19. 
147 See: Trial Exh ibit 3.20. 
148 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 15. 
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with the lock rods from Watkins. Storms added that he has returned to the Premises since 
Gerald Mitchell opened the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill, and the front entrance doors 
still sway if pulled upon even with the new lock rods engaged in the door jamb. 
The evidence does not infer that the lock rods were broken or non-functioning 
merely because Storms added a chain and lock to secure the front doors at night. 
Assuming that Carter's testimony regarding dirt and debris in the threshold and door 
jamb or header holes is true, nothing in the record aids the determination of whether or 
not such dirt and debris is normal wear and tear versus abuse. In the alternative, this 
Court finds that dirt and d bris in the threshold and door jamb constitute normal wear and 
tear to a commercial leasehold over a thirteen year period. Therefore, Watkins has not 
shown that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy or committed waste by 
failing to maintain or repair the lock rods. 
In the alternative Watkins seeks $151.46 for repairing the front entrance door 
Jock by replacing the lock rods. 150 Trial Exhibit 4 is an invoice from Bennetts Paint & 
Glass dated June 29, 2011 which details "new lock rods" at a cost of $48.55 and 'on site 
labor check panic hardware and install new lock rods on front door" at a cost of 
$100.00. 151 The panic hardware had been installed by Bennetts Paint and Glass on or 
about January 31 , 2011. 152 The labor costs for checking the panic hardware and installing 
the new lock rods are not separated. Storms and Brownstone were not in possession of 
the Premises during any of the intervening days between January 31, 201 I and June 29 
201 l. Mr. Mitchell took possession of the Premises in April of 2011. St01ms and 
14 Id. See also: Trial Exh ibits 3.19. 3.20, and 3.22 . 
150 See: Trial Exhibit 4. 
15 1 Jd ., at p. I. 
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Brownstone are not responsible for labor to recheck a panic system installed one month 
after they vacated the Premises. 
In addition, since Mr. Mitchell had been in possession of the Premises for three 
months before Carter replaced the lock rods and ince Watkins did not identify the 
alleged non-functioning of the lock rods within a reasonab le time after Storms and 
Brownstone vacated the Premises, any damages for an alleged breach of Storms' and 
Brownstone's at-wiJl tenancy or alleged waste based upon the lock rods fails for lack of a 
causal connection between the alleged damage and Stom1s/Brownstone. 
5. Cleaning E.xpenses 
Next, Watkins alleges that Stonns and Brownstone left a majority of the Premises 
I -3 
"very dirty" after they vacated the Restaurant. ) Watkins requests $9,065.00 for fees 
. d l h p . 154 mcmTe to c ean t . e rem1ses. 
Restaurant employee Katie Williams, who worked at the Brownstone for five 
months in 2006 and then from May 2007 until September of 20 l O when the Restaurant 
closed, testified about routine cleaning during the Restaurant's operation. She explained 
that day-hostesses at the Restaurant were expected to dust the tops of the wood on the 
walls and windows depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .10. Servers and managers dusted the grey 
beams shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .10 on a daily basis or as necessary when they were 
dusty including in-between each of the lines within the grid on the ceiling. Day-servers 
and bar-servers scrubbed the floors daily with bleach water. Night-hostesses would clean 
152 Trial Exh ibit 33. 
153 Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 15- 18. 
1s4 Id. 
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the doors wi th Windex. Night-servers, at the end of their shi fts, were expected to wipe 
down the window sills. 
Employee Ryan Getsinger testified that he boiled a tlu·ee to four gallon pot of 
water every night, to which was added bleach and degreaser, to clean the floors. The hot 
water was poured on the floor and then the floor was scrubbed with a stiff-bristled deck 
brush. The water was then "squeegeed" into the floor drain. The damp floor was then 
dry-mopped. 
Tamara Metcalf created a list of what employees were supposed to do at each of 
the various stations in the Restaurant. Williams helped prepare punch lists for the daily 
chores required of hostesses and servers. Willian1s testified that the Brownstone was a 
very busy restaurant. 
According Metcalf, the kitchen hood system was maintained by a company hired 
by Storms. Getsinger testified that kitchen staff cleaned the exhaust filters approximately 
every two weeks by running them through the dishwasher. 
Storms and the beer-brewer were responsible for cleaning the brewery area 
because a certain kind of cleaning chemical was required and because the brewing 
equipment was expensive. With regard to the brewery area, Metcalf testified: "we don't 
want very many people back there responsible for that." 
Every year, Storms conducted an "annual cleaning day" at which time he closed 
the Restaurant. It was a mandatory day for all employees. Approximately forty ( 40) 
employees came to work early in the morning and conducted extensive cleaning 
tlu·oughout the day, until late in the afternoon. The General Manager was responsible for 
the supervision of the annual cleaning. 
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Kitchen equipment was taken outside and scrubbed, pressure-washed and hosed 
down. Tamara Metcalf testified that the kitchen equipment would sparkle "like brand 
new" following these annual cleanings. The kitchen area where equipment had been 
removed was cleaned, and then the kitchen equipment was re-installed. Chairs and tables 
were removed and the floor was cleaned with bleach water a hard scrub-brush, and 
sometimes with a butter knife. 155 The grease, dust, and black grime on the brick walls 
were scrubbed down. The walls and windowsill of the bathrooms were scrubbed. The 
large window in the ladies' bathroom was scrubbed. Sinks were cleaned with Lysol or 
Jorox . Employees got down on the bathroom floors and cleaned arow1d the toilets and 
scrubbed the floors. Tiles on the walls in each stall were cleaned and washed down the 
doors and doorknobs were cleaned, and the pictures were dusted. Th large rafters in the 
open ceiling were dusted using hydraulic lifts or ladders and large fluffy dusters. 156 
Beams and ceiling fans were cleaned. The brewery area was cleaned. The exterior brick 
was cleaned. 157 The final annual cleaning took place in September of 2009. 
Storms hired Alan Flores to deep clean the Premises after the Brownstone ceased 
operation in September of 2010. Flores began his work in October of 2010 but ceased 
for a number of weeks. He then removed the contents and fixtures within the Premises 
and clean d the entire Premises save for the ceiling area, ceiling fans, and upstairs storage 
rooms. Flores described his method of deep cleaning by using degreaser and hot water so 
as not to damage the drains. Flores finished his work after Christmas of 2010. 
155 See: Defendants Trial Exhibits T.27 and T.28. 
156 See: Defendants ' Trial Exhibit T.30. 
157 See: Defendants' Trial Exhibit T.29. 
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ew tenant Gerald Mitchell who testified that he became serious about renting 
the Premises "in the first part of 201 1," was asked about the condition of the Premises 
when he first inspected it. Although Mitchell did not specify whether his testimony 
related to his inspection in August of 2010 (at which time the Restaurant was still in 
operation) or after Storms and Brownstone moved out, the evidence infers that Mitchell 
looked at the Premises some time after the building became vacant because Mitchell 
described the kitchen as "stripped out." 
At his inspection Gerald Mitchell commented to Dane Watkins that the 
Restaurant "wasn't usable." Mitchell specified leaks in the roof, the stripped kitchen and 
all of the plumbing, which Mitchell described as "in pretty bad shape." He noticed 
grease build-up that required cleaning before he could do basic things like choosing a 
paint color. Mitchell contracted with S & R Carpet Upholstery Cleaning to clean the 
ceilings in the kitchen the walls, and the bathrooms. 158 
Mitchell testified that the Premises were "pretty dirty" with a lot of grease buildup 
and dirt, requiring a lot of clean up before be could prepare to reopen the Premises as the 
Snow Eagle Brewery and G1ill. In Addendum A to the April 4 2011 Commercial Lease 
and Deposit Receipt between Snow Eagle Brewery and Watkins, Mitchell rec ived a 
$6,000.00 "cleaning credit" in acknowledgement of the fact that ''the Premises are not in 
1 d .. ,,1·9 a c ean con 111011. 
Mitchell hired Simon Gisin to conduct a thorough cleaning because the build-up 
of dirt prevented any painting. Mitchell testified that Gisin was to clean walls, beams, 
exterior ductwork, the mezzanine floor and trim board, and brick and to paint the 
158 See: Trial Exhibit 16. 
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Premises in the color(s) Mitchell wanted. 160 Watkins argued that he paid for the cleaning 
with th $6 000.00 cleaning credit to Snow Eagle Brewery and Giill. 161 Gisin's invoices 
(Trial Exhibit 12 and I 3) were charges in addition to his $6,000.00 cleaning, painting, 
and texturing contract with Mitchell. 
Gisin testified that Mitchel I hired him to clean and paint the ceilings and "pretty 
much everything in there." He stated that the general condition of the Premises was 
"pretty dirty, pretty bad." Gisin explained that he "pretty much wiped everything down 
and vacuumed everything pretty good." Gisin cleaned the bathrooms and the mezzanine, 
painted the ceilings and the walls, including texturing, at a contracted rate of $6,000.00. 
Gisin acknowledged that restaurant grime can be difficult to clean. He stated, 
"when you've got a restaurant, that kind of like a grease-dust stuff just is murder." Gisin 
recommended that the ceiling and walls should be repainted, rather than scrubbed down, 
because "No one is going to come in here and scrub them down. It would be just a little 
bit faster to dust them off and repaint them." Gisin charged an amount for painting the 
ceilings and walls in addition to the $6,000.00 contract already in place. 
Prior to opening the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill, Gerald Mitchell hired Rusty 
Kappel, a professional carpet cleaner, to clean the Premises to allow Mitchell to finish 
renovating the Restaurant. Kappel was hired to clean the floors throughout the Premises. 
Kappel testified that when he entered, the Premises appeared to have been vacant for a 
while . 
159 Trial Exhibit 2, at p. 5. 
160 See: Trial Exhibits 12 and 13. 
161 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 16. 
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a. Exposed Beams, Vaulted Ceiling and High Ceiling Fans 162 
Initially, Watkins points to the exposed beams, vaulted ceiling, and high 
ceiling fans which were "covered with grease and dust" as objects requiring cleaning. 163 
Watkins identifies Trial ~xhibits 3.40, 3.41, 3.42 3.43 , 3.48 3.1 32, 3.133, 3.134, 3.135, 
3 .1 36 3 .13 7, and 3 .13 8 as examples of dirty beams, ce ilings, and ceiling fans. 164 
Storms identified Trial Exhibits 3.40 and 3.41 as depicting rafters m the 
Restaurant directly above the brewery. Trial Exhibit 3.40 shows a slanting beam with a 
fair amount of dust covering the surface. Trial Exhibit 3.41 also displays a beam with a 
lighter coating of dust on the surface. Mr. Watkins testified that the beams had not, to his 
lrnowledge, been cleaned in the thirteen (13) years that Storms and Brownstone occupied 
the Premises. Alan Flores did not clean the large, wooden beams. Simon Gisin testified 
that he vacuumed off the beam shown in Trial Exhibit 3.40. 
Dane Watkins identified Trial Exhibit 3.42 as the ceiling fan above the dining 
area. Trial Exhibit 3.42 shows a ceiling fan with dust on the upper sides of the blades and 
the motor housing. Storms conceded that Trial Exhibit 3.42 displays the condition of the 
fan when he and Brownstone vacated the Premises. Simon Gisin cleaned the ceiling fan 
depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.42. 
Trial Exhibit 3.43 was identified by Mr. Watkins as "what could have been a 
swamp cooler" with dust and dirt on top of it. Gisin testified that the duct work shown in 
Trial ~xhibit 3.43 was removed when the Restaurant was remodeled for Gerald Mitchell 
and the ceiling was patched. Gisin did not clean the ducts shown in Tr.ial Exhibit 3.43. 
162 See: Trial Exhibits 3.42, 3 .1 36, 3 .137, and 38. 16. 
163 Watkins' Closing Argument, atp. 15. 
164 Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 15-16. 
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Alan Flores identified Trial Exhibit 3.48 as the second floor area (or mezzanine). 
Flores testified that he only cleaned the floor area shown in Trial Exhibit 3.48. 
Dane Watkins recognized Trial Exhibit 3.132 as an area of drywall damage in 
need of repair. He did not testify about Trial Exhibit 3. 132 in terms of cleaning 
expectations. 
Trial Exhibit 3.133 showed what Mr. Watkins described as dust and grime on the 
trim board . Flores identified the area depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.133 as the second floor 
(the mezzanine). Flores cleaned the walls and the floor in that area, including the use of 
hot water on the floor. Simon Gisin identified the area depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.1 33 as 
" in the back up above where the tanks were." Gisin vacuumed, and mopped the floor and 
wiped down the trim board. He testified that the " light colored stuff' on the trim board in 
Trial Exhibit 3.133 was "a dust-greasy thing that was hard to get off." 
Trial Exhibit 3.134 was identified by Storms as the second cei ling directly above 
the kitchen. Storms identified areas of leakage in the photograph. Otherwise, dust can be 
seen on the top of the ductwork in Trial Exhibit 3. 134. Alan Flores testified that he did 
not clean the "vents or where the AC goes." 
Trial Exhibit 3.135 was identified by Storms as a photograph taken when Storms 
and Brownstone vacated the Premises. Trial Exhibit 3. 135 reveals a pinkish-red colored 
wall with pipes extruding above the trim board and with two, row1d holes in the wall. 
None of the witnesses testified about the cleanliness of the area depicted in Trial Exhibit 
3.135, although some dust is visible on the trim board. 
Mr. Watkins identified Trial Exhibits 3. 136 and 3.1 37 as dirty ceiling fans, which 
he observed when he re-entered the Premises after Storms' and Brownstone' s departure. 
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Storms likewise identified Trial Exhibits 3 .136 and 3 .13 7 as ceiling fans in the Restaurant 
directly over the brewery. He admitted they were not cleaned because the brewing 
equipment was the last thing moved off the Premises and the ceiling above the brewing 
area was not cleaned. 
Storms identified Trial Exhibit 3.138 as fill auger-hole directly above the brewery 
in the Restaurant. He conceded that the part of the wall depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .13 8 
was not cleaned before he and Brownstone vacated the Premises. 
· othing in the record informs the Court whether or not some dust and di1t are to 
be expected on the ceilings and upper beams of vacated commercial premises. Simon 
Gisin's testimony seemed to infer that greasy dust is not uncommon in restaurants and is 
very difficult to remove. Without expert guidance regarding normal wear and tear in 
circumstances such as the Restaurant, the record does not support a finding that the dusty 
beams, vaulted ceiling and high ceiling fans breached Storm's and Brownstone's at-will 
tenai1cy with Watkins or amounted to waste upon the Premises. 
In the alternative, this Court finds that the dust on the beains, vaulted ceiling, and 
high ceiling fans, as seen in Trial Exhibits 3.42 3.136, ai1d 3.137, is excessive and 
represents a breach of the expectations of Storms' and Brownstone's tenancy at will with 
Watkins. But Watkins' evidence does not specify the costs incurred to clean the beams, 
high ceiling fans and vaulted ceiling. Instead, Watkins offers the fact that he gave 
Gerald Mitchell a $6 000.00 cleai1ing credit on Mitchell's lease as evidence of such 
costs. 165 Such evidence offers no information from which an award for cleaning the 
16" Watkins ' Closing Argument, at p. 16. See also: Trial Exhibit 2 at Addendum A. 
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ceiling beams and fans can be fashioned. Therefore, Watkins' claim for damages to 
clean these high areas of the Premises fails for lack of specificity. 
b. Stained Brickwork166 
The next area identified by Watkins as problematic was the stained 
brickwork, which Watkins identified as Trial Exhibits 3.52 38.6, 38.10, 38.12, 38.17, 
167 38.18, 38.20 and 38.24. 
Dane Watkins identified Trial Exhibit 3.52 as the floor and brick wall in the 
brewery area that needed heavy cleaning. He identified the dark material on the brick as 
mold. Alan Flores testified that Trial Exhibit 3.52 did not depict mold, but dirty brick 
and grout, which he cleaned in December of 2010 . In fact, Flores testified that Trial 
Exhibit 3.52 was taken after he cleaned the wall and floor. Simon Gisin testified that the 
bottom two bricks shown in Trial Exhibit 3.52 were "pretty dirty." He explained that the 
dark coloration was hard to remove. In fact, he testified that he did not remove all of the 
dark coloration but that he brightened the brick up. Gisin's work was done in May and 
June of 20 11 some five to six months after Flores' work. 168 
Burggaf testified that when the cement floors were completed in the course of the 
Brownstone Restaurant remodel, she and Storms had a concrete stain applied to the 
floors. Burggraf was very unhappy with the end result of the concrete stain because, 
among other things, the bricks at the base of the walls were oversprayed with the stain. 
Burggraf testified that Trial Exhibit 3 8.6 illustrated the overspray problem. Alan Flores 
cleaned the brick shown in Trial Exhibit 38.6 in December of 2010. He testified that the 
166 See: Trial Exhibits 3.52, 38.6, 38.10, 38.12, 38.17, 38.20, and 38.24. 
167 Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 16, 17 
168 See: Trial Exh ibits 12 and 13 . 
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photograph was taken after he cleaned. Rusty Kappel testified that he also cleaned the 
brick shown in Trial Exhibit 38.6. Kappel's work was done in June of 2011. 169 
Burggraf also identified the brick in Trial Exhibit 38.l O as an example of the 
overspray issue. Alan Flores testified that he cleaned the brick shown in Trial Exhibit 
38.10 in December of 2010. Flores stated that the photograph was taken after he had 
cleaned. He explained that he could not restore the brick to its natural color. 
Burggraf was the only witness to address Trial Exhibit 38.12. She could not 
positively identify whether overspray was depicted in Trial Exhibit 38.12. 
Trial Exhibit 38.17 was never identified at trial. 
The only testimony related to Trial Exhibit 38.18 came from Alan. Fl.ores, who 
observed that the floor shown in Trial Exhibit 38. 18 was clean. 
Alan Flores identified Trial Exhibit 38.20 as the area in which the walk-in cooler 
had been located during Storms' and Brownstone's tenancy of the Premises. Flores 
cleaned the walls degreased the floor, and cleaned the posts in December of 2010. He 
stated that the Premises, as hown in Exhibit 38.20, were clean. 
Storms identified Trial Exhibit 38.24 as the food preparation area m the 
restamant. No testimony was given as to the condition of the bricks shown in Trial 
Exhibit 38 .24. 
The reason for the black stainjng on th bottom bricks was not proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, as mold. Only Dane Watkins identified the black 
discoloration on the bottom rows of bricks as mold.170 Watkins did not lay any 
foundation as to Dane Watkins' ability to distingwsh mold from cement overspray. Trial 
169 ~: Trial Exhibit 16. 
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xhibit 3.52, which shows a close-up view of the bricks on the bottom of the wall 
reveals signs of scrubbing. 
Instead the evidence supports a fmding that the black staining on the lower bricks 
of the walls was caused by concrete overspray which was part of the renovation of the 
Premises by Burggraf and Storms. Assmning the black staining was overspray, such 
condition did not result from lack of maint nance or abuse by Storms and Brownstone. 
Burggraf and Storms began operation of the Restaurant with the overspray in place. 
Other staining visible on the higher levels of brick, as particularly seen in Trial 
Exhibits 38.6 and 38.20 were not specifically identified as to the cause of the 
discoloration. Alan Flores cleaned the brick walls as torms and Brownstone vacated the 
Premises in December of 2010. Simon Gisin cleaned the walls of the Premises in May 
and June of 2011. Rusty Kappel apparently cleaned the same surfaces again, in June of 
2011. 
Watkins offered no expert testimony as to nonnal wear and tear to the walls of a 
rental building which was used to operate a restaurant for some thirteen (13) years. 
either was expe1.t testimony offered as to the level of cleaning required when a tenant 
moves out of a leasehold building. The evidence inferred that Storms and Brownstone 
hired Alan Flores who had experience deep cleaning restaurants in the Yellowstone Park 
area to deep clean the Premises prior to completely vacating the building. That 
additional cleaning was necessary after the bui lding sat vacant for some five months is to 
be expected, and should not be charged to Storms and Brownstone. 
170 See: Trial Exh ibit 3.52 . 
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In the alternative this Court finds no evidenc , other than concrete overspray and 
normal wear and tear, of abuse to the interior brick walls of the Premises. 
For these reason , Watkins has not shown that Stonns and Brownstone breached 
their at-will tenancy with Watkins or c01mnitted waste by failing to maintain the 
brickwork. 
c. Walls and Floors. 171 
Next, Watkins points to Trial Exhibits 3.10 1, 3.102, 3.103, 3. 117 3.118, 
3.119 3.120, 3.12 1 3.122, 3.123, 38 .1 , and 38.2 as evidence of the lack of cleaning to 
the kitchen walls, floors , ceiling and concrete back room. 172 Watkins argued that Rusty 
Kappel of S & R Carpet Upholstery Cleaning charged $1 ,470.00 to clean the "problem 
areas." 173 
Trial Exhibits 3.101 , 3 .102 and 3 .103 depict a concrete floor (with evidence of 
scrubbing), and green, tan, and white drywall. Dane Watkins placed the area shown in 
Trial Exhibits 3.101, 3.102, and 3.103 as the outside walls ofthe kitchen. He complained 
that damage was done to the sh etrock. Mr. Watkins testified, with regard to Trial 
Exhibit 3.102 that when Storms and Brownstone vacated the Premises they replaced 
some of the sheetrock where equipment was removed. The green-colored wall in Exhibit 
3.102 was an example of the material put in by Storms and Brownstone as they left the 
building. Mr. Watkins complained that St01ms and Brownstone did not complete any 
taping or texturing on the replaced sheetrock. 
171 See: Trial Exhibi ts 3.101 , 3 .11 7 through 3.123, 38 .1 and 38.2. 
172 Watkins' Closing Argument at p. 17. 
173 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 17. See also : Trial Exhibit 16. 
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Mr. Watkins also observed water continuously running from a piece of equipment 
formerly located in or around the area shown in Trial Exhibit 3.102. On cross-
examination, Mr. Watkins was not sure whether the leak was located in the area shown in 
Trial Exhibit 3.102 or behind it. 
Employee Ryan Getsinger testified that Trial Exhibits 3. 101 and 3.102 show the 
same wall on opposite sides. He observed a leak in the area whenever a heavy rain fell or 
when the snow melted in the spring. He also testified that snow from the parking lot, 
which was plowed up against the north side of the building, would melt in the spring and 
come through the garage door on the north side. Melted snow water would pool in the 
preparation area depicted in Trial Exhibits 3.101 and 3.102. 
Trial Exhibits 3 .117, 3 .118, and 3 .119 reveal a corner in what Dane Watkins and 
Tamara Metcalf identified as the dishwasher area of the former kitchen in the Restaurant. 
Green and white paneling, with visible stains, is evident, as is a portion of the concrete 
flooring. Herbert Rockhold identified the white paneling as a Masonite-type hard board 
with a slick coating on the outside surface. Rockhold explained that the green paneling 
was moisture-resistant sheetrock. 
Tamara Metcalf identified that a waist-high counter had been located on the right-
hand wall shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .118, as well as a heavy-duty dishwasher. The 
dishwasher reached over Tamara's head (and Tamara described her height as 5'7"). The 
corner depicted in Trial Exhibit 3 .118 was covered by equipment. 
Mr. Watkins argued that the white hardboard needed to be repaired and changed 
because it was rotted out. The green material was new sheetrock put in by Rockhold at 
the request of Storms and Brownstone, but was neither taped nor textured. Rockhold 
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replaced those sections because the wall was damaged. The sheetrock near the floor was 
"substantially busted up" according to Rockhold. Both Storms and Rockhold observed 
water damage to the sheetrock near the floor, which was the reason why Rockhold 
replaced the sheetrock, as seen in Trial Exhibits 3.11 7, 3.1 18, and 3.119. Tamara Metcalf 
noted that the floor shown in Trial Exhibits 3. 117, 3,1 18, and 3. 11 9 was usually wet 
because of all the washing. 
Mr. Watkins testified he thought the valve depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.1 19 was 
continuously leaking, although he was unsure. Gerald Mitchell testified that the leak was 
shown in Trial Exhibit 3. 118, coming from a piece of plumbing sticking out of the wall. 
Metcalf testified that a water leak came from the backside of Exhibit 3.118 (she identified 
Trial Exhibit 3.101 as the backside of Trial Exhibit 3. 118) off and on, usually in the 
spring or when heavy rain occurred. Metcalf testified that the only water leaks in the 
plumbing depicted in Trial Exhibits 3. 11 7 and 3. 11 8 would have come from the sinks, 
which were then taken care of immediately. 
Metcalf identified the markings on the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.11 7 as rust from the 
stainless steel shelves formerly located there. Metcalf differentiated between dirt or 
grease and stains and testified that the walls had been clean to the point that paint was 
rubbed off. Alan Flores deep-cleaned the white walls depicted in Trial Exhibits 3.1 17, 
3. 118. and 3. 119 but could not erase the stains. 
Both Flores and Rockhold testified that the green sheetrock shown in Trial 
Exhibits 3.117, 3.11 8, and 3. 119 was covered in stainless steel when they worked in the 
building. Storms testified that the stainless steel sheathing, which glued to the wall, was 
removed when the dishwasher was taken out of the building. 
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Mitchel I replaced the sheetrock shown in Trial Exhibits 3 .117, 3 .118, and 3 .119 
with tile because, in his experience, the sheetrock did not hold up and the existing studs 
in the area were spaced in such a way that the sheetrock would do exactly what was 
shown in the pictures. Mitchell admitted that tile installation was a significant upgrade 
from the white board used by Storms and Brownstone. Mitchell tore out the right-hand 
side wall shown in Trial Exhibit 3.118 in his renovations, and replaced it with a stub-
wall. 
Trial Exhibit 3 .1 20 shows another corner in what was the kitchen area of the 
Restaurant with visible grease staining on the wall. Tamara Metcalf identified the white 
wall area as the location of the fryer. Dane Watkins complained of the "discoloration of 
the rot" and the need for repairs. He thought the brownish/orangish/yellowish coloration 
of the wall in Trial Exhibit 3 .120 was the result of dirt and grease. Metcalf testified that 
the discoloration was the result of staining from heat and hot fryer oil. She identified 
areas where the white board on the right-hand wall had actually been scrubbed off when 
the wall was cleaned. 
Metcalf also testified that the dark, straight line under the light switches on the 
left-hand wall as where a table had been located which wore off the paint. She infotmed 
the Cou11 that the Health Department had inspected the building on numerous occasions 
and never cited the Brownstone fo r the conditions shown in Trial Exhibit 3.1 20. Alan 
Flores deep-cleaned the wall with degreaser to the point of exposing some of the wood 
from underneath the fini sh. Flores testified that when you work in a kitchen and have 
heat "of course, you' re going to see discoloration." Gerald Mitchell testified that the 
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walled area shown in Trial Exhibit 3 .120 was remo ed during his renovations in order to 
enlarge the kitchen. 
Trial Exhibit 3 .121 illustrates a wall area, with white patching and some brownish 
staining. Dane Watkins identified the area as pmi of the kitchen hood system going out 
to the outside. He testified that "[t]here was an attempt I think made to do some drywall 
work that doesn't look like it worked or did the job." Alan Flores testified that the 
picture was taken after he had cleaned the area. He stated: "I'm pretty sure if you go to a 
restaurant, I mean, there ' s stuff that gets stains after that many years and the grease you 
kind of 1 mean, you try to clean it and it stays." Gerald Mitchell testified that the pattern 
of staining in Trial Exhibit 3.1 21 resulted from grease going tlu·ough the cold air return. 
Storms explained that the white patches on the ceiling and the peeling paint on the black 
duct work resulted from Waters Constructions' attempts to repair the inside walls 
following the roof leaks in 2006. 
Trial Exhibit 3 .122 depicts a white wall with greenish-brown markings around 
what had been a square-shaped structure. Dane Watkins testified that the markings were 
di1t. 174 Tamara Metcalf identified the pictur as the outside wall of the kitchen facing the 
bar. A chalk board hung inside the square-shaped markings on the wall. Metcalf 
testified that the wall was cleaned as part of the "3 :30 side work" as well as the annual 
cleaning. She identified the dark mark in the center of the wall as wear, because a 
counter had been located at that position. The square marking surrounding the spot 
wher the chalkboard hung was, she believed dirt from the chalkboard. Metcalf testified 
174 With regard to his testimony Dane Watkins misident ified Trial Exhibit 3.122 as Trial Exhibit 3.121 
when he testified about square or rectangular markings on a wal l. Since Tria l Exhibit 3.122 clearly shows 
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that the chalkboasd was taken down daily, and the wall was wiped down. Alan Flores 
testified that Trial Exhibit 3. 122 was taken after he cleaned the wall. 
Trial Exhibit 3 .1 23 reveals another corner with drywall and a small patch of the 
floor visible. The wall on the left-hand side is the back of the wall depicted in Trial 
Exhibit 3.122. Tamara Metcalf testified that the metal plate shown at the base of the 
wall in Trial Exhibit 3.123 was installed during her t nure at the Brownstone in order to 
stabilize the wal I. 
Trial Exhibit 38 .1 shows the dining area of the Restaurant, looking empty and 
clean. The picture was taken from the front door. Alan Flores testified that Trial Exhibit 
3 8 .1 shows the Restaurant in a clean state. The last thing Flores deep-cleaned was the 
floor in the Restaurant. He used hot water and degreaser and scrubbed the floor with a 
brush. He then sprayed the floor with hot water and used large squeegees and a mop. 
Trial Exhibit 38.2 illustrates the ladder to the mezzanine over the brewing area. 
Alan Flor s testified that the same ladder in Trial Exhibit 38.2 can be seen in the left-
hand corner of Trial Exhibit 38.20. Flores deep-cleaned the area just as he had other 
areas in the Restaurant. 
Rusty Kappel charged Gerald Mitchell $1,470.00 to pull down kitchen wall(s), 
clean and degrease the kitchen floors , walls, and ceiling, and to clean the concrete back 
room. 175 Kappel performed the work on or about April 6, 2011. 176 Kappel testified that 
when he entered the Premises "you could tell that somebody had moved out and it 
seemed vacated for a while." 
square or rectangular marking on a wall (and Trial Exhibit 3.121 does not), Mr. Watkins' testimony 
regarding square or rectangu lar markings shall be attributed to Trial Exhibit 3.122. 
175 Trial Exhibit 16. 
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Kappel' s testimony was unclear whether he tore down walls in the kitchen 
b cause they needed to be replaced or because Mitchell determined to reconfigure the 
kitchen area for the White Eagle Brewery and Grill. Furthermore, without expert 
testimony as to expected wear and tear to walls floors, and ceilings in a restaurant 
operated over a period of thirteen years, no determination can be made as to whether the 
marks and staining to the walls visible Trial Exhibits 3.101 3. 102 3. 117 3. 118 3.119 
3.120, 3.1 21, 3.122, 3.123, 38.1 and 38.2, were to be expected or was unusual. In the 
alternative, this Court finds that the marks and staining shown in Trial Exhibits 3.101 , 
3.102, 3.117, 3.11 8, 3.1 19, 3.1 20, 3.12 1 3.122 3.123, 38 .1 and 38.2 were within the 
reasonable bounds of normal wear and tear. 
Storms and Brownstone hired Herbe1t Rockhold to replace some of the damaged 
sheetrock in the kitchen area. Storms and Brownstone also hired Alan Flores to deep-
clean the entire Premises after the equipment had been removed. Several months after 
Flores completed his cleaning, Kappel came in and cleaned the same areas again. 
Although Watkins was unhappy that Storms and Brownstone did not tape or 
texture the replaced sheetrock, the former Lease did not require Storms and Brownstone 
to return a building in new condition to Watkins. Stonns and Brownstone repaired walls 
they believed had been damaged. And in fact , Gerald Mitchell not only reconfigured the 
Premises to hi s tastes but also repainted because he did not like colors originally selected 
by Storms and Burggraf. Thus, Mitchell took out some of the new sheetrock installed by 
Storms and Brownstone. His use of tile was a significant upgrade from the white 
hardboard installed by Storms and Burggraf. 
176 Id. 
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The attempt to repair drywall work, identified by Dane Watkins in Trial Exhibit 
3. 121 , was undertaken by Waters Construction after Storms complained to Mr. Watkins 
about internal damages from water leaks. Waters Construction never completed its work 
because the leaking roof was not repaired and because of a payment dispute with 
Watkins. The dark areas emanating from the cold air return may have been grease or 
dust related. Flores testified that such staining was both expected in a restaurant 
operating for many years and not the sort of stain that could be removed. Whether or not 
such staining could be considered abuse versus normal wear and tear was not proved by 
Watkins. This Court finds the testimony of Alan Flores credible that the staining was 
normal wear and tear to a building operated as a restaurant over the course of thirteen 
years. 
The greenish-brown markings on the wall in Trial Exhibit 3.122 were stains or 
dirt from the chalkboard that formerly hung on the wall. Flores cleaned the wall depicted 
in Trial Exhibit 3. 122. Whether or not such stains or dirt could be considered abuse 
rather than normal wear and tear were not shown by Watkins. In the alternative, this 
Comt finds the stains represented normal wear and tear to the wall. 
Nothing in the evidence revealed what complaints Watkins had with regard to 
Trial Exhibits 3. 123, 38.1 and 38.2. 
Based upon the lack of evidence that the staining identified by Watkins in Trial 
Exhibits 3.10 1, 3.102, 3. 11 7, 3.118, 3. 119, 3. 120, 3.121 , and 3.1 22 was abuse, the 
evidence does not support a finding that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-wi ll 
tenancy with Watkins or committed wasted by failing to maintain the walls and floors. 
Fwthe1more, without testimony identifying the alleged abuse in Trial Exhibits 3.123, 
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38.1, and 38.2, Watkins has not shown that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will 
status with Watkins or committed waste upon the Premises with regard to thos exhibits. 
d. Upstairs Storage Room Floor. 177 
Next, Watkins complains that Storms and Brownstone left the floor of the 
upstairs storage room "very unclean."178 Watkins points to Trial Exhibits 3.108 and 27 in 
support of its allegation, and argues that $110.00 was spent to strip, refinish and clean 
I • · fl · 179 t,e existmg storage room · oonng. 
Trial Exhibit 3.108 shows a portion of a black-and-white formica floor and a 
portion of the adjoining wall with what appears to be an empty space where a piece of 
equipment was removed. Dane Watkins identified the removed equipment as a heater. 
e identified the exhibit as the upstairs area because of the "checkered floor. " 
Kathy Bmggraf testified that Trial Exhibit 3.108 was upstairs storage room on the 
west side of the building. The same type of flooring is seen in Trial Exhibits T.75, T.77, 
and T. 78, which Burggraf also identified as the upstairs storage rooms. Burggraf testified 
that the black an.d white flooring shown in Trial Exhibits 3.108 T.75 T.77, and T.78 was 
the same in 2010 as it had been in 1997 when Stonns and Burggraf received possession 
of the Premises. 
Watkins testified that he ordered the floors d picted in Trial Exhibits 3.108, T.75, 
T.77, and T.78 stripped and refinished because they were "just a disaster." The floors 
appear to be dirty in rial Exhibits 3.108 T.75, T.77, and T.78. othing in the record 
discusses what is actually visible in Trial Exhibits 3. 108 T.75, T.77, and T.78, however. 
177 See: Trial Exhib its T.75, T.77, and T. 78. 
178 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 17. 
179 l.Q. See also: Trial Exhibit 27. 
FIND fNG S OF FACT AND CONCLUSIO S OF LAW 60 
137
The ourt cannot discern if it is in fact viewing dirt or staining, or wear and tear over 
years of use. 
Watkins did not submit pictmes of the condition of the floors when Storms and 
Burggraf took possession of the Premises. o pictures showing how the floors appeared 
after Watkins had them stripped and refinished were offered in evidence. 
Tamara Metcalf related that the G neral Manager was tasked with cleaning the 
area, including cleaning the floor and dusting. Alan Flores did not specify the upstairs 
storage rooms as areas he deep-cleaned after Storms and Brownstone vacated the 
Premises. 
Based upon the lack of evidence of precisely what is depicted in Trial Exhibits 
3. 108, T.75, T.77, and T.78, how the floors appeared when Storms and Burggraf took 
possession of the Premises, and the result of the stripping and refinishing to which Dane 
Watkins testified, the record does not suppo1t a finding that Storms and Brownstone 
breached their at-will tenancy with Watkins or committed waste by failing to maintain 
the upstairs storage room floors . Watkins shall not recover the $110.00 charged by 
Pioneer Janitorial Services Inc., shown in Trial Exhibit 27 as dan1ages for Storms' and 
Brownstone's alleged failure to maintain the upstairs storage room floors. 
e. Bathrooms. 180 
Watkirls also seeks damages for cleaning the bathrooms. 181 Gerald 
Mitchell hired Rusty Kappel to clean the tile and walls of the bathroom to get rid of what 
Mitchell testified to be "layers of filth that was in there." Kappel cleaned the bathrnoms 
180 See: Trial Exhibits 3.6 1, 3 .67 - 3. 7 l , 38.22, and 38.23. 
181 Watkins' Closing Argument at p. 18. 
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in June of 2011. Kappel charged Mitchell $1 485.00 to "clean bathrooms" and "stairs on 
, fl ,, 182 mam · oor. 
In terms of general maintenance, Katie Wil Iiams testified that the Brownstone 
employee hired as the dishwasher was responsible for cleaning the bathrooms on a daily 
basis, including the sinks and the toilets. Tamara Metcalf testified that she (as the 
General Manager) or the dishwasher cleaned the bathrooms every day. She specified that 
the day-dishwasher would do a deep-clean in the mornings by scrubbing the floor, 
washing the stalls down, taking out the garbage, wiping off the door, sanitizing the sinks, 
cleaning th mirrors, cleaning the toi let wiping the window down, and cleaning the 
pictures in the bathrooms. The night-dishwasher, who relieved the day-dishwasher 
would do the same thing when he came in around 5 o'clock p.m. Metcalf would check 
the bathrooms throughout her shift and clean again if necessary. 
R staurant employee Allison oble, who worked at the Brownstone from 2002 to 
2008, remembered that the bathrooms were remodeled in either 2003 or 2005, including 
new tile paint and grout. 1he bathroom fixtures all looked brand new. 
Alan Flores testified that he deep-cleaned the bathrooms in December of 2010. 
He used a toothbrush to scrub the grout on the tiles. He used a toothbrush and degreaser 
to clean the sinks. The floors were sprayed with degreaser and scrubbed. He identified 
Trial Exhibits 38.22, T.91 , and T.92 as photographs of the bathrooms after they had been 
cleaned. He also pointed out that oxidation on the toilets was not dirt or grime. He 
explained that the discoloration on the toilet seats, seen in Trial Exhibits T. 91 and T.92 
182 Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16. 
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was a function of time rather than uncleanliness. He also explained that the stains shown 
in Trial Exhjbit T.90 occurred with age. 
Kappel testified that he completely cleaned the bathrooms : the walls, fixtures, 
urinals sinks mirrors toilets, and the floors~ from the tile down. 183 He recalled that the 
grout throughout the bathrooms was dirty. He found hard water deposits. He compared 
the toilet seat shown in Trial Exhibit T.91 to the toilet seat shown in Trial xhibit T.92 
and observed that the seat in Trial Exhibit T.91 looked more yellow than the seat in Trial 
Exhibit T.92. He testified that he observed "Just a normal wear and tear and use in 
there." 
Kappel's invoice for cleaning the bathrooms and stairs on the main floor was 
dated June 18, 201 1.184 Gerald Mitchell opened the Snow Eagle Grill and Brewery on 
July 4 2011. This infers that the remodeling of the Premises was on-going when Kappel 
entered the Premises to deep-clean the bathrooms. 
Trial Exhibit 37.10 appears to show dirty floors in one of the bathrooms. That 
photograph was taken in January of 20 13, however, two years after Storms and 
Brownstone vacated the Premises and approximately eighteen (18) months after the 
Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill had been in operation. Trial xhibits 37.14 and 37.25 
were also taken in January of 2013. Trial Exhibits 38.22, 38.23, T.90, T.91 and T.992 
taken by Storms prior to vacating the Premises, do not show abnormal dirt or grime in the 
bathrooms. 
Given the facts that Alan Flores cleaned the bathrooms in December of 2010, and 
that Kappel s cleaning services were undertaken in a period that involved, more likely 
183 ~: Trial Exh ibits 37.10, 37.14, 37.2S, 38.22 and 38.23. 
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than not, traffic from various construction workers undertaking the remodeling project, 
the evidence does not support a finding that the bathrooms were left in an abnormally 
dirty condition. Furthermore, without expert testimony about normal wear and tear to 
bathrooms used by the public over a thirteen-year period, without more specific te1ms as 
to the parties ' agreement regarding final cleaning before the tenant quitted the Premises, 
and without expert guidance as to the depth of cleaning expected of commercial tenants 
Watkins has not show11 that Storms and Brownstone left the bathrooms in a state beyond 
normal expectations. 
In the alternative, the evidence submitted by the parties convinces this Court that 
the bathrooms exhibited nothing more than normal wear and tear for a commercial 
restamant operated over the course of thirteen years. For these reasons, Watkins shall not 
recover for Kappel's bathroom cleaning services. 
6. North Rain Gutter. 185 
Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone left the north ram gutter 
"nonfunctional" when they vacated the Premises. 186 Watkins obtained an estimate from 
Green Acres Home Improvement, dated September 29, 20 11, to replace the rain gutter, at 
a cost of $580.00. 187 No evidence was presented as to what Watkins actually paid to 
replace the north rain gutter. 
Gerald Mitchell testified that the rain gutter on the north side was impacted with 
gr ase. He observed from below the water coming over the rain gutter, down the wall, 
and into the bottom left-hand side of the framing of the window depicted on the left side 
1~4 Tria l Exhibit 16. 
185 ee: Trial Exhibit T.94. 
186 Watkins' Closing Argument at p. 18. 
FINDlNGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 64 
141
of the bar in Trial Exhibit T.98 . Mitchell believed that the hood vent fans were impacted 
with grease and that the grease would follow along the roof and end up in the rain gutter. 
Mitchell did not know if the gutter could have been cleaned out with a hot-water 
pressure wash r. He testified that the window framing was not sealed to control the leak. 
Mitchell also testified that because of the porous nature of the walls, being cinder block 
with a brick fa9ade, he did not believe the walls could be sealed from water leakage. He 
admitted that he insisted upon replacement of the rain gutter because he did not believe 
sealing the outside of the building was a viable option. 
Mitchell never observed the replacement of the rain gutters, but he testified the 
replacement would have occurred before he opened the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill on 
July 4, 201]. Mitchell testified that since the gutter were replaced, he had not observed 
the phenomenon of water coming off the roof and then corning back into the building as 
before. He noted, however, that leaks are still occurring in the building, including a leak 
on the ceiling close to the north wall, in the bar area. 
Storms identified the window and wall between the kitchen and bar as one of the 
leaking areas after Briggs Roofing completed the new roof Storms also identified the 
n011h rain gutter as the gutter damaged by Briggs Roofing when old roofing material was 
dumped from the roof into a dump truck. The damaged gutter was replaced in 2007. 
Storms identified on-going leaks in the kitchen area in 2013. 188 
Employee Ryan Getsinger, who worked for Stom1s and Brownstone from April of 
2007 until the Restaurant closed in 2010 (save for a one year period from June of 2008 
until Jw1e of 2009), and who worked for the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill from July 4 
187 Trial Exhibit 6. 
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201 l unti l Mru:ch of 2012 and again from October of2012 until March of 2013, testified 
that he never observed rain coming out of the gutters other than through the downspouts. 
Getsinger never saw the rain gutters actually replaced during the time he worked for 
Snow Eagle. Herbe1t Rockhold testified that when he worked on the Premises in the fall 
and winter of 2010, he never saw the rain gutters dysfunctional or overflowing. 
The Restaurant's hood and vent system was inspected by the Bonneville County 
fire marshal on a regularly-scheduled basis. Brownstone never failed an inspection. 
Storms and Brownstone also hired contractors to clean and maintain the exhaust 
system. 189 The last cleaning took place on August 15, 2010. 190 After September 30 
2010, Brownstone did not operate the grill or the cook line. 
The original building prior to Storms' and Burggrafs renovations, was a cinder 
block structure with a brick fa<;ade. Watkins tendered no exhibits showing grease in the 
rain gutters. At the time of Green Acres Home Improvements estimate, Snow Eagle 
Brewery and Grill had been in possession of the Premises approximately five months, 
and in operation over two and one-half months. 
The evidence infers that Storms did not leave the north-side rain gutter in an 
unusable state. Whether the leaks that Mitchell noticed came from the compromised roof 
(which continued to leak after the Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill opened), or from 
operations of the Snow agle Brewery and Grill Watkins has not shown that Storms 
should be responsible for replacing the north-side rain gutter. The evidence does not 
suggest that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will relationship with Watkins or 
188 ee: Trial Exhibits T.124, and T.142. 
189 ee: Trial Ex.hi bit R. The Restaurant's exhaust system is shown on Trial Exhibit T.93. 
t9o M. 
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committed waste upon the Premises. Therefore, Watkins shall not recover damages for 
the replacement of the north-side rain gutt r. 
7. Kitchen Walls and Floors. 191 
Next Watkins seeks $3,200.00 for repair or replacement of damaged kitchen 
walls and floors. 192 Watkins specifically mentions the east wall of the kitchen the white 
walls in the kitchen, and the concrete floor of the kitchen. 193 Watkins specified Trial 
Exhibits 3.117 through 3.1 23 , 38.7, 38.13, 38.25 through 38.30, 39.09, 39.10, and Trial 
Exhibit V as illustrative of the alleged damages at issue. 
Gerald Mitchell hired American Commercial Services to wash and prepare the 
floor (for tiling), set up the tile pattern, and install durock (a substance placed under tile 
for levelling) at a cost of $800.00. 194 American Conm1ercial S rvices finished tiling the 
floor at a cost of $200.00 and tiled the wall for $2,200.00. 195 
In addition Watkins requested damages for costs to clean the walls depicted in 
Trial Exhibits 3.117, 3.118 3. 119, 3.120 3.12 1, 3.1 22, and 3.123. Included in the walls 
necessitating cleaning was the east wall jn the kitchen shown in Trial Exhibits 3.122, 
3.123, 38.25, and 38.30. However, Watkins maintains that the east wall in the kitchen 
had to be removed because of rotted wood framing. 196 Incurring costs to clean a wall 
infe rs that the wall was in a useable condition. This inference coupled with the lack of 
expert testimony regarding expected wear and tear to restaurant walls, particularly in the 
kitchen area exposes a record devoid of evidence supporting a finding that Storms and 
19 1 ~ : Trial Exh ibits 3.117 through 3.120 3.122, and 3.123. 
192 Watkins' Closing argument, at pp. 19-22. 
193 ld. 
194 Trial Exh ibi t 7. 
195 ~: Tria l Exhibi t 8. 
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Brownstone breached their at-will relationship with Watkins by failing to maintain and 
repair the walls in the kitchen. Indeed, the vidence showed that Storms and Brownstone 
replaced some of the green, moisture-resistant sheetrock in the kitchen prior to vacating 
-h p · 197 t e _ rern1ses . 
Trial Exhibits 38.7 and 38.25 reveal a north and east view of the kitchen area. 
T1ial xhibit 38.7 shows stainless-steel sheeting hung on the north wall and what appears 
to be new or very white Abitibi board ( or Masonite-type hard board with a slick coating 
on the outside surface). Restaurant employee Ryan Getsinger identified the white board 
in Trial Exhibit 38 .7 as the east wall in the kitchen. Herbert Rockhold testified that the 
same wall (the east wall of the kitchen) shown in Trial Exhibit 38 .25 was new Abitibi 
board installed by Storms and Brownstone prior to vacating the Premises. Sto1ms 
clarified that the new wall was white, fiberglass panel. Storms testified that this new wall 
was taken out by Gerald Mitchell when he reconfigured the kitchen. 
Trial Exhibit 38.13 was never identified or discussed by any witness during the 
trial. 
Trial Exhibit 38 .26 shows a wall of the kitchen partia!Jy replaced with new green 
sheetrock. Ryan Getsinger identified a black strip along the bottom of the wall as plastic 
or rubber stripping to keep moisture from reaching the wall . Herbert Rockhold testified 
that Trial Exhibit 38.26 shows the wash area of the Restaurant. 
Getsinger testified that Trial Exhibit 38 .27 shows the west wall of the kitchen. 
Getsinger identified the black stripping along the bottom of the wall as the same rubber 
or plastic used to keep moisture off the wall. He noted that the stripping appears to stop 
196 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 19. 
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at one point on the wall. Getsinger explained that the wall in the photograph stood 
behind forty ( 40) to fifty (50) racks of glasses. No stripping appears on the north wall, 
which frames a portion of what Getsinger described as a broom closet. 
Despite the stainjng that appears on the left side of the wall and along the bottom, 
Storms testified that those areas were inspected by the Health Department. Storms and 
Brownstone never received a citation by the Health Department when the Restaurant was 
in operation. Furthermore, Brad Simonson testified that whereas the whiteboard used in 
the kitchen was inherently problematic because of moisture leakage allowed at the seams 
he had seen the same whiteboard used in kitchens elsewhere. Gerald Mitchell tiled the 
kitchen walls in the area where no stainless steel previously existed. 
Trial Exhibit 38.28, which shows the north wall of the kitchen covered with 
stainless steel sheets, is where the grills and oven were located during the operation of the 
Restaurant, according to Alan Flores. Th.is was also known as the cook line, according to 
Flores. Flores identified the discolored wall area above the stainless steel. He testified 
that the di.scoloration resulted from the heat from the cook line. 
Trial Exhibit 38.29, according to Ryan Getsinger, shows the west side of the 
garage. Part of the north wall of the kitchen, covered in stainless steel is also visible in 
the photograph. Getsinger testified that no black stripping is visible on the portion of the 
broom-closet wall on the west side of the photograph, underneath the light switches. The 
staining above the stainless steel did not merit citati.on by the Health Department during 
the operation of the Restaurant. Stonns testified that Gerald Mitchell removed the west 
wall and the broom closet when he reconfigured the kitchen. 
197 See: Trial Exhibits 3 .101 3.102, 3.103, 3.117, 3. 118 3.119, 38.26, and 39.07. 
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Trial Exhibit 38 .30 reveals the north and west walls of the bar area, the west wall 
being steadied by a large metal sheet along the floor. The west wall of the bar area was 
the same as the east wall of the kitchen area. Storms testified that the west wall was 
removed by Gerald Mitchell when he reconfigured the Premises. 
Trial Exhibits 39.09 and 39. 10 were identified by Storms as the west side of the 
kitchen. Storms testified only that Trial Exhibits 39.09 and 39. 10 did not show pitting or 
cracks in the floors. Nothing in the record offered any other explanation of the walls 
shown in Trial Exhibits 39.09 or 39.l 0. 
Storms and Brownstone used Trial Exhibit V to demonstrate leaks into the 
Premises from the faulty roof. Storms testified that Trial Exhibit V also showed the 
kitchen walls removed by Gerald Mitchell during his reconfiguration of the kitchen. 
In summary, the evidence does not support a finding that Storms and Brownstone 
breached their at-will relationship with Watkins or committed waste upon the Premises 
by failing to maintain or repair the kitchen wall s. Storms replaced some of the green 
sheetrock in the kitchen. Other walls, including the brand new east wall of the kitchen, 
were torn out by Gerald Mitchell when he remodeled the Premises. Nothing in the 
evidence reveals what would be considered normal wear and tear to kitchen walls in a 
restaurant over a thirteen year period. Mitchell 's tiling upgrade is not an expense that 
should be borne by a former tenant who used a lesser, but commonly used, method to 
install walls in a commercial kitchen. 
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As for the floors, Watkins alleged the concrete was cracked or pitted.198 Again 
no evidence guided the Court regarding normal wear and tear expected of concrete floors 
used in a commercial restaurant over a thirteen-year period of operation. 
The trial evidence revealed the following: restaurant employee Ryan Getsinger 
testified that he never observed cracks or pitting in the concrete floor of the kitchen. He 
did not observe water pooling in holes or depressions in the concrete when the floor was 
clean d with hot water. 
Storms pointed to the floor of the Restaurant as depicted in Trial Exhibits T.27 
and T.28. He explained that the cement floors were not designed to have a uniform look, 
but a variegated mottled appearance with darker and lighter spots or areas throughout the 
floor. Storms testified there were no cracks in the kitchen floor when he vacated the 
Premises, other than the texturing built into the concrete in 1996. Storms stated there was 
no pitting in the floor that would have been a source of contamination. He affirmed that 
the floors met the criteria of the Health Department jnspections, since the Restaurant 
never received a citation. Storms never received a notation on any health inspection 
notice indicating that the floors were a problem. 
Alan Flores testified that the concrete floor was not pitted when he cleaned just 
prior to handing the Premises over to Watkins. Brad Simonson testified that the "traffic 
pattern in the kitchen was such heavy traffic that the concrete had abraded where that 
pattern was." Whether a traffic pattern in concrete flooring is nonnal wear and tear or 
abu was not clarified by any expert testimony. In the alternative, this Court finds that a 
198 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 2 1. 
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traffic pattern a concrete floor used continuously over a thirteen year period represente 
normal wear and tear to the floor. 
Simonson also testified to "grease impregnation" of the floor. Nothing in the 
evidence instructed the Court as to whether or not grease impregnation is normal wear 
and tear in a commercial restaurant over a thi1teen year period. Neither was grease 
impregnation shown in photographs or mentioned by other witnesses. This Couit is 
unable to determine whether grease impregnation existed, particularly in light of the fact 
that the Brownstone was never cited for health or safety violations by the Health 
Department or the Fire Department during th course of its operations. 
Gerald Mitchell testified that although concrete is an acceptable flooring for a 
conm1ercial kitchen, the integrity of the .floor on the Premises had been degraded to the 
point it would no longer function. He clarified that the kitchen floor was pitted and 
cracked. After investigating a number of options, Mitchell decided to tile the kitchen 
floor.1 99 
In summary the evidence fai led to convince the Court that pitting or cracks, 
necessitating floor replacement existed when Storms vacated the Premises. Expert 
testimony might have enlightened the Cou1t as to how concrete floors wear over time, 
particularly in commercial restaurants. Without such evidence, and without visual proof 
of the cracking and pitting, the record does not support a finding that Storms and 
Brownstone abrogated their responsibilities w1der their at-will tenancy with Watkjns or 
committed waste upon the Premises by failing to maintain or repair the kitchen floor. 
199 ~ : Tr ial ExJ1ib it 8. 
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Furthermore, this Court finds that some pitting and cracking of concrete in high traffic 
areas ought to be expected in the normal wear and tear of the building. 
For the reasons set forth, Watkins shall not recover costs associated with repairing 
or replacing the kitchen walls or floor. 
8. Electrical Repairs?10 
Watkins then asks for $661.00 m electrical repairs, required by "unresolved 
electrical issues" allegedly left behind by Storms and Brownstone.20 1 Watkins specified 
exposed and unknown wires, broken light fixrures umesolved electrical connections and 
lack of functional lighting in a back room.202 
Kathy Burggraf testified that she ai1d Storms removed the fo1mer electrical wiring 
in the building when they renovated it in 1996. Storms and Burggraf installed all new 
electrical wiring in the Restaurant. 
Blaise Kauer, an electrical contractor, entered the Premises in January of 2011 at 
Dane Watkins' request. Kauer understood that Mr. Watkins wanted to show the building 
and needed the electrical connections to be safe. Kauer noticed wires hanging out and 
exposed pipes from machines that had been removed by Storms and Brownstone. He 
testified that "a lot of times in a commercial area, that can happen. It depends on who 
takes out the equipment whether an electrician takes it and covered it up." 
Kauer checked electrical boxes, such as those seen in Trial Exhibits 39.05 and 
39.06. Kauer fixed a couple of broken light fixtures, and replaced burnt-out light bulbs. 
H found wires coming out of the conduits but could not remember if the breaker had 
200 See: Trial Exhibits 3.34 through 3.36, 3.52, 3.111 and 38.6. 
20 1 Watkin ' Closing Argument, at pp. 22, 23 . 
202 Id. 
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been shut off or not. Kauer stated that his work for Watkins was ' just a temporary fix 
until the next tenant gets there and decides what they're going to do with it." He testified 
that a lot of the work he did for Watkins was "common sense by my trade. You look 
around £ r things that are electrically unsafe." Kauer charged and received $661.00 for 
h . · 203 1s services. 
Kauer identified a decorative light fixtur shown in Trial Exhibits 3.34, 3.35 and 
3.36, which he "would have just hauled off and then capped the top." He did not have 
any specific recollection as to what he did regarding the broken light fixture shown in the 
pictures. Dane Watkins testified that the light fixture that lies broken on the floor in Trial 
Exhibits 3.34, 3.35, and 3.36 was found in that condition when Mr. Watkins re-entered 
the Premises in January of 2011. Herbert Rockhold explained that the fixture was broken 
before Storms and Brownstone moved out of the Premises and that he installed the simple 
light socket and bulb, seen in Trial Exhibits 3.33 3.34 and 3.35. to replace the decorative 
light fixture that was lying broken on the floor. Rockhold did not know how the 
decorative light fixture was broken. 
Kauer identified Trial Exhibit 3.52 as a broken cover that he "probably capped." 
He testified that he most likely found another way to cover the outlet rather than to buy a 
new patt but he could not remember. 
Kauer described Trial Exbjbit 3. 70 as a junction box which he typically wo uld 
have covered. Rockhold testified that he did not remove any light fixtures in the area 
depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.70. The wires in the junction box in Trial Exhibit 3.70 appear 
to b capped. 
203 Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 19. 
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The light fixture hanging from the ceiling in Trial Exhibit 3.11 1 was identified by 
Kauer as needing only screws to mount it back into the ceiling. He did not remember the 
location of the fixture, however. Herbert Rockhold did not observe a light fixtme 
hanging in the condition depicted in Trial Exhibit 3. 111 . Rockhold testified that he never 
observed that light particular fixture on the Premises. Storms did not recognize the light 
fixture in Trial Exhibit 3. 111. Storms testified that the fixture did not exist on the 
Premises when he and Brownstone vacated the building. 
Tti al Exhibits 3. 125 and 3. 128 show several electrical wu es that required 
removal, unhooking, or placing in a box for safety, according to Kauer. He noted that the 
wires had wire nuts on them, but testified that a person could be shocked if the wire nuts 
fe ll off. The white wire in Trial Exhibit 3.1 28 did not have a wire nut. Rockhold 
testified that the white wire was a common wire and that he did not test its voltage. 
Kauer did not elaborate whether he tested the white wire to see if it carried electricity. 
Kauer did nothing with the grey wire shown in Trial Exhibit 3. 128. Rockhold testifi ed 
that the grey wire was computer wire or telephone wire which carried a very low voltage. 
Kauer explained that "most people hire an electrician to leave [a building] in a 
safe way." Storms and Brownstone hired Herbert Rockhold , who is not a licensed 
electrician, to remove equipment from the Premises. Rockhold supported his expertise 
with testimony that he built his home in Idaho Fall s and wired the entire house himself. 
Rockhold sealed open wires with wire nuts and turned off the breakers supplying the 
wires. He used a multimeter to determine that none of the wires were hot. 
Kauer 's testimony was disturbingly imprecise and general . He gave a description 
of why Watkins hired him to check over the Premises. When asked about the specific 
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tasks he undertook, however, his testimony became much more vague and indefinite. He 
could not remember if the Premises had dark areas because lights were burnt out or 
because bulbs were gone. He could not recall if wires coming out of conduits were 
energized or not. He was not sure what he had done to address broken fixtures. Often he 
testified about what he "would have done," but could not remember what he actually did 
with a particular fixture. He was not sure if wires were simply removed from the 
electrical panel or boxed. He could not recall where light fixtures or electrical outlets 
were located on the Premises and therefore could not testify what he had done with the 
fi xtures or outlets. Kauer recalled that he was asked to do "something with the switches," 
but he did not recall what he did. Although he was hired to check for safety issues, Kauer 
did not check each one of the outlets. He could not recollect the condition of the 
Premises in January of 2011. 
In addition to the vague nature of Kauer's testimony, the record does not support 
a finding that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy with Watkins by 
fai ling to ask a certified electrician to cap off loose wires or shut down breaker boxes. 
The former Lease did not specifically require such services, nor was an expert called to 
testify as to a particular expectation or level of care which should be exercised after 
electrical equipment is removed from a commercial building. This Court does not find 
that Storms and Brownstone were required to hire a certified electrician to ascertain the 
safety of the electrical connections left behind when the Premises were returned to 
Watkins. Furthe1more, thi s Court finds that Herbert Rockhold had sufficient knowledge 
of electrical outlets and wiring to leave the building in a reasonably safe condition. 
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For these reasons Watkins has not shown that Storms and Brownstone breached 
their at-will relationship with Watkins or committed waste upon the Premises by leaving 
the Premises in an unsafe condition. Watkins shall not recover bis fee to Kauer, 
represented in Trial Exhibit 19. 
9. Grease Trap.204 
Watkins seeks $2,025.00 from Storms and Brownstone for services rendered to 
empty the grease trap on the Premises, to restore its functionality, and to equip Gerald 
Mitchell with a new grease trap system.205 
Ryan Getsinger testified that the grease trap was located on the floor of the 
kitchen near the sink trap depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.117. It was covered by a heavy 
metal cover. Storms explained that the metal lid was at floor level and below that was 
located the actual lid to the grease trap. Restaurant employee Tan1ara Metcalf testified 
that the kitchen manager was responsible for cleaning the grease trap and, on a rare 
occasion the Brownstone hired a professional cleaning service as well. The grease trap 
was cleaned every two months or when it began to smell. Getsinger testified that 
cleaning the grease trap required two (2) to three (3) hours. 
Storms did not know the condition of the grease trap when he quitted the Premises 
at the end of December 20 10. 
Dane Watkins did not inspect the grease trap when he first took repossession of 
the Premises in January of 2011. The grease trap, shown in Trial Exhibits 39.01 and 
39.02, was located under the concrete floor in the kitchen, accessible by a steel Lid at the 
floor level and another steel lid o er th trap itself. Trial Exhibit Z depicts the floor level 
204 ~: Trial Exhibits 39.0 I and 39.02. 
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grease trap lid with the handle visible. The lid does not appear to be broken or unusable 
and the handle is clearly visible. Gerald Mitchell testified that the grease trap was not 
useable, and that he spent time and money trying to open it. Mitchell hired two different 
services, the second of which was successful in prying off the lid. Mitchell testified that 
the grease trap was totally encased in grease and had not been maintained for some time. 
Mitchell related that once the grease was removed he discovered that the inside metal was 
completely rotted and the grease trap was not salvageable. 
Parkers Septic Tanks Service LLC charged Mitchell $425.00 to pump the grease 
out of the grease trap.206 Parkers rendered its services on or about April 11 , 2011.207 
Mitchell testified that he also paid Idaho steel $100. 70 to fabricate a new lid for the grease 
trap before he discovered that the metal walls were rotted . 208 The Idahosteel invoice 
which describes new angles mounted to an aluminum plate, is dated April 12, 2011.209 
Storms testified that the original grease trap cover was made of steel, not 
aluminum. Storms also testified that he saw an aluminum plate in the Snow Eagle 
Brewery and Grill which was positioned on the floor underneath the brew kettle. 
Mitchell recounted that he ultimately filled the old grease trap full of cement and 
bought an aboveground grease trap for use in the White Eagle Brewery and Grill. 
Mitchell paid American Commercial Services Corporation $100.00 to backfill the old 
grease trap.2 10 
205 Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 23-24. 
206 Trial Exhib it 15. 
207 Jd. 
208 Trial ExJ1ibit l 4. 
209 ld . 
2 10 Watkins' Closing Argument at p. 25; Trial Exhibit 9. 
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Mitchell described the capacity of the original grease trap as "a fraction" of the 
aboveground system he now employs . He later estimated the capacity of the old grease 
trap to be one-hundred ( 100) gallons. He estimated his new system holds between seven-
hw1dred and thfrty-:five (735) and one-thousand five-hundred (1,500) gallons of grease. 
Storms' testimony that he did not check the grease trap or have it emptied prior to 
moving out of the Premises infers that the grease trap was left with grease in it. 
Regardless of what grease may have been added by cleaning procedures which took place 
at Watkins' behest, standard cleaning of the Premises and maintenance of the building 
would infer that a tenant should empty an underground grease trap before vacating the 
leasehold. Therefore, Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will relationship with 
Watkins, by fai ling to empty the grease trap before they returned the Premises to the 
lessor. Watkins shall recover $425.00 for costs incurred to empty the grease trap. 
As for the lid and the walls of the grease trap, Watkins offered no testimony 
whether or not such underground grease traps deteriorate from normal wear and tear. 
Neither was testimony offered as to what kind of maintenance, other than periodically 
emptying the trap, might be required for underground grease traps. Instead, the evidence 
infers that the grease trap deteriorated from contact with grease. The Court has no 
expertise as to whether such deterioration is typical or unusual. Therefore, Watkins has 
not shown that Storms and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy, or committed 
wasted, by returning the Premises to Watkins with an unusable grease trap. 
Furthermore, Watkins shall not recover costs incutTed to manufacture a new 
grease trap lid (assuming, without finding, that the ldahosteel invoice applied to the 
grease trap lid and not the plate under the brew kettle), to backfill the old grease trap, or 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 79 
156
to purcha e a new grease trap system for the White Eagle Brewery and Grill. Such 
charges have not been connected to a duty breached by Storms and Bro~'llStone. 
10. Investigation and Repair of Plumbing Mainlines. 
Watkins seeks to recover $220.00 that J & R Pltunbing paid AAA Sewer Services 
to send a camera down the plumbing mainlines. 211 Watkins specifies Trial Exhibits 3.95 
through 3.102, 3.125 through 3.127, and 36 as evidence of his claims.212 
In its closing argument Watkins contends that 
... when Storms and Brownstone vacated, they left a number of exposed 
plumbing Jines and fixtures without any indication of their purpose. See 
Exs. 3.95-.102, 3.125-127. Storms had been using one of the drainage 
lines, but the other drainage line was from the original restroom in the 
northeast corner that Storms had not used. Mr. Mitchel did not know 
which one Storms used and when Mr. Mitchell tried to use them, he found 
they had a bunch of stuff in the lines. Mr. Watkins was not involved or 
consulted in the remodel process, so he could not identify the lines either. 
Mitchell had to determine which of the two lines was functional , and to 
clear the line. To accomplish this, Mr. Mitchell hired AAA Sewer Service 
to camera and clean out the lines at a cost of $220.00. See Ex. 36.2 13 
Trial Exhibits 3.95 through 3.99 and Trial Exhibits 3.125 through 3.127 appear to 
relate to the beverage lines between the brew tank and the bar. Trial Exhibits 3. IO 1 and 
3.102 show hook-ups and floor pipes in the kitchen. None of these exhibits appear to 
relate to Trial Exhibit 36, which is an invoice from AAA Sewer Services to J & R 
Plumbing regarding a camera used on the "mainline." 
a. Costs to "Camera" the Mainline. 
The only evidence Mr. Watkins offered at trial regarding the plumbing and 
Trial Exhibit 36 did not refer to cameras u ed to explore the mainline. During his 
2 11 See: Trial Exhibit 36. 
2 12 Watkin s' Closing Argument, at p. 25. 
213 .)Q. 
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testimony, Dane Watkins alluded to "a lot of problems with the septic tank." Mr. 
Watkins testified that he knew there were some problems in the bathrooms. When asked 
for specifics, Mr. Watkins said the sink in the bathroom leaked. He thought it was in the 
men's bathroom. He also mentioned leaks in the kitchen where the equipment was 
removed. 
Mr. Watkins pointed to Trial Exhibit 3 .102 as evidence of leaks in the kitchen. 
Trial Exhibit 3.102 shows a hose connection and a pipe into the floor of the kitchen. Mr. 
Watkins stated that it was continuously running. Nothing in the Trial Exhibit 3.102 
photograph depicts a water leak. Mr. Watkins was not sure which piece of equipment 
was tied to the leak. He then waivered as to where the leak was located within the 
kitchen. 
Gerald Mitchell testified that the plumbing was in bad shape. He added, however, 
"maybe I shouldn't say this, but it probably wouldn' t make any difference because the 
plwnbing had to be replaced anyway." Mitchell testified that because of the 
reconfiguration of the kitchen, he would have replaced the plumbing regardless of its 
condition. 
Despite Watkins' reference to Trial Exhibits 3. 101 and 3.102 in regard to Trial 
Exhibit 36, the leaky plumbing described by Dane Watkins appears to have nothing 
whatsoever to do with Trial Exhibit 36. 
Kathy Burggraf recalled that when she and Storms first obtained possession of the 
Premises, there was one bathroom on the north comer of the building. Storms and 
Burggraf completely reconfigured the plumbing in the building. Mr. Mitchell testified 
that there were two sewer lines that ran out of the building. Mitchell did not know if both 
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of them were fw1ctional. As for Trial Exhibit 36, Mitchell did not know if the invoice 
was connected to the main line sewer. He testified, "I only know that they carnera'd the 
brew lines or the access lines and whether this is pa1t of that -- or whether the $75 charge 
is part of that or the $145 is the other part of that 1 don't know.' othing in the evidence 
linked Trial Exhibit 36 with any payment made to AAA Sewer Service by Watkins or 
Gerald Mitchel I. Instead, Trial Exhibit 36 shows that AAA Sewer Service invoiced J & 
R Plumbing for its work, not Watkins or Mitchell. 
The foundation for Trial Exhibit 36 was not properly laid at trial. Neither 
Mitchell nor Dane Watkins could identify whether or not the services performed in Trial 
Exhibit 36 went to the brew lines or the sewer line. Trial Exhibit 36 makes no indication 
of "clearing" the lines, only of using a camera. Nothing in the evidence linked a payment 
by Watkins or by Mr. Mitchell with Trial Exhibit 36. Furthermore, if Watkins was 
unsme which sewer line was used by Storms and Brownstone, a telephone call or two 
between the attorneys representing the parties wa a quick and inexpensive answer. 
With regard to Trial Exhibit 36 and Watkins' claim that it did not know which 
sewer line were used by Storm and Brownstone, Watkins has not shown that Storms 
and Brownstone breached their at-will tenancy with Watkins or committed waste upon 
the Premises. Watkins shall take nothing by its claim for the $220.00 charge shown in 
Trial Exhibit 36. 
b. Costs to Clean and Extend the Brew Lines.21 ~ 
As for the brew Jines Mr. Watkins testified that "some of the plumbing 
had to be changed over that wasn' t working and it was just a major, major overhaul what 
21 4 See: Trial Exhib its 3.95 through 3.99, 3. 125 through 3. 127, and AA-3 . 
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we had to repair and fix ." When asked to specify the problems with the plumbing, 
Watkins merely stated that he was referring to "the underground plumbing" which was 
"over by the bar section and that was underneath." He then clarified that "it's my 
understanding they couldn't use that." Mr. Watkins conceded that all of his knowledge 
about the underground plumbing came from Gerald Mitchell. 
Mr. Watkins identified the conduits coming up through the floor, shown in Trial 
Exhibits 3.96, 3.97, 3.98 and 3.99, as paii of the housing for the underground tubing 
used in St01ms' and Brownstone's brewery system. Herbert Rockhold testified that the 
tubing connected the walk-in cooler and beer serving tanks to the bar spigots. Rockhold 
testified that Trial Exhibits 3 .126, ai1d 3 .127 showed conduit located in the bar area. 
Trial Exhibit 3 .127 is a photograph looking down into the conduit shown in Trial Exhibit 
3.126. Rockhold testified that expanding foam was sprayed around the tubes where they 
entered or exited the conduit to keep foreign matter out of the conduit. When Rockhold 
pulled the tubes he noted that some of that expanding foam could have broken ai1d fallen 
i.nto the conduit. 
Watkins references Trial Exhibit 11 with regard to the "obstructed and unusable" 
1 1. J 15 supp y mes.- At trial, however, Dane Watkins testified that he was not seeking 
reimbursement for the charges r fleeted in Trial Exhibit 11. Therefore, Watkins shall not 
recover the charges shown therein. 
Watkins also s eks $1 675 .00 to "cut and remove the concrete and run new 
conduit pipe for the beverage supply lines" because the lines were "plugged and 
215 Watkins ' Closing Argument, at p. 25. 
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unusable."216 Trial Exhibit 9 includes two charges: "Scheduling and oversight of 
concrete cutting and plumbing installation. Meeting with James, Andy Ivan and J&R" 
for which $200.00 was charged; and "Concrete saw cutting and removal. 16" slab and 
partial 4" original slab" at a fee of $1,475.00. 
Gerald Mitchell testified that the saw cutting and removal was part repair and part 
remodel of the Premises. The evidence reflects that Mitchell moved the bar from its 
previous position back toward the north wall. Trial Exhibit AA-3 shows the outline of 
the bar when Storms and Brownstone operated the Restaurant, drawn in blue ink with 
cross-hatches. Mitchell moved the bar north of its previous position. The new bar is 
shown in Trial Exhibit AA-3 as it was being installed. 
The water line used by Storms and Brownstone is depicted in Trial Exhibit AA-3 
as two black squares. The beverage lines came out of the floor at a black square which is 
filled in, next to the left foot of the man wearing suspenders. All of those lines were 
moved by Mitchell behind the new bar he in.stalled, depicted in Trial Exhibit AA-3. 
Nothing in the invoices shows that the brew lines were cleaned or emptied. Instead, the 
charges infer that the brew lines were moved to accommodate the reconfiguration of the 
bar desired by Mitchell. 
The evidence reflects that the charges incurred in Trial Exhibit 9 were not repair, 
but remodeling costs. Watkins has not shown. that torms and Brownstone breached their 
at-will relationship or committed waste upon the Premises with regard to the brewery 
supply lines. Watkins shall not recover the $1 675.00 he requests under Trial Exhibit 9. 
2 16 Id. See also: Trial Exh ibit 9. 
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11. Repainting Expense. 
FinaJly, Watkins seeks $1, 149.00 for repainting the walls.217 It declares that "this 
is not a r ult of deterioration from normal use and the passage of time. The new tenant 
had no option to use the existing paint due to the condition it was in."218 
Watkins points to the fact that Storms and Brownstone left some of the walls 
spackled but not painted.219 Herbert Rockhold testified that the paint on the walls was so 
old it would be difficult to match. Furthermore as noted above Storms and Brownstone 
originally agreed under the Lease to maintain and repair the Premises normal wear and 
tear excluded. Without expert testimony to guide the Court as to whether holes in walls 
(which appear predominantly to be nail holes) constitute abuse as opposed to normal 
wear and tear to a commercial building, Watkins has not shown the breach of a duty by 
Stonns and Brownstone. Conversely old paint that requires updating seems very much 
in line with normal wear and t ar to a commercial building particularly one that houses a 
restaurant. Nothing in the former Lease required Storms and Brownstone to leave the 
walls in a like-new condition. 
In summary, Watkins has shown that Storms an.cl Brownstone breached certain 
expectations under their at-will tenancy, or in the alternative, committed waste upon the 
Premises in everal instances. Watkins proved damages of $274.64 for the unusable 
crash bar system on the north-side entrance, and $425 .00 for the uncleaned grease trap in 
217 Watkins' Closing Argument, at pp. 26-27. 
2 18 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 26. 
2 19 Id. See also: Trial Exhibits 3. 11 , 3.12, 3.13 , 3.14, 3.15, 3. 16, 3.1 7, 3.26, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3 .30 3.31 , 
3.32, 3.57, 3.58 3.59, 3.60, 3.61 , 3.62 3.63 3.64 3.67 3.69,3 .71,3.72, 3.77 38.3 38. 10,38.20 and38.22 
(those tr ial exhibits to which no witness testified were excluded from the list). 
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the kitchen. Therefore Watkins shall recover a total amount of $699.64 from Storms and 
Brownstone for damages beyond normal wear and tear to the Premis s. 
C. Unjust Enrichment - Rent. 
Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone were unjustly enriched by remaining 
in possession of the Premises without paying rent after September 30, 2010.220 Taking 
into consideration the temporary restraining order issued by this Court (at Watkins' 
behest) the follow-up motions surrounding Watkins' request for a writ of attachment, the 
time requested by Storms and Brownstone to move out of the building, and the number of 
days Storms and Brownstone necessitated for the move, Watkins requests rent for forty-
two (42) days in the an1ount of $133 .33 per day or $5,600.00.22 1 
In their closing Argument, Sto1ms and Brownstone point to the first page, first 
unnumbered paragraph of the former Lease between the parties , which shows that 
Storms' and Burggraf's initial $23,750.00 deposit to Watkins included $5,000.00 for 
"Last month's rent."222 Nothing in the record upports a finding that Watkins credited 
the $5,000.00 prepaid rent toward the last month the parties operated under the Lease, to 
the at-will tenancy period or to period of time Stonns' and Browristone remained in 
possession of the Premises after September 30 2010. 
Based upon the temporary restraining order issued on October 1, 2010, the partial 
preliminary injunction announced (but not issued) on November 4, 2010 and withdrawn 
on ovember 9, 2010, the prutial preliminary injunction announced (but not issued) on 
ovember 24 20 10, and the Court 's denial of Watkins' request for a Rule 54(b) 
220 Watkins Closing Argument, at pp. 27-3 1. 
121 Watkin ' Closing Argument, at p. 30. 
222 Trial Exhibit l , at p. I. 
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c rtificate (in order to appeal the November 9 2010 Partial Preliminary Injunction) 
torms and Brownstone could not reasonably begin to remove items from the Premises 
until after 3:21 o'clock p.m. on November 24, 2010. 
While Storms and Brownstone were responsible for paying rent for the move-out 
period, that period was extended by weather conditions which existed in late November 
and December of 2010. Herbett Rockhold testified that when he resumed his efforts to 
empty the Premises, the north side of the building (the primary location for moving the 
equipment out of the building) was covered in ice. Rockhold recalled snow virtually 
every morning. Such conditions slowed the efforts to move heavy equipment, back the 
trailers into the loading zones, cany heavy loads, and operate a fork lift. 
In addition, on November 19, 2010 Dane Watkins asked Storms and Brownstone 
to consider selling the signs, poles, awnings bar and bike racks on the Premises to 
Watkins before removing them.223 On ovember 23 , 2010 (one day before the order 
issued allowing Storms and Brownstone to remove everything except the poles), Watkins 
again asked Storms and Brownstone not to remove the awnings bar, bike racks, signs, 
and poles until Dane Watkins discussed the purchase of the items.224 
On December 1, 2010 counsel for Watkins e-mailed counsel for Storms and 
Brownstone to say that he not received authorization from Watkins to make an offer on 
any items removable by Storms and Brownstone.225 On the san1e date, Dean 
Brandstetter, counsel for Storms and Brownstone re ponded that time was of the essence 
223 Trial Exhibit A, at p. 000029. 
224 Id . 
225 Trial Exhibit A, at p. 000014. 
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regarding any offers from Watkins and that he (Brandstetter) did not expect Storms and 
. r W tk" ak d . . 226 Brownstone to wait 1or a ms tom ea ec1s10n. 
On December 10, 2010 Mr. Brandstetter e-mailed B.J. Driscoll counsel for 
Watkins to inform Driscoll that Dane Watkins personally asked Storms for a price on the 
bar, signs, and awnings. Mr. Brandstetter reminded Mr. Driscoll that Sto1ms was not 
offering the bar, signs, and awnings for sale, and therefore did not have an asking 
price.227 Mr. Brandstetter requested that any offer from Mr. Watkins to Storms and 
b .b . d ·1 228 Brownstone e su m1tte . via cotmse . 
Storms testified that he did not remove the bar, the signs, or the awnings pending 
an offer from Mr. Watkins to purchase those items. Storms recounted that on December 
23 2010, Mr. Watkins finally did make an offer for the bar, the signs and the awnings. 
Apparently the offer was rejected. However, Storms had left those items in place while 
waiting for the promised offer. The removal of the bar was necessary before the brewing 
system the largest pieces of equipment in the building, could be removed. 
Storms and Brownstone required thirty-six (36) days to move out of the Premises, 
from ovember 25 until December 30, 2010. Since torms and Brownstone waited, as 
requested by Mr. Watkins from November 19 2010 until December 23 , 2010, for an 
offer on some of the remaining equipment, the evidence shows that Sto1ms and 
Brownstone had only seven (7) days of unhampered time to move the final pieces of 
equipm.ent from the Premises. 
226 Id. 
227 Trial Exhibit A, at p. 00001 2. 
m lg. 
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Storms and Brown tone have not requested a return of any p01tion of the 
$5,000.00 prepaid rent for their final month in possession of the Premises. That amount 
amply cover the seven days Storms and Brownstone utilized after accommodating Dane 
Watkins' request to leave the bar and other items in place pending a purchase offer to 
move out of the building. 
Therefore, Watkins has not shown that Storms and Brownstone were unjustly 
enriched by the thirty-six (36) days they used to vacate the Premises, only seven (7) of 
which were without encumbrance by Mr. Watkins. 
D. Other Trial Issues. 
Finally, a number of other disputed issues arose at tt·ial which Watkins did not 
argue in closing. Whether or not Watkins intended to include those issues is unknown 
but the Court shall address them briefly. 
1. "29 Auger Holes.-
Watkins submitted photographs of holes dri lled through the ceiling of the 
Restaurant. torms identified these holes as auger holes through which barley, milled by 
Storms, 230 was transferred to the brewery. Snow Eagle Brewery and Grill also installed 
an auger for its brewing process.231 Storms testified that Gerald Mitchell used the same 
auger holes, originally drilled by Storms and Burggraf, for his restaurant. 
Watkins shall not recover for any alleged damages caused by the auger holes . 
229 See: Trial Ex hibits 3.78 3. 114, 3.136 
230 See: T1ial Exhibi t T.97. 
231 See: Trial Exh ibits T.168 and T.169. 
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U . D n2 2. pstairs oor. 
Dane Watkins complained that Trial Exhibits 3.79 and 3.80 depicted "door 
damage." He thought the duct tape was being used just to shut the door. He testified 
repairs were necessary to "secure the location." Watkins could not say whether the door 
in Trial Exhibit 3.79 and 3.80 was the same door as was in place in 1996 when the 
Premises were turned over to Storms and Burggraf. 
Tamara Metcalf testified that the door shown in Trial Exhibits 3.79 and 3.80 
which lacks a deadbolt and has duct tape over the sliding latch was the door "into the 
room where the manager s office is." The duct tape was installed so that when 
employees carried heavy items out of the storage room they could open the door without 
putting down their burden. 
Watkins fai led to carry his burden as to any damage to the upstairs door 
attributable to Storms and Brownstone. 
3. Office Door.233 
Watkins testified that Storms and Brownstone left the office door without a 
deadbolt and that the deadbolt had to be rep laced. Watkins believed that the office door 
had a deadbolt when the Premises were turned over to Storms and Burggraf. However, 
Watkins was unsure whether Trial Exhibit 3.91 was in fact, the upstairs office door. He 
later waivered, stating that if the door had not had a deadbolt in 1996 such a condition 
"would have been repaired." 
Tamar Metcalf remembered that the office door never had a deadbolt in it, during 
her employment for Storms and Brownstone, beginning in 2002. Kathy Burggraf 
232 ~ : Trial Exhibits 3.79 and 3.80. 
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testifi d that th office door depicted in Trial Exhibit 3.91 was m the exact same 
condition as when she and Storms took possession of the Premises. 
4. · '34 Emergency EX1t Latch on Garage Door.-
Trial Exhibits 23 and 33 show charges for the installation of an emergency exit 
device on the man door next to the north side garage door behind the kitchen on the 
Premises. Restaurant employee Ryan Gets.inger testified that no emergency exit alarm 
was installed on the man-door next to the garage door during his employment for Storms 
and Brownstone from 2007 until the Restaurant closed in 2010. Storms also stated that 
an alarm device on the man-door next to the garage door never existed during his 
leasehold of the Premises. 
Trial Exhibit 38.29 shows the man door next to the garage door without a red bar 
or red device. Trial Exhibit 38.29 was taken as Stom1s and Brownstone exited the 
Premises. 
Trial Exhibit 39.05, on the other hand shows the san1e door with a red handle or 
device for sounding an alarm if the door is opened. Trial Exhibit 39.05 was taken during 
the renovations of the Premises for Gerald Mitchell. 
This Court finds that Watkins has not shown entitlement to the costs of installing 
an emergency exit device where no such device was utilized by Storms and Brownstone. 
5. Storms' and Brownstone's Counterclaim. 
Storms and Brownstone seek recovery of attorney fees, storage rental fees , 
insurance for the Premises, liability and equipment insurance, electricity costs, and added 
move-out cost for the period of time they were forced to remain in possession of the 
233 See: Trial Exhibit 3.91. 
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Premi s under the temporary restraining order, entered by this Court at Watkins' 
request, and the follow-up litigation over Watkins' requested writ of attachment.235 
Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim totals $21 ,078.39.236 
Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone cannot recover damages incmred by 
the temporary restraining order and follow-up litigation unless Stom1s and Brownstone 
were "wrongfully enjoined or restrained."237 Watkins contends there is no allegation or 
evidence that it acted wrongfully in seeking the temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction, or that this Comt wrongfully issued the partial preliminary 
. . · 238 lllJ unct1011. 
The parties arguments require a detai led look into litigation which occurred prior 
to Storms' and Brownstone's relinquishment of the Premises to Watkins . On October 1, 
2010 this Court issued the temporary restraining order, pmsuant to Idaho Code § 8-
502( d), enjoining Storms and Brownstone from removing "any property" from the 
Premises.239 Watkins posted the requisite $IO 000.00 bond on October 5 2010.240 
On October 14, 2010, this Court held a Show Cause hearing on Watkins' Motion 
for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment and Preliminary lnjunction.24 1 The matter was taken 
234 See: Trial Exhibits 38.29 and 39.05. 
?' '-
_,, Storms' and Brownstone's Argument, at pp. 50-52. 
236 Storms' and Brownstone's Argument, at p. 52,140. 
237 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 31; Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). 
238 Watkins' Closing Argument, at p. 32. 
- 39 Temporary Restraining Order, at p. 2. 
240 otice of Filing Bond, The Watkin ompany, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. V-2010-
5958 (filed October 5, 20 I 0). 
- 41 Minute Entry, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed 
November 24, 2010) (hereinafter the "November 24, 2010 Minute Entry"). This Court notes that the 
handwritten date on page 1 of the ovember 24 2010 Minute Entty is erroneous. 
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under advis ment, with the parties given additional briefing time.242 The Tempormy 
Re ·training Order remained in effect w,til the Court issued its ruling.243 
On November 4 2010, this ourt issued its Partial Preliminary Injunction, 
wherein Watkins' request for a prejudgment writ of attaclunent was denied on the ground 
that Watkins had not shown a reasonable probability that it would prevail on its claims 
under the "New Lease."244 Thus, Watkins did not have a valid claim against torms and 
Brownstone for which attaclunent would issue. 
However this Court granted Watkins a partial preliminary injunction based upon 
Idaho Code § 55-308, which prohibits a tenant from removing fixtures from rented 
premises if such removal would cause damage to the premises. 245 In so doing, the 
Temporary Restraining Order was dissolved. " [A] restraining order is effective only 
until a hearing is had upon the order to show cause, and if upon such bearing, an 
injunction pendent lite is granted, the latter supersedes the temporary restraining order 
which has then served its purpose and becomefimclus ofjicio."246 
This Court also relied upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c) for the authmity 
to issue the preliminary injunction.247 Watkins was required to post a $10,000 cash or 
surety bond prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunction.248 Watkins did not post a 
separate bond pertaining to the Partial Preliminary Injunction or request that the 
Temporary Restraining Order bond be substituted for the Partial Preliminary Injunction 
bond. (Neither did Watkins request xoneration of the Temporary Restraining Order 
242 November 24 20 IO Minute Entry, at p. 4. 
243 Id. 
244 Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. 12. 
245 Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. 13 . 
246 Rowland v. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216. 233 P. 869, 872-3 (1925). 
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bond, however.) Watkins was also ordered to prepare the preliminary injunction order, 
which Watkins did not do. 249 
Instead on November 9 2010 Watkins moved for reconsideration of the Partial 
Preliminary Injunction and argued that the "New Lease" was a valid contract between the 
parties pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-307.250 Watkins renewed its request for a 
prejudgment writ of attachment.251 On the same date Storn1s and Brownstone moved for 
reconsideration of the partial preliminary injunction only, on the grounds that no 
evidence had been submitted for preliminary injunction or the amount of the bond.252 
This ou11 set aside the Partial Preliminary Injunction that same day, November 9, 
2010.253 
A hearing was held on the two motions for reconsideration on ovember 1 7 
2010 .254 Watkins' Reconsideration Motion was denied.255 Watkins oral.ly moved for a 
Rule 54(b) ce11ificate for purposes of appeal.256 As to the preliminary injunction issue, 
the pai1ies stipulated to most of the items in dispute save for three: the bar, the outdoor 
signs and poles and the no11h and east awnings. 257 The Court took under advisement the 
matters of Watkins' Rule 54(b) certificate request and the three items in dispute.2 8 
247 ld. 
248 Partial Prelimina,y lryunction, at p. 14. 
249 Id . 
250 Watkins' Reconsideration Motion, at p. 2. 
2s1 Id. 
252 See: Stonns' and Brownstone 's Reconsideration Motion. 
253 See: Set Aside Order. 
254 MiJ1ute Entry The Watkins Company. LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed 
ovember 24, 2010). 
n Id. , at p. 2. 
2s6 Id. 
25 7 Id. 
?58 -- l!L at p. 4. 
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On November 24 2010, this Court issued the Second Partial Preliminary 
Injunction. This Court granted Watkins a preliminary injunction as to the outdoor poles 
only. Watkins was required to post a bond in the amount of $10,500.00 to cover the cost 
2'9 of the poles. ) The preliminary injunction was predicated upon the posting of the 
bond.260 Nothing in the record shows that Watkins posted the preliminary injunction 
bond. either did Watkins request to substitute the Temporary Restraining Order bond 
for the Second Partial Preliminary Injunction bond. This Court by separate order dated 
November 24, 2010, denied Watkins' request for a Rule 54(b) certificate.26 1 
Thus, a writ of attachment never issued in this case. Indeed a preliminary 
injunction never issued in this case either. Instead the Temporary Restraining Order, 
originally granted on October 1 20 I 0, remained in effect until November 24, 2010. This 
is because after the November 4, 2010 Partial Preliminary Injunction , wherein Watkins ' 
argument in favor of a writ of attachment was denied, Watkins moved for reconsideration 
of thi s Court' s denial of a writ of attachment. Storms and Brownstone were not at liberty 
to move anything out of the Restaurant until Watkins' request for a writ of attachment 
was finally adjudicated (both on the merits and with regard to Watkins' request for a Rule 
54(b) certificate). In short, Watkins prolonged the period of time in which Storms and 
Brownstone remained in possession of the Premises through November 24 2010. 
Fm1hermore the preliminary injunction granted pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-308 
in the Partial Preliminary Injunction which issued on November 4 2010 never came 
259 Second Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. 12. 
260 Id. 
261 Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) Certificate, The Watkins Company, lLC v. Storms 
Bonneville Coun ty case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (fil ed November 24, 20 I 0). 
FINDI NGS OF FA T AND CONCLUS IONS O F L W 95 
172
into being. Watkins never filed the bond required.262 Watkins never prepared the 
preliminary injunction order, as required by the Partial Preliminary lnjunction. 263 
Storms and Brownstone requested reconsideration of the Partial Preliminmy 
Injunction on the grounds that evidence to sustain the injunction had not been offered. 264 
This Comi dissolved the Partial Preliminary injunction on November 9, 2010.265 When 
the Second Partial Preliminary Injunction issued on November 24, 2010, Watkins was 
again ordered to post a bond with the Clerk of the Court in the amount of $10,500.00, 
which represented the replacement costs for the poles supporting the two outdoor signs 
Stonns and Brownstone were enjoined from removing.266 Only the original $10,000.00 
bond, paid at the issuance of the temporary restraining order, remained with the Clerk of 
the Court. Watkins did not pay the additional amount required in the Second Partial 
Preliminary Injunction. 
Whether or not the Second Partial Preliminary Injunction came into being based 
upon the $10,000.00 temporary restraining order bond is, in the end, of little relevance. 
The Temporary Restraining Order based upon Watkin's request for a writ of attachment 
under Idaho Code § 8-502(d), expired when this Cowi denied the writ. Watkins moved 
for reconsideration of thjs Court's denial of the writ. 267 At the November 17 2010 
hearing, this Court denied Watkins' Reconsideration Motion.268 Watkins then orally 
262 See: Partial Preliminmy inj unction, at p. 14. 
263 Partial Preliminary Injunction, at p. J 2. 
264 Storms' and Brownstone's Reconsideration Motion, at p. 2. 
265 Set Asi I Order. 
- 66 Second Prelimina,y injunction, at p. 11. 
267 Watk ins' Reconsideration Motion. 
268 Minute Entry, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no,. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed 
ovember 24, 20 I 0), at p. 2. 
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requested a Rule 54(b) certificate to appeal thi Court's denial of the writ. 269 Watkins' 
request for a Rule 54(b) certificate was denied on November 24 2010. 270 
During the pendency of the writ question, not only did Watkins' temporary 
restraining order bond remain with the Clerk of the Court but also, Storms and 
Brownstone could not remove any of their property from the Premises. Simply put the 
issue had not been finally adjudicated. Watkins sought a writ to attach on all of Stom1s' 
dB , · h' 'h p · 27 1 an rownstone s property wit mt e rem1ses. 
While prohibited from removing property and equipment from the Premises, 
Storms and Brownstone incurred costs and fees for insurance and utilities to protect both 
the property within the Premises and the Premises itself. either Idaho Code § 8-502(d) 
nor § 8-503 addresses the wrongful issuance of a temporary restraining order, only the 
wrongful issuance of a writ. (This Court notes that the term "wrongful," in the context of 
a writ of attachment, does not mean a malicious attachment without probable cause, but a 
writ for which no valid grounds for attachment exist.)2 72 
On the other hand, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) which pertains to all 
restraining orders issued requires a bond "for the payment of such costs and damages 
including reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred or 
suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." 
Wrongful restraint does not equate to malicious conduct, but to a determination that the 
basis for the requested restraint was without merit. 
269 Id. 
270 Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) Certificate, The Watkin Company, LLC v. Storms, 
Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed ovember 24, 2010). 
2 1 Watkins' Affidavit at p. 5, 21. 
272 See: Ta_) for v. Fluharty, 35 Idaho 705, 208 P. 866, 870-1 ( 1922). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON LUSIONS OF LAW 97 
174
Such is the situation in this case. Watkins sought a writ of attachment based upon 
the New Lease he claimed against Storms and Brownstone. This Court determined that 
the New Lease never came into effect between the parties. Thus, Watkins' basis for the 
temporary restraining order was ultimately found to be without merit. Therefore, Sto1ms 
and Brownstone may recover their costs and fees up to the amount of the bond. 
Storms identified attorney fees he paid to Mr. Brandstetter for time spent on the 
temporary restraining order and writ of attachment issues.273 The fees indicated in Trial 
Exhibit J were incurred from September 29, 2010 through December 21, 2010.274 
The litigation between the pa11ies to this lawsuit between the dates of October l , 
2010 and November 24 2010 revolved entirely around Watkins' request for a temporary 
restraining order and writ of attachment. The issues which were eventually tried dealt 
with the state of the Premises after Storms and Brownstone vacated the building. Thus, it 
is clear from the record that the attorney fees incurred by Storms and Brownstone from 
September 29, 2010 tlu·ough November 24 2010 are recoverable under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65(c) because the temporary restraining order was ultimately determined 
to be without merit, and becau e the only issues before the Court from the inception of 
the lawsuit (October 1 2010) until the writ and injunction issues were finally adjudicated 
(Novemb r 24, 2010) were the writ and injunction matters. 
Taking into consideration the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions the skill requi ite to perform the legal services properly, the experience 
and abi lity of Mr. Brandstetter in the particuiar field of law the charges incurred in 
comparison to fees incurred in similar cases, the amount involved and the results 
273 See: Trial Exhibit J. 
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obtained the undesirability of the cas and awards in similar cases, this Comt finds that 
Mr. Brandstetter s fee of $11 815.00 is reasonable for the work Mr. Brandstetter 
accomplished regarding the temporary restraining order and Watkins' efforts to gain a 
writ of attachment. This fee encompasses the period of September 29, 2010 through 
?75 November 17, 2010.-
The remaining $810.00 requested by Storms shall not be included in the Rule 
65(c) award for the reason that the temporary restraining order and writ of attachment 
issues were finalized by ovember 24, 2010. In addition, Mr. Brandstetter's time sheet 
shows that after November 17, 2010, he was involved in preparation of the answer to 
Watkins' Complaint, as well as correspondence and teleconferences with Storms and 
with opposing counsel. one of the entries after November 17 2010 reference the 
restraining order or writ issues. Accordingly, the attorney fees charged after November 
17 20 10 shall not be recovered by Storms and Brownstone under their Rule 65(c) theory. 
In terms of the in urance an.d utilities Storms paid for the Premises during the 
months of October, ovember, and December of 2010, Storms could not begin to move 
out of the Premises until November 25, 2010. Therefore the costs Storms incurred from 
October 1, 2010 through and including November 24 2010 are attributable to Watkins' 
wrongful temporary restraining order and its failed efforts to impose a writ of assistance 
on Storms and Brownstone. Therefore, Stonns is entitled to recover as damages, those 
insurance and utility costs and fees associated with the pe1iod of October 1, 2010 tlu·ough 
and including November 24, 2010. 
274 1d. 
275 See: Trial Exhib it J. 
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Storms rented storage space from Lincoln Storage (no. Al 8) at a cost of $120.00 
per month beginning on September 29, 2010.276 Storms rented space Al 8 for the months 
of Octob r and November of 20 l 0. Storms is entitled to recover rent for the month of 
October and twenty-four days of November (at the rate of $4.00 per day for a thirty-day 
month) for the rental of Lincoln Storage space Al 8, fo r a total recovery of $216.00. 
Storms rented Lincoln Storage space A12 at a cost of $135.00 per month, 
beginning on August 24 2009.277 He moved personal items from space A12 to another 
location so that he could use space A l2 for equipment from the Restaurant. Storms' did 
not identify when he moved his personal items out of space Al 2 but he did testify that he 
rented the space for October November and December of 20 10. Without better 
evidence of when St01ms moved his personal items out of space A l2, however, the 
record does not support a finding that Storms' rental of space Al2 is attributable to 
Watkins. 
Storms rented Lincoln Storage space A09 at a cost of $135 .00 per month, 
beginning on September 22, 2010.278 St01ms rented space A09 for the months of October 
and ovember of 2010. Storms is entitled to recover rent for the months of October and 
twenty-four days of November (at the rate of $4.50 per day for a thirty-day month) for 
the rental of Lincoln Storage space A09, at a total recovery of $243.00. 
Storms continued to insure the building in which the Restaurant had been located 
through October 25 2010. The annual cost for the building insuranc was $2,385 .00.279 
The monthly cost of the bui lding insurnnce ($2,385 .00 ..;- 12) equaled $198.75, making 
276 Trial Exhibi t B, at pp. 00001 and 00002. 
277 Trial Exhibi t B at pp. 00003 and 00004. 
278 Trial Exhibi t B, at pp. 00005 and 00006. 
FlND1 GS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 100 
177
the daily insurance rate for October $6.41. Storms is entitled to re over $160.25 for the 
building insurance premium attributable to the period of October 1, 2010 through 
October 25 2010. 
Storms also maintained business personal property insurance, liability rated on 
sales/payroll, liquor liability, equipment breakdown coverage, terrorism coverage, cluster 
endorsement, and food contamination insurance on the Premises tlu·ough January 11 
2011.280 he $4,334.00 combined annual premium breaks down to $361.17 per month. 
Stom1s is entitled to recover the insurance premiums he paid on the Premises for the 
month of October 2010 and for twenty-four days of the month of November 2010 (at 
$12.04 per day for a thirty-day month), for a total amount of $650.13. 
Storms paid $678.97 for electrical usage, water, sewer and garbage for the 
month of October 2010.281 Storms is entitled to recover that amount under Rule 65(c). 
Storms paid $1,246.80 for electrical usage, water sewer, and garbage for the 
month of ovember 2010.282 This figure breaks down to $41.56 per day for a thi1ty-day 
month. Storms is entitled to recover $997.44 for utilities for November 1-24, 2010 under 
Rule 65(c). 
Storms paid $298.54 to Inte1mountain Gas Company for October of 2010 and 
$794.34 for 28' ovember of 2010 . ., Storms shall recover the gas charges he paid for 
October of 2010. The ovember charge breaks down to $26.48 per day for a thirty-day 
179 Trial Exhibi t D, at pp. 00004 and 00005. 
280 Trial Exhibit D at pp. 00004, 00008. 
281 Trial Exhibil. F, at p. I. 
282 Trial E hibit F, at pp. I, 2. 
183 Trial xhib it H 
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month. Storms is entitled to recover, pursuant to Rule 65(c), $635.52 for November 1-24 
of 2010, together with $298.54 for the month of October, for a total recovery of $934.06. 
Furthermore, Storms paid Herbert Rockhold an additional $2,000.00 in moving 
costs because the move took place in the snow and ice of late-November and December 
of 2010 instead of early-October of 2010 due to the temporary restraining order and 
Watkins' attempts to secure a writ of attachment. The weather conditions slowed the 
move-out process, necessitating the additional $2,000.00 charged by Rockhold. Storms 
is entitled to recover the additional $2 000.00 charged by Rockhold pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c ). 
In sum Storms and Brownstone have shown themselves entitled to receive 
$17,015 .88 in costs and fees attributable to Watkins' wrongful temporary restraining 
order. Since Storms and Brownstone are allowed costs and fees only up to the amount of 
the bond, they shall recover the full $10,000.00 bond from Watkins. 
6. Attorney Fees. 
The pa1iies' attorney fee requests shall be determined upon the filing of motions, 
if any, by the parties. Any attorney fee motions shalJ be filed within fourteen (1 4) days 
of the date of the forthcoming judgment. 284 
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusions are 
appropriate: 
m Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) 54(e (5). 
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l. The terms of the Lease carried over into Storms' and Brownstone' s 
tenancy at wil l as guidel ines for determining whether or not Storms and Brownstone 
breached their duties as tenants to Watkins. 
2. Storms and/or Brownstone breach the covenant to repair in the Lease with 
regard to the broken vestibule window pane, the unusable panic bar on the north-side 
entrance, and the uncleaned grease trap. 
3. Watkins should be awarded $699.64 for cleaning or repairs of the 
Premises as a result of Storms' and/or Brownstone's breach. In the alternative, Watkins 
should recover $699.64 from Storms and Brownstone for waste committed upon the 
Premises. 
4. Storms and Brownstone were not unjustly enriched by possession of the 
Premises from November 25, 2010 to December 30, 2010 without paying rent. 
5. Storms and Brownstone shown themselves entitled to recover storage 
rental expenses, additional moving expenses, insurance expenses, utility expenses, and 
attorney fees as damages for the temporary restraining order entered against them. 
6. Storms and Brownstone are entitled only to recover the amount of the 
bond paid by Watkins for the temporary restraining order, which amounts to $10,000.00. 
VII. ORDERS 
In accordance with the foregoing findings and conclusions, the fo llowing orders 
are appropriate: 
I . Watkins shall take nothing by its allegations against Burggraf. 
2. Watkins shall take nothing by its Count One (breach of contract) claims 
against the defendants. 
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3. Watkins' Count Two request for injunctive relief is denied as moot. 
4. Watkins' shall take nothing by its Count Three request for an accounting 
under the "New Lease." 
5. Watkins' request for the defendants' eviction in Count Four of its Second 
Amended Complaint is denied as moot. 
6. Watkins shall recover $699.64 from Storms and Brownstone for repairs to 
the Premises necessitated by Storms' and Brownstone's breach of the expectations of 
their at-will tenancy with Watkins or, in the alternative, for waste to the Premises. 
7. Watkins shall take nothing by its claim of unjust enrichment against 
Storms and Brownstone. 
8. Storms and Brownstone shall recover the full amount of the $10,000.00 
bond given by Watkins for the Temporary Restraining Order on their counterclaim 
against Watkins. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
-of 
DATED this Ji_ day of November 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ~'u/':),dl}_ff served a true copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and e onclusions of Law on the parties listed be I.ow by deposit 
into the U.S. mail by deposit into the attorney's courthouse mailbox, or by facsimile 
transmission. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & 
AS SOCIA TES PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
D U.S. Mail ~ Courthouse Box 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. "'-._ 
COX, OHMAN & D U.S. Mail '&J Courthouse Box 
BRANDST TTER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" Street 
P.O. Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMP ANY LLC, an 










MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, ) 
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and ) 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC. , an ) 
Idaho Corporation; collectively doing ) 
business as BROWNSTONE ) 
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) _______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-5958 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
(hereinafter "Watkins") shall take nothing by its allegations against defendant Kathy 
Burggraf, an individual. 
Watkins shall take nothing by its breach of the "New Lease" claims against the 
defendants. 
Watkins' request for injunctive relief against the defendants is denied as moot. 
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Watkins' shall take nothing by its request for an accounting under the ''New 
Lease." 
Watkins' request for the defendants' eviction is denied as moot. 
Watkins shall recover $699.64 from defendant Michael Storms, an individual 
(hereinafter "Storms"), and defendant Brownstone Companies, Inc. , an Idaho 
Corporation (hereinafter "Brownstone"), for repairs to the premises located at 455 River 
Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereinafter the "Premises") necessitated by Stom1s' and 
Brownstone's breach of the expectations of their at-will tenancy with Watkins or, in the 
alternative, for waste to the Premises. 
Watkins shall take nothing by its claim of unjust enrichment against Storms and 
Brownstone. 
Storms and Brownstone shall recover the full amount of the $10,000.00 bond 
given by Watkins for the Temporary Restraining Order on their counterclaim against 
Watkins. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
t1)I 
DATED this E day of November 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on k ) / '1}, }JJ_!f- I served a true copy of the 
foregoing Judgment on the partfe~w by deposit into the U.S. mail by deposit 
into the attorney's courthouse mailbox, or by facsimile transmission. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & 
AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN& 
BRANDSTETTER,CHARTERED 
510 "D" Street 
P.O. Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" STREET 
P.O. BOX 51600 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600 
(208) 522-8606 
Fax: (208) 522-8618 
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960 
ATTORNEYS FOR MICHAEL STORMS AND BROWNSTONE COMPANIES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC., an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintif£1Counter-Defendant 
vs. 
WCHAEL STORMS, an individual; and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation collectively doing , 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. : CY-10-5958 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS 
COMES NOW the Defendants/Counterclaimants, Michael Storms and Brownstone 
Companies, by and through their attorney of record, Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq., and move the 
Court for an award of attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred by 
Defendants/Counterclaimants in successfully defending Plaintiff's causes of action and 
prosecuting Defendants' /Counterclaimants' counterclaim. Said motion is made and based 
pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code §12-120(3). This motion is based on the record and file 
in this matter and the affidavit and memorandum of costs and attorney fees filed simultaneously 
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herewith. Defendants/Counterclaimants request oral argument. 
DATED thi~day of December, 2~  
~~~ ~=::::::::.~---==------===-?~~, ~======--
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the .!t,1 day of December 2014 l caused a true and 
con-ect copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below 
theis names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage 
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
Smith Driscoll and Associates 
414 Shoup 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Fax: 529-4166 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 . Maple St. #402 
Fax: 782-3167 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
¥tl By facsimile transmission 
[ ] By Courthouse box 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
j.t'J By facsimile transmission 
[ J By Courthouse box 
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. . 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" STREET 
P.O. BOX 51600 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600 
(208) 522-8606 
Fax: (208) 522-8618 
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960 
;:iul1, VILLE COUN f )' I . ~ . 
- · • J.lj ·~/ 
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ATTORNEYS FOR MICHAEL STORMS AND BROWNSTONE COMPANIES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC., an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual; and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation collectively doing , 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-10-5958 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
Defendants/Counterclaimants submit the following Memorandum of Attorney Fees and 





Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Chartered Attorney's Fees; 
02/28/2014 Electronic legal research 
12/27/2012 Richard St.Clair Mediator Fee; 
TOTAL 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1 
S:IDEAN\CLIENTS • ACTIVE\Storms. Michae~Second Cau,elmemorandum of costs and attorney fees .wpd 
188
' -
The above attorney fees are more particularly itemized in the Affidavit of counsel filed 
herein of which is by reference made a part hereof as though fully set out herein. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, being first duly sworn, says that he is the attorney for 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, in the above-entitled action and as such is fully informed relative 
to the above described costs and attorney fees incurred by him in defense of Plaintiff's causes of 
action and in prosecution of Defendants/Counterclaimants counterclaim against Plaintiff. That to 
the best of Affiant's knowledge and belief, the costs and attorney fees incurred by Kirk Vance 
herein and as set out in the above Memorandum and the Affidavit filed herein are true and 
correct; that same have been necessarily incurred by Defendants/Counterclaimants in defending 
and prosecuting this matter; and that the costs and attorney fees are in compliance with Idaho 
law. 
r-1 
DATED this.I_ day of December, 2014. 
~~:.a----
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .1 day of December, 2014. 
TARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: ~\~\\\e., 
My Commission Expires : q -7.'2~ 1.67..0 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
,,.,( 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _1__ day of December 20 I 4 I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below 
their nan1es either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage 
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsim ile as set forth bet.ow. 
B .J. Driscoll, Esq. 
Smith, Driscoll and Associates 
414 Shoup 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Fax : 529-4166 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 . Maple St. #402 
Fax: 782-3167 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
Af By facsimile transmission 
[ ] By Courthouse box 
[ ] 
[ J n 
By pre-paid post 
By hand delivery 
By facsimile transmission 
By Courthouse Box 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
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DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
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COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" STREET 
P.O. BOX 51600 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-1600 
(208) 522-8606 
Idaho State Bar No.: 2960 
ATTORNEYS FOR MICHAEL STORMS AND BROWNSTONE COMPANIES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC., an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintif£/Co unter-Defendant 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual; and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation collectively doing , 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Case No.: CV-10-5958 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETIER, ESQ. , being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is a partner in the law firm of Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Chartered, 
which represents the Defendants/Counterclaimants in the above-entitled matter. 
2. The firm of COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, Chartered, was retained by 
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Defendants/Counterclaimants, to assist Defendants/Counterclaimants in defense of the causes of 
action brought by Plaintiff and in prosecution of the Defendants/Counterclaimants Counterclaim 
against the Plaintiff. 
3. Affiant' s hourly rate is $225.00. 
4. Affiant was required to participate in a multiple hearings and a trial lasting seven 
days. Affiant defended and prosecuted multiple Motions for Summary Judgment. Affiant 
propounded and answered extensive discovery, and brought and defended multiple motions to 
compel. Filed answers to several amended complaints and prepared an Counterclaim on behalf 
of Defendants/Counterclaimants. Affiant perfom1ed extensive legal research on the various 
claims, causes of action and issues raised throughout the case and prepared multiple memoranda 
and briefs. Further, affiant exhaustively interviewed large numbers of witnesses, reviewed 
voluminous records, photographs, exhibits, and documents. Finally, affiant prepared 
comprehensive proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument after the evidence 
concluded. 
5. The case dealt with difficult questions of law and fact and did consume the 
amount of time and effort set forth. 
6. The skill requisite to perform the services properly were that typical of 
researching legal issues and presenting them in court. 
7. Affiant has been litigating cases since 1982 and has thirty two (32 ) years of 
litigation experience. 
8. There was no time limitation imposed by the Defendants/Counterclaimants and 
much of the work was responsive to the Plaintiffs actions in the proceedings. 
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9. The circumstances of the case imposed no time limitations except in regards to the 
questions involved. 
10. The attorney fee is fixed. 
11. Affiant has represented Defendants/Counterclaimants since 2010 in other 
proceedings and matters. 
12. The action was not undesirable and affiant's efforts were greatly successful. 
Plaintiff sought damages in excess of $27,000, but were denied virtually all relief except $699.64 
or roughly 2%. Further, on the Counterclaim, the Defendants/Counterclaimants requested an 
award of $21 ,078.39, the court found damages in favor of Storms and Brownstone in the amount 
of $ 17,015.88 and recovered judgment in the amount of $10,000 the amount of the bond posted 
by Plaintiff and set by the court. 
13. Defendants/Counterclaimants are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code §12-120(3) in that a commercial transaction was alleged (all transactions except for 
personal or household purposes). 
14. Between November 18, 2010 and the date hereof the time and labor required 
devoted exclusively to the defense of plaintiff' s claims and the prosecution the counterclaim of 
amounts to $86,876.50 or three hundred eighty six and twelve hundredths (386.12) hours. 
Throughout, affiant' s representation of Defendants/Counterclaimants in these proceedings by 
reason of the extensive time that was required and as a courtesy to Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Affiant discounted the number of hours actually billed. As reflected in the itemized charges for 
services attached hereto and made a part hereof thirty (30) hours were not charged. While in 
Affiant' s opinion, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of affiant's courtesy, Affiant claims 
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attorney fees only in the amount actually charged and paid by Defendants/Counterclaimants 
amounts to $406.50 or three hundred fifty two and ninety-two hundredths (2.92) hours. That the 
forego ing attorney fees pertain solely to the prosecution of the within action. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of this office's billing setting forth costs and attorneys 
fees incurred for the above purposes 
15. In add ition Affiant has incurred attorney fees in the sum of $720.00 or three and 
two tenths (3.2) hours in the preparation of the Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, the 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs and 
supporting exhibit. Since no hearing has been held and if objection is made to the request for 
attorney fees additional attorney fees may be incurred, the Defendants/Counterclaimants reserve 
the right to supplement the request as additional attorney fees are incurred. 
16. To the best of Affiant' s knowledge and belief, the amount of $80,126.50 for 
attorney fees and $720.47 for costs is correct and to which the Defendants/Counterclaimants are 
entitled to recover in the total sum of $80,846.97. 
17. Awards in similar cases are similar to the amount requested herein. 
18. In the course of my experience I have become familiar with the time other 
attorney devote and charges other attorneys charge for like work and the prevailing charges for 
like work would be comparable to those charged and sought herein. 
19. That based on Affiant's knowledge, belief and expertise as a practicing Idaho 
attorney for over thirty years, Affiant veri ly believes and opines that the costs, disbursements and 
attorney fees as charged and set for herein are fair, reasonable, correctly stated, properly claimed 
and are in accordance with Idaho Law. 
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20. On behalf of Defendants/Counterclaimants affiant hereby requests that 
Defendants/Counterclaimants be permitted to recover their attorney fees in the sum of 
$80,126.50 and costs in the sum of $20.47 for the total sum of $80,846.97 and that 
Defendants/Counterclaimants have judgment against Plaintiff for that amount. 
f'l1 
DATED this.I:_ day of December, 2014. 
~/ ,.-95:.-----
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3°day of December, 2014. 
N~RY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: 'i5cnne,"\) \ \\ -e.. 
My Commission Expires: 9,-"Z..'Z.-'ZC'Th 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
r1 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the J__ day of December, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below 
their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage 
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
Smith, Driscoll and Associates 
414 Shoup 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Fax: 529-41 66 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 N. Maple St. #402 
Fax: 782-3167 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
J><j By facsimile transmission 
[ ] By Courthouse Box 
[ ] By pre-paid post 
[ ] By hand delivery 
)><('By facsimile transmission 
[ ] By Courthouse box 
&2~<-6 
DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, ESQ. 
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COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETIER, CHARTERED 
51 O "D" Street 
P. 0 . Box 51600 




999 S Lee 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
Landlord/Ten ant 
12/01/2010 Office Conference with client 
Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of Answer to Complaint 
12/02/2010 Telephone Conference with client 
12/03/2010 Review and respond to emails from counsel 
12/06/2010 Telephone Conference with client 
12/10/2010 Review and respond to emails from Mr. Driscoll 
12/14/2010 Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll 
Review email from Mr. Driscoll 
12/1 5/2010 Preparation of email to client 
12/21/2010 Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
Telephone Conference with client 
Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll 
08/30/2011 Preparation of Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Hearing 
09/06/2011 Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
09/20/201 1 Office Conference with client 
09/21/2011 Telephone Conference with client 
Review of e-mail from client 
Preparation of Notice Vacating Heating and Withdrawing Motion to Dismiss 
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
10/13/2011 Preparation of Notice of No Conflict 
10/18/2011 Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Review of e-mail from Mr. Driscoll and preparation of e-mail to client 
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STATEMENT NO: 54 
Landlord/Tenant 
10/24/2011 Preparation of Motion, Order, and Affidavit for Retention 
12/09/2011 Telephone Conference with client 
01/03/2012 Review e-mails from client 
01/11 /2012 Telephone Conference with client 
05/11 /2012 Preparation of e-mail to client 
07/17/2012 Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
08/01 /2012 Office Conference with client 
08/07/2012 Court Appearance at Status Conference 
08/17/2012 Preparation of letter to Mr. Whyte 
09/12/2012 Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll 
09/26/2012 Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll - 2nd cause 
10/09/2012 Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll - 2nd cause 
11/06/2012 Research landlord/tenant law tenancy at wi ll, month to month, holdover tenancy, potential 
effect of remaining in possession after order of eviction, creating a term for years, month 
to month, or one year 
11/07/2012 Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of e-mail to client 
Preparation of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
11/08/2012 Preparation of final revisions to discovery 
11/09/2012 Preparation of letter to client 
Preparation of Notices of Service 
11/13/2012 Preparation of e-mail to client and review of response 
11 /1 4/2012 Review and respond to e-mail from Judge St. Clair 
11/19/2012 Preparation of letter to client 
Preparation of letter to client 
Preparation of e-mail to client 
12/04/2012 Preparation of e-mail to client 
Review and respond to e-mail from client 
12/06/2012 Office Conference with client 
12/11/2012 Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of Notice of Compliance Witnesses 
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LandlordfT en ant 
12/17/2012 Preparation for Mediation 
Appearance at Mediation 
12/18/2012 Preparation of Motion to Compel and Stay Summary Judgment proceedings, and Affidavit 
12/26/2012 Review and respond to e-mail from client 
Preparation of letter to Counsel 
12/27/2012 Preparation of letter to Richard St. Clair 
01/03/2013 Preparation of Motion for Summary Judgment, Notice of Hearing, Motion and Order 
Shortening Time 
Partial preparation of Responses to Discovery Requests 
01/04/2013 Review and respond to e-mail from counsel 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of partial and additional responses to discovery requests 
01/07/2013 Office Conference with client 
01/09/2013 Preparation of final revisions to discovery response and Notice of Service 
Search of all e-mails to include in discovery 
01/11/2013 Review and respond to e-mail from counsel 
Partial preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
01/12/2013 Further preparation on Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and partial 
research on equitable relief 
01/14/2013 Preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Preparation of e-mail to client 






Review and respond to e-mail from client 
Office Conference with client 
Partial preparation of Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Office Conference with client, preparation of final revisions to Affidavit and Exhibits, 
preparation of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, review and 
respond to e-mail from counsel, preparation of Motion to Compel , Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Compel, and Notice of Hearing 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of Motion, Affidavit, and Order Shortening Time 
Telephone Conference with Court Clerk 
Telephone Conference with Court and Counsel 
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of e-mail to client 
Preparation of e-mail to client 
Review of Watkins Supplemental Discovery 





































December 03, 2014 

















Preparation of revisions and amendments to Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment and exhibits (discounted from 3.0 to 1.0) 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of Supplemental Response to discovery (discounted) 
Preparation for Motion to Compel cross motions 
Court Appearance at Motion to Compel cross motions 
Preparation of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of two (2) e-mails to Mr. Driscoll (1/29/2013) 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of revisions to Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Review of discovery responses and additional copies made, and preparation of letter to 
Clerk 
Preparation of revisions to Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk 
Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk 
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Research abi lity to file additional affidavits authorities 
Review of exit photos and preparation of e-mails to client 
Review and respond to e-mails from client 
Partial preparation for hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Court Appearance at .hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend 
Office Conference with client 
Review and forward e-mail to client 
Preparation for hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Telephone Conference with Court and Counsel 
Preparation of letter to client 
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of witness list and e-mail to client 
Preparation of e-mail to cl ient 
Telephone Conference with client 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll 
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Detailed review of discovery responses from Watkins and timing of same 
Review and raespond to various e-mails from client 
Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk 
Telephone Conference with client 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of Counterclaim 
Office Conference with client 



















































Review e-mai l from client 
Review and respond to e-mail from Mr. Driscoll 
Telephone Conference with cl ient 
Preparation for Status Conference hearing 
Telephonic Status Conference hearing 
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll 
Telephone Conference with client 
Preparation of e-mail to counsel 
Telephone Conference with Judge's Clerk 
Telephone Conference with cl ient 
Office Conference with client 
Telephone Conference with client 
Office Conference with cl ient 
Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of e-mai l to client 
Rev iew of e-mail from Mr. Driscoll and forward to client 
Review e-mail, preparation of e-mail to cl ient and to Mr. Dri scol l 
Preparation of e-mail to client 
Review and respond to e-mail from client 
Office Conference with client 
Preparation of letter to Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of e-mail to client 
Preparation of Notice of Settlement Fai lure 
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Review of e-mai l and attachments from Mr. Driscoll , and preparation of e-mai l to cl ient 














Telephone Conference with Judge Simpson's Clerk 
Office Conference with client 
Review and forward of e-mail to Mr. Driscoll 
Review Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Office Conference with client 
Telephonic Court Appearance with Court and counsel. 









Office Conference with client. 
Preparation for hearing on Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Amend. 
Preparation for hearing and argument outl ine. 
Court Appearance for hearing on Opposition to Motion to Amend and Motion for 
Sanctions. 
Preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Sanctions. 
08/21/2013 Preparation of Notice of Available Trial Dates. 
09/17/2013 Review of email from counsel and preparation of email to client. 
09/18/2013 Telephone Conference with client. 
09/19/2013 Preparation of Defendant's 3rd Supplemental Answer to Discovery. 
09/20/2013 Preparation of Amended Notice of Available Trial Dates . 
09/23/2013 Office Conference with client. 
Preparation of Notice of available trial dates. 
Preparation of Notice of Service. 
Review and respond to email from Clerk. 
09/25/2013 Preparation of email to Clerk 
Office Conference with client. 
10/22/2013 Preparation of Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim. 
Preparation of email to cl ient and review of damage claims. 
10/23/2013 Office Conference with client. 
11 /05/201 3 Research fil ing a first counterclaim in response to a 2nd Amended Complaint 
11/07/2013 Review of discovery and supplementation 
Preparation of email to client 
11/12/2013 Office Conference with client 
11/13/2013 Preparation of Response to Motion to Dismiss 
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11/15/201 3 Preparation of Supplemental Response to Requests for Production and Interrogatories 
and Notice of Service 157.50 
45.00 
45.00 
Office Conference with client 
Telephone Conference with client 
11/25/2013 Preparation for hearing on Motion to Strike Counterclaim 
Court Appearance at hearing on Motion to Strike Counterclaim 
12/06/2013 Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll and prepare email to client 
12/09/2013 Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll 
12/18/2013 Preparation of email to Mr. Driscoll 
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STATEMENT NO: 
Landlord/Tenant 
Research Construction of contracts, Obligation to maintain, obligation to restore premises 
Research Idaho case law on issues raised by Motion for Summary Judgment on 








Preparat ion of Memorandum to Mr. Brandstetter summarizing results of legal research 
Preparation for hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, detail review and analysis of 
supporting and opposing cases. 
Court Appearance at hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Office Conference with client 
Preparation of Settlement Statement 
Preparation of final draft and exhibits to mediation statement 
Preparation for mediation 
Participation in mediation in Pocatel lo 
Preparation of letter to client 
Beginning of trial preparation, trial notebook, discovery notebook, exhibits 
Court Appearance at Pre-Trial Conference 
Office Conference with client 
Office Conference with client 
Preparation for trial, review of photos of Watkins subm itted in discovery 
Research health care inspection standards criteria, grease (FOG) trap maintenance 
standards 
02/12/2014 Telephone Conference with Kelli Eiger from Eastern Idaho Health .Department 
Preparation for trial , Watkins discovery organization and review 
Research cooking hood maintenance standards, fire code requirements 
Review , organization and preparation of photographs ; organization and outline of issues; 
trial notebook; and Watkins discovery notebook 
Office Conference with client and 6 witnesses 
02/18/2014 Office Conference with Michael and Levi 
02/21/2014 Office Conference with client 
02/26/2014 Preparation of partia l exhibits and photographs list and organization of same 
02/27/2014 Emai l to Judge's Clerk regard ing exhibit binder preference 
Preparation of exhibit binder and tria l organization 
02/28/2014 Office Conference with client 
Preparation of emails to Judge's Clerk 
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of Motion and Order to Extend time to file exhibits 
Preparation of Notice of Compliance Exhibit List, Witness List and Pre-Trial Order 
Office Conference with client 
03/03/2014 Preparation of exhibit labels, exhibit list revisions , exhibit binders, exhibits 
Preparation of Notice of Compliance: Exhibits, letter to Clerk 
Office Conference with client 










































December 03, 2014 . . 





Preparation of email to Mr. Driscoll 
Review email from Mr. Driscoll 
Preparation of email to client 
Office Conference with cl ient 
Office Conference with client 
Preparation for trial, review of exhibits, legal research elements, fact issues, photo 
analysis plaintiff and defendant (3 hours spent billed 2 hours ) 
Review and respond to emails from Mr. Driscoll 
STATEMENT NO: 
03/13/2014 Preparation for trial, interview witnesses, Jeff Dexter and Katie Wil liams. Meeting with 
client, preparation of subpoenas (11); legal research pleadings, judicial notice, research 










Preparation for trial, meeting with client, exhibit review and identification, testimony 
outlines 
Preparation for trial, meeting with Mr. Storms, meeting with Alison Noble, Ryan Getsinger 
and Herb Rockhold 
Telephone Conference with Alan Flores 
Preparation of letter to Mr. Flores and Mr. Englis 
Preparation for trial and conference with cl ient 
Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial (14 hours spent, bi lled 11) 
Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial (13 hours spent billed 11) 
Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial 
Office Conference with client, witnesses and attend trial 
Preparation of Stipulation to Continue 2nd day of trial and email to Mr. Driscoll 
Review of decision denying motion for involuntary dismissal 
Preparation of Order Granting Continuance of Trial Date (no charge) 
04/23/2014 Office Conference with client and preparation for trial 
04/24/2014 Office Conference with client, witness and trial preparation (13 hours spent billed 9) 
04/25/2014 Preparation for trial and conference with client 
Court Appearance for trial 
05/05/2014 Office Conference with cl ient 
05/06/2014 Office Conference with client 
Court Appearance - Trial Day 6 
05/28/2014 Office Conference with client 
Preparation for last day of trial 
05/29/2014 Preparation for trial 
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LandlordfT enant 
Telephone Conference with client 
Research rebuttal testimony 
06/02/2014 Office Conference with client 
06/09/2014 Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll 
06/12/2014 Telephone Conference with cl ient 
06/13/2014 Telephone Conference with Bingham County Clerk 
Preparation of email to client 
06/17/2014 Preparation of Available Dates 
07/28/2014 Office Conference with client 
07/29/2014 Preparation for trial 
Court Appearance at last day of trial 
08/07/2014 Review and respond to email from Mr. Driscoll 
09/09/2014 Telephone Conference with Dan Williams, Court Reporter 
Preparation of email to client 
Telephone Conference with client 
Partial preparation of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
09/10/2014 Review and respond to email from client 
Partial preparation of findings and conclusions 
09/11/2014 Partial preparation of Finding of Fact (10 hours spent - 8 hours billed) 
Preparation of Motion and Order for Extension of Time 
Telephone Conference with Mr. Driscoll 
STATEMENT NO: 
09/12/2014 Partial preparation of findings of fact (12 hours spent - 8 hours billed as courtesy to client ) 
09/14/2014 Partial preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
09/15/2014 Partial preparation of Findings, Conclusions and Argument 
09/16/2014 Preparation of partial findings of fact 
09/17/2014 Partial preparation of findings, conclusions, argument and legal research (10.5 hrs. spent -
billed 7.5 as courtesy to client) 
Review file, research remedies, compile research document 
09/18/2014 Revisions, editing, and partial preparations conclusions of law and argument and research 
of elements unjust enrichment, waste, breach of lease provision for repair and 
maintenance (15 hours spent - 10 hours billed ) 
Review and edit FF/CL document 
09/19/2014 Preparation of final revisions, editing findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument 
10/27/2014 Office Conference with client 






































Telephone Conference with client 
Review Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED 
TOTAL CURRENT WORK 
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq . - ISB #7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Pla intiff 
~
E CEIVEp 
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BY:------
IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY 
BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND 
BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-5958 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, The Watkins Company, LLC ("Watkins" ), by and 
through its counse l of record, and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6) 
and 54(e)(6) moves the court for an order disallowing all of the costs and attorneis fees 
claimed by the defendants in the present case . 
This motion is made on the grounds and fo r the reasons that the defendants are 
not the prevail ing parties in th is case, any award of costs and fees may be affected by 
the court's ruling on Watkins' pending Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and as a 
matter of law the defendants cannot recover anything the costs and attorney's f ees 
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they seek. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Proced ure 7(b)(3)(C), Watkins sha ll "file a brief 
within fourteen (14) days with the court in support of the motion," and therein shall set 
forth in detail its argument s and authorities in support of this motion. 
The motion is based on th is Motion and the Notice of Hearing filed concurrently 
herewith, on the Brief in Support of Motion to Disa llow Costs and Attorney's Fees t o be 
filed within fourteen (14) days, and on the court 's records and files herein . 
The plaintiff requests oral argument. 
DATED this /7 day of December, 2014. 
i I 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
' ~, 
B. y l:') riscoll, Esq. 
A orneys for Plaint iff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /7 day of December, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTtONfo D ISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES t o 
be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facs imile transmission or overnight delivery, 
addressed to the following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETIER, CHTD 
P.O. Box 51600 
510 "D" Street 
Idaho Fa lls, ID 83405 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
District Judge 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 N. Maple, #310 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ J Fax 
[ ] yvern ight Del ivery 
[VJ Hand Delivery 
[~S.Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Del ivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB #7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave . 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Facsimi le: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TH E COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liabi lity company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, KATHY 
BURGGRAF, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 




Case No. CV-10-5958 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S 
FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civi l Procedu re 54(d)(6), 54(e)(6), and 7(b)(3)(C), the 
plaintiff/counterdefendant, The Watkins Company, LLC ("Watki ns"), f iles this brief in 
support of its motion t o disa llow costs and attorney's fees requested by the 
defen dants/counterclaimants, Michael Storms ("Storms" ) and Brown stone Companies, 
Inc. ("Brownstone") . As explained more fu lly below, the court should grant Watkins' 
motion and disallow all of Storms and Brownstone's costs and attorney's fees. 
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II. THE COURT SHOULD DISALLOW ALL OF STORMS AND BROWNSTONE'S COSTS 
AND ATIORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THEIR TOTAL RECOVERY IS LIMITED TO THE 
AMOUNT OF THE SECURITY BOND. 
As Watkins has previously pointed out to the court, any recovery by Storms and 
Brownstone is capped by the amount of the bond. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
No restra ining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except 
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court 
deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages including 
reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred 
or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined 
or restra ined. 
I.R.C.P. 65(c) (emphasis added). By the plain language of Rule 65, the bond limitation 
includes all costs and damages "including reasonable attorney's fees." 
Idaho courts have addressed this issue and expressly accepted the majority view 
that there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent a showing of malicious 
prosecution. The court in McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393, 402 
(Ct. App. 1987), explained, " In jurisdictions with rules or statutes similar to I.R.C.P. 65(c), 
most courts have held that there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent a 
showing of malicious prosecution." (Emphasis added.) The court explained the 
reasoning as follows: 
Although attorney fees expended on pretrial restraint issues are 
embraced by Rule 65(c), the rule does not mandate that every dollar of 
such fees will be recovered. Rather, the rule strikes a balance, 
articu lated by Ju stice Cardozo, between protecting wrongfully restrained 
defendants and avoiding undue hardship for plaintiffs who present 
facially meritorious claims in good faith. 
Id. at 400 (emphasis added). 
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In McAtee, several decreed water right owners appealed the limitation on their 
recovery to the amount of the security bond in their favor, arguing that the final award 
at tria l "was inadequate because it fa iled to cover all attorney fees." Id. The owners 
also argued the limitation was unfair because the trial judge had commented that "he 
did not be lieve a final recovery would be limited by the bond." Id. at 401. The appellate 
court disagreed, applied the plain language of Rule 6S(c}, and limited the owners' total 
recovery to the amount of the bond. Even though the appellate court acknowledged 
that the party "took this statement [from the trial court] to be an assurance that the 
bond amount wou ld not adversely affect them," id., the court nonet heless limited the 
party's recovery to the amount of the bond. 
The owners in McAtee had provided some authority for the minority view that 
"when a bond proves inadequate, the plaintiff ought to pay the excess because it was 
his request for pretria l restraint which caused the defendant's loss." Id. The McAtee 
court admitted that " [t]he minority view seems attract ive on its surface" because it 
"provides compensation for the entire loss resulting from the wrongful restraint" and 
"places the burden of compensation on the litigant who made the 'mistake,' albeit in 
good faith, of seeking the pretrial restraint." Id. Nonetheless, the McAtee court 
following the majority view that "there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent 
a showing of mal icious prosecution," fo llowing the reasoning of Justice Cardozo and the 
"public policy of encouraging ready access to the courts." Id. 
Importantly, restra ined parties like the defendants in McAtee are not without a 
remedy. There, the court recognized that the trial court had "left the door open to 
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further adjustment of the bond before trial," but that the party "sought no further 
adjustment." Id. The water right owners could have sought to increase the bond 
amount at some point in the proceeding, thus increasing their potential final recovery in 
the case. However, the owners "let the $5,000 bond go unchallenged until a final 
judgment on the merits had been entered." 113 Idaho at 402. As the owners had not 
sought modification until after the trial court had entered final judgment, the court 
could not consider awarding any more. 
Here, Storms and Brownstone's recovery for al l costs, damages, and attorney's 
fees is limited to the amount of the $10,000 bond, which amount the court has already 
awarded in the judgment.1 As a matter of law, Storms and Brownstone cannot recover 
more. They may attempt to raise the same failed argument as the owners in McAtee 
that the bond was "inadequate" because it did not cover all of their damages or 
attorney's fees, but the law has not changed. And unlike in McAtee, Storms and 
Brownstone cannot claim they relied on any statement from the trial court that "he did 
not believe a fina l recovery would be limited by the bond," 113 Idaho at 401, because 
this court made no such comment. 
Moreover, if courts followed the minority rule and allowed a restrained party to 
recover more than the bond amount, then the party seeking the injunction would face 
unfair surprise at the end of the case. The main value of legal precedent is to allow 
parties to make educated decisions about the relative st rength of their position and to 
evaluate the risk of continuing litigation. Watkins has a right to rely on Rule 65{c) and 
1 See p. 2 of the Judgment filed 11/19/20 14, already on fi l.e with the cou1t. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S FEES - Page 4 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\831S - Watkins v. Storms.I I\P leadings\076 Brief.Motion .Disallo w.doc 
213
McAtee that a restrained party cannot recover more than the bond amount to evaluate 
its risk as the case progresses. 
Whi le the minority view may offer some appeal, Idaho courts follow the majority 
view that "there can be no recovery in excess of the bond absent a showing of malicious 
prosecution ." Id. at 402. Storms and Brownstone had four years to seek an adjustment 
of the bond amount before entry of final judgment, but they did not. Applying well-
established and we ll -reasoned Idaho law, the court should grant Watkins' motion and 
disal low Storms and Brownstone's request for costs and fees above the bond amount 
the court has already awarded in the judgment. 
111. THE COURT SHOULD DISALLOW ALL OF STORMS AND BROWNSTONE'S COSTS 
AND ATIORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTIES. 
For any party to recover costs and attorney's fees, it must first estab lish that it is 
the "prevailing party." In this regard, Idaho Ru le of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) provides in 
pertinent part as fol lows: 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by 
these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing 
party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(B) Prevai ling Party. In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respect ive parties. The tria l court in its sound 
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs 
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after 
considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the 
resultant judgment or judgments obtained . 
As the Supreme Court of Idaho explains, "An award of costs under I.R.C.P. 
54(d){l), as the rule itself provides, is committed to the sound discretion of the district 
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court." Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. , 128 Idaho 851, 857 (1996) (citations 
omitted) . 
Where the trial court grants re lief to each party on some of their claims, the 
court acts within its discretion to order that each side bear their own costs and attorney 
fees. In a landlord--tenant dispute context, the most analogous case to the present is 
Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall Associates, 122 Idaho 261, where both 
the landlord and the tenant prevai led in part and the court awarded no costs or fees to 
either party. The tenant established a breach of contract, but the breach was not held 
material. For its part, the landlord recovered rent for the t ime period the tenant was in 
the building, but the trial court denied any prospective rent damages because the 
landlord had failed to mitigate its damages. Thus, with both the landlord and the tenant 
prevailing in part, the trial court declined to award any attorney's fees. The appellate 
court affirmed this decision. This court would likewise act well within its discretion by 
refusing to award any costs or fees to Storms and Brownstone. 
This case is also akin to Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 750 (Ct . App. 
1984), where the trial court explained, '" [e]ach [party] was about equally justified in 
bringing suit. It appears to me that the liability for the incurring of costs and attorney 
fees is about equal. In fact the suit was necessary to resolve the difficulties confronting 
both sides." ' On appeal, one of the parties cha llenged the court's denial of the request 
for costs and attorney's fees. However, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 
exercise of discretion, recogn izing that where both part ies had prevailed in part on their 
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respective claims, the trial court acted well within its discretion to deny the party's 
request for costs and attorney's fees. Id. 
Here, like in Ace Realty, the court would act we ll within its discretion by denying 
Storms and Brownstone's request for costs and attorneys because both sides prevailed 
on some issues. This is especially true where Storms and Brownstone did not even 
succeed in recovering the attorney's fees they claimed to have incurred from the initia l 
proceedings on the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 
Storms and Brownstone obtained a bond in the amount of $10,000. Their attorney's 
fees incurred in the first seven weeks of this case amounted to $11,815. 2 They never 
sought to amend the amount of the bond. As a result, Storms and Brownstone 
continued to litigate for nearly four more years, but recovered nothing more. For its 
part, Watkins' recovery was less than the amount sought, but the amount of recovery 
should increase somewhat following the court's decision on the motion to alter or 
amend the judgment. Viewing the case as a whole, Storms and Brownstone are not the 
prevailing parties in this action, and the cou rt would act comfortably within its 
discretion by denying Storms and Brownstone any costs or attorney's fees. 
That Storms is not the preva iling party is especial ly true where he admitted at 
tria l that he persona lly suffered no damages on his countercla im.3 
Consider also Decker v. Homeguard Systems, a Div. of lntermountain Gas Co., 
105 Idaho 158, 161 (Ct. App. 1983), where the plaint iffs had 22 of their 28 causes of 
2 See Trial Exhibit J and p. 99 of the Find ings of Fact and Conclusions of aw fi led 11/19/20 14, already on 
file wi th the court. 
3 See pp. 8-9 of the Brief in Support ofMotion lo A lter or Amend the Judgment fi led 12/3/20 14, already on 
fi le with the cou1.1. 
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action dismissed, recovered only 3% of what it sought, and the defendant prevailed on a 
counterclaim against one of the plaintiffs, but the court still held that the plaintiffs were 
a prevailing party. Like Ace, t he Decker case is also analogous to this case, where the 
court rejected most of Watkins' claims, but Watkins recovered about 2% of what it 
sought (with the motion to amend the judgment still pending), and Storms and 
Brownstone obtained a only a limited recovery on its counterclaim. But Decker is even 
stronger authority to reject Storms and Brownstone's request for costs and fees 
because if this case were like Decker, then Watkins would arguably be the prevailing 
party, not Storms and Brownstone. This is even a greater reason to hold Storms and 
Brownstone are not the prevailing parties and are not entitled to any award of costs or 
fees. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Idaho's decision in Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 
172 (2009), provides further support for a holding that Storms and Brownstone are not 
the prevailing parties. In Crump, the plaintiff received judgment against the defendant, 
and the defendant received no judgment against the pla intiff, but the court determined 
that the defendant who obtained no affirmative relief was the prevailing party in the 
action and awarded costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, even going 
so far as to say, " [T]he fact that a party receives no affirmative relief does not prohibit it 
from being deemed the prevailing party." Id. at 174. Here, the conclus ion that Storms 
and Brownstone are not prevailing parties could be just ified even if Watkins had 
recovered no judgment against them, but denial of Storms and Brownstone's request is 
especially appropriate where Watkins recovered judgment against them . 
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IV. THE COURT SHOULD REDUCE ANY AWARD TO STORMS AND BROWNSTONE 
BASED ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RULE 54. 
As posited above, the court shou ld disallow all costs and attorney fees Storms 
and Brownstone seek because the amount is already capped by the bond amount, and 
because Storms and Brownstone are not the prevailing parties in this case. In the 
alternative, any award to t hem shou ld be reduced as follows. 
Rule 54(d)(5) requires that Storms and Brownstone itemize all amounts they 
seek. Their memorandum of costs seek attorney's fees of $80,126.S0,4 but the only 
itemize $79,406,50.5 The court shou ld disal low the $720.00 that Storms and 
Brownstone have fa iled to itemize. 
Of all the factors the court cou ld consider in making an award, the most 
significant factor in this case is the amount involved and the results obtained . I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3)(G) . While Storms and Brownstone assert that their efforts were "greatly 
successful,"6 the record does not support that contention. Watkins obta ined a modest 
judgment against them.7 And while Storms and Brownstone did recover the ful l amount 
of the $10,000 security bond, they had already incurred more than that amount in 
attorney's fees ($11,815 by the court's determination) in the fi rst seven weeks of the 
case and never sought to increase the amount of the bond . Thus, Storms and 
Brownstone started out t he case as net losers, and then proceeded t o spend another 
four years and approximately $80,000 in attorney's fees with absolute ly no prospect of 
4 See p. 3 of Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs fi led I 2/3/20 14, already on fi le with the court. 
5 See the last page of Ex. "A' to the Affidavit in Suppo1t of Attorney Fees and Costs filed 12/3/20 14, 
al ready on fil e w ith the court. 
6 See p. 3 of Affidav it in Support of Attorney Fees and Costs fi led 12/3/2014, already on file with the court. 
7 This judgment is the subject of Watkins pending Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment filed 
12/3/2014, already on file with the court. 
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( 
recovering anything more. Underthe totality of the circumstances and viewing the 
outcome of the case as a whole, no one could say that spending over $90,000 in 
attorney's fees to recover $10,000 on your best day would be a "greatly successful" 
endeavor. Sound judicial policy weighs against the court awarding Storms and 
Brownstone anything more. Otherwise, the court would be encouraging the parties to 
waste the time and resources of the parties and the judicial system simply to increase 
their chance at recovering attorney's fees at the end of the case. 
Finally, while Watkins does not fault Mr. Brandstetter for offering courtesy 
discounts to Storms and Brownstone, this court should reject Storms and Brownstone's 
argument that Watkins "is not entitled to the benefit of [Mr. Brandstetter's] courtesy."8 
Under no circumstances should Watkins be required to pay for attorney's fees or costs 
that Storms and Brownstone never actually incurred. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the court should disallow Storms and Brownstone's 
request for an award of costs and attorney's fees. Any award above the bond amount 
already included in the Judgment would be reversible error. 
DATED this d S day of December, 2014. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
B. riscoll, Esq. ==iff 
8 See p. 3 of Affidavit in Support of Attorney Fees and Costs filed 12/3/20 14, already on file with the court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2l_ day of December, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD 
P.O. Box 51600 
510 "D" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
District Judge 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 N. Maple, #310 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
[ ])J. S. Mail 
[vf Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ]~-- S. Mail 
[v1 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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FrLED lN ctlAMBERS AT BLACKFOOT, 
BINGHAM COUNTY, lDAHO OYJ 
C~f#.mht,.- /5, 01015 
AT 4:3qf'Yll~ ~ I ;;. . 
DARRN B.IMPSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
TIIE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an 










MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, ) 
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, and ) 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an ) 
Idal10 Corporation; collectively doing ) 
business as BROWNSTONE ) 
RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) _______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-5958 
ORDER SUBSTITUTING THE 
ESTATE OF MICHAEL 
STORMS AND GRANTING 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
(hereinafter "Watkins"), filed this breach of contract, breach of covenant to repair, unjust 
enrichment, and waste action against Defendants Michael Storms, an individual 
(hereinafter "Storms"); Kathy Burggraf, an individual (hereinafter "Burggraf '); 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. , an Idaho Corporation (hereinafter the "Brownstone"); and 
Storms Burggraf, and Brownstone collectively doing business as the Brownstone 
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Restaurant and Brewhouse (hereinafter the "Restaurant"). 1 Watkins also requested 
injw1ctive relief, an accounting, eviction, and attorney's fees. 2 Storms and Brownstone 
asserted affim1ative defenses and counterclaimed for storage rental, moving, utility, and 
insurance expenses, together with attorney fees. 
A Comt Trial was held on March 18-21 April 25, May 6, and July 29 of 2014.4 
Judgment was entered November 19, 201 4 whereby Watkins took nothing by its breach 
of the ''New Lease" claims, its request for an accounting under the "New Lease," and its 
unjust enrichment claim. 5 Watkins' requests for injunctive relief and for the defendants' 
eviction were denied as moot.6 Watkins recovered $699.64 from Storms and Brownstone 
for repairs to the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho alls Idaho (hereinafter 
the "Premises") wherein the Restaurant was located. 7 Watkins took nothing by its unjust 
enrichment claim against Storms and Brownstone.8 
1 Second Amended Complaint The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-
20 l0-5958 (filed September 6, 20 l 3) (hereinafter the "Second Amended Complaint"). 
2 Second Amended Complaint, at pp. 6-8 . 
3 Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, The Watkins Company, llC v. Storms, 
Bonneville County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (fi led October 23, 2013) (hereinafter the "Answer and 
Counterclaim"). 
4 Milrnte Entry [for March 18, 2014 Court Trial] , The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville 
County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed March 2 1, 20 14); Minute Entry [for March 19, 2014 Court Trial] , 
The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led March 21 20 14)· 
Minute Entry [for March 20, 2014 Court Trial], The Wc1tkins Company, llC v. Storms, Bonneville County 
case no. CV-20 10-5958 (fi led March 2 1, 2014); M inute Entry [for March 21 2014 Court Trial] , The 
Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-201 0-5958 (fi led May l , 20 l4); Minute 
Entry [fo r April 24, 2014 Cou1t Trial ], The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. 
CY-2010-5958 (filed May 1, 2014). Th is Cou1i notes that the Bonneville County Cle rk has not prepared a 
minute entry for the July 29, 2014 hearing as of this Order. 
5 Judgment, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV -2010-5958 (fi led 
ovember l 9, 2014) (hereinafter the "Judgment") , at pp. l-2. 
6 ld. 
7 Judgmem at p. 2. 
8 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, at p. 88. 
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Storms and Brownstone showed themselves entitled to receive $17,015.88 in 
costs and fees attributable to Watkins' wrongful temporary restraining order.9 Storms' 
and Brownstone's recovery was limited by the amount of the bond, however, and 
Watkins was adjudged liable to Storms and Brownstone in the amount of$1 0,000.00. 10 
Storms and Brownstone have moved for an award of costs and attorney fees. 11 
Watkins objected to Storms' and Brownstones' Motion for Fees and Costs. 12 
Storm's and Brownstone' s Motion for Fees and Costs was heard on February 11 , 
2015 along with Watkins' request to alter or amend the Judgment.13 This Court ruled 
upon Watkins' Motion to Alter or Amend14 but, due to an oversight, failed to rule on 
Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs. 
Tragically, Storms has died. His estate moved for substitution into the lawsuit on 
Storms' behalf.15 Watkins' objected to Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for 
Substitution. 16 
9 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case 
no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed November 19, 201 4) (hereinafter the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law"), at p. 102. 
1010 Id., Judgment, at p. 2. 
11 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. 
CV-2010-5958 (filed December 3, 2014) (here inafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and 
Costs"). 
12 Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney's Fees, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville 
County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed December 17, 2014) (hereinafter "Watkins' Objection to Fees and 
Costs"); Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney's Fees, The Watkins Company, LLC v. 
Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led December 23, 2014) (hereinafter "Watkins' 
Brief re: Objection to Fees and Costs"). 
13 Minute Entry, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 10-5958 (filed 
February 11 , 20 15). 
14 Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, 
Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fil ed April 9, 2015). 
15 Defendants' Motion for Substitution of Party, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County 
case no. CV-20 10-595 8 (filed August 7, 2015) (hereinafter "Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for 
Substitution"). 
16 Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion for Substitution of Party, Judgment, The Walkins Company, 
LLCv. Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (fi led August 19, 2015) (hereinafter "Watkins' 
Objection to Substitution"). 
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A hearing was held on Sto1ms' and Brownstone's Motion for Substitution on 
August 26, 2015. 17 At that hearing, this Court discovered its oversight with regard to 
Storms ' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs. 
Having reviewed the parties' arguments on both Storms' and Brownstone 's 
Motion for Fees and Costs and Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Substitution, the 
record in this matter, and the relevant authorities, the Estate of Michael Storms 
(hereinafter the "Estate") shall be substituted into this lawsuit as party defendant in place 
of Michael Storms, and the Estate and Brownstone shall recover in part their requested 
attorney fees and costs. 
II. ISSUES 
Storms and Brownstone request substitution of the Estate as party defendant in 
place of the deceased Storms.18 Watkins objects and argues that the Estate has no "claim" 
to attorney fees since attorney fees are merely ancillary to the claims Storms presented at 
trial, and Storms' death extinguished any right of recovery of Storms' attorney fee 
request. 19 
Storms and Brownstone premise their attorney fee request upon Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) and argue they successfully defended against Watkins' causes of action and 
successfully prosecuted their counterclaim. 20 Watkins paiTies that Storms ' and 
Brownstone's total recovery is limited to the bond Watkins put down to enjoin Stom1s 
17 Minute Entry, Judgment, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no . CV-2010-
5958 (filed August 26, 2015). 
18 Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Substitution, at p. 1. 
19 Watkins' Objection to Substitution, at pp . 2-4. 
20 Stonns' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs, atp. 1. 
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and Brownstone from removing items from the Premises.21 Watkins also contends that 
Storms and Brownstone were not the prevailing parties to the lawsuit. 22 Watkin further 
posits that Storms' and Brownstone's fee request should be reduced based upon the 
requirements ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedw-e 54 (hereinafter "Rule 54").23 
Based upon the parties' arguments, the following issues must be determined: 
I. Is the Estate entitled to recover attorney fees if any, awarded on behalf of 
Sto1ms? 
2. Are Storms and Brownstone entitled to recover attorney fees abov the 
amount of the bond? 
3. Are Stonns and Brownstone prevailing parties to this lawsuit? 
4. What amount of money if any meets the standard for reasonable attorney 
fees based upon the considerations outlined in Rule 54? 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Watkins owns the Premises which consists of commercial real estate.24 
2. Stom1s was the president and registered agent for Brownstone.25 
3. On July 31 , 1996, Storms and Burggraf, as individuals entered into a 
thi1ty (30) year commercial lease agreement with Watkins (hereinafter refened to as the 
"Lease") to lease the Premises for the operation of the Restaurant. 26 
4. After executing the Lease with Watkins, Storms and Burggraf gutted the 
building and renovated it to accommodate the Restaurant. 27 
21 Watkins' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at pp. 2-5. 
22 Watk ins ' Brief re : Objection to Fees and Costs, at pp. 5-8. 
23 Watkins' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at pp. 9-10. 
24 Findings of Fact and Conclusions o,f law, at p. 4, l. 
r Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 4, 12. 
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5. In 2005, Burggraf sold her interest in the Brownstone.28 
6. On April 21, 2010, Watkins received a judgment against Storms and 
Brownstone terminating the Lease.29 Following the entry of the April 21 2010 judgment, 
Storms and Brownstone retained possession of the Premises and paid rent on a month-to-
month basis .Jo Storms became a tenant-at-will, possessing the Premises with Watkins' 
consent but without fixed lease terms. J1 
7. By letter dated September 15, 2010, counsel for Brownstone informed 
Watkins of its intention to vacate the Premises on October 17, 2010. 32 
8. On September 29, 2010, Watkins filed the above-numbered and styled 
lawsuit against Storms, Brownstone, and Burggraf and alleged that they breached the 
terms of the "New Lease" by failing to timely pay rent, failing to pay late fees, failing to 
pay interest on their delinquent payment and impermissibly vacating the Premises.J3 
Watkins also sought to permanently eajoin Storms and Brownstone from removing an 
fixtures from the Premises if such removal would cause damages. 34 Watkins requested an 
accounting under the "New Lease" and the defendants ' eviction.35 
9. Storms and Brownstone operated the Restaurant for the last time on 
September 30, 20 10.36 
26 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 4 ,r 3. 
27 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law at p. 5, ,r 7. 
28 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law at p. 6 ,r I 0. 
29 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 9 ,r 21. 
3° Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p9. 9-l 0, ,r 2 1 . 
3 1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. IO ,r 22. 
32 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, at p. 12 ,r 30. 
33 Complaint, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms Bonneville County case no. CV-2010-5958 ( fi led 
September 29, 2010) (hereinafter the "Complaint"). 
34 Complaint at pp. 5-6. 
r Complaint, at pp. 6-7. 
36 ld. 
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10. On October 1, 2010 Watkins moved for a temporary restraining order 
prohibiting Storms and Brownstone from removing any property located in or on the 
Premises.37 A temporary restraining order was granted and the parties were directed not 
to remove any property from the Premises until a decision issued on Watkins ' application 
for a prejudgment writ of attachment. 38 
11. On October 5 2010 Watkins post d a $10,000.00 bond as required by the 
temporary restraining order. 39 
12. On November 4, 2010, Watkins' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment was denied, but his request for a preliminary injunction was partially 
granted.40 Stonns and Brownstone were enjoined from removing certain equipment and 
stmctures from the Premises.41 
13. On November 9, 2010, the partial preliminary injunction was set aside. 42 
14. On November 24, 2010, this Court again granted Watkins a partial 
preliminary injunction applicable only to the outdoor poles in the vicinity of the 
Premises. 43 Storms and Brownstone were not enjoined from removing other disputed 
fixtures. 44 
15. A Court Trial took place in the spring and early summer of201 4.45 
16. Watkins demanded compensation, in the amount of $2 1,739.1 9, for 
Storms' and Brownstone's alleged breach of the Lease's covenant to repair.46 Stom1s and 
37 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 12 132. 
3s Id. 
39 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 92. 
40 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 12, 133. 
41 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law at pp 12-3, 33. 
42 Finding. of Fact and Conclusions of law at p. 13 34. 
43 Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, at p. 14, 36. 
44 Id . 
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Brownstone were ultimately ordered to compensate Watkins, in the amount of $699.64, 
for certain items left in a state of disrepair. 47 
17. Watkins' claims against Storms and Brownstone for breach of contract (a 
it related to the "New Lease") , an accounting, and breach of the cov nant to repair under 
the "New Lease" were summarily adjudicated in Storms' and Brownstone's favor. 48 
I 8. Watkins' requests for injunctive relief and eviction were declared moot.49 
19. Watkins ' request for rent in the amount of $5,600.00, under an unjust 
enriclunent theory, was denied. 50 
20. Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed damages in the amount of 
$2 1,078.39 for Watkins' wrongful restraint of their efforts to vacate the Premises.5 1 
Storms and Brownstone were found entitled to recover $17 015.88 for costs and fees 
attributable to Watkins ' wrongful temporary restraining order. 52 Stonns ' and 
Brownstone's recovery was limited to Watkins' $10,000.00 temporary restraining order 
bond.53 
IV. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
A. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
1. nder Rule 54(d)( l ), costs a.re allowed as a matter of right to the 
prevailing party or parties to a lawsuit, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 
45 See: footnote 4. 
46 Plaintiff's Closing Argument, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-
20 l 0-5958 (fi Jed September J 9, 2014), at p. 2. 
47 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 104, 16. 
48 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 16-7, 1,148, 50, and 52. 
49 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 16 ~149 , 51. 
5° Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, at pp. 86-89. 
5 1 Stonns and Brownstone Proposed Findings, Conc lusions and Argument The Watkins Company, LLC v. 
Storms, Bonnevi lle County case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed September 19 2014) at p. 53. 
52 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 91-102. 
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2. At any time after a decision by the court, any party who claims costs may 
file and serve on the adverse parties a memorandum of costs itemizing each claimed 
expense.54 
3. In any civil action, the comt may award reasonable attorney fees. 55 A 
party's ability to recover attorney fees matures upon the filing of a judgment in the 
lawsuit.56 
B. Costs and Fees Incurred as a Result of a Wrongful Temporary Restraining 
Order. 
1. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) (hereinafter "Rule 65(c)") reads, in 
pe1tinent part: 
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the 
giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, 
for the payment of such costs and damages including reasonable attorney's 
fees to be fixed by the court as may be incurred or suffered by any party 
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
2. Rule 65(c) allows the trial court to award costs and reasonable attorne 
fees to any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.j7 
3. If a paity requesting a temporary restraining order ultimately fails on the 
merits of the basis for the restraining order then the "wrongfully enjoined or restrained 
party" may recover its damages.58 
53 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 102. 
54 Rule 54(d)(5). 
55 Rule 54(e)( l). 
56 See. e.g.: Western World, Inc. v. Prater, 121 Idaho 870,873 828 P.2d 899 902 (Ct. App. 1992). 
51 Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 73785 P.2d 634, 637 ( 1990). 
58 See: McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock Inc. , 11 3 Idaho 393, 395-6, 744 P.2d 121 , 123-4 ( t. App. 
1987). 
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4. The recoverable attorney fees under Rule 65(c) are those incurred in a 
proceeding to dissolve a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction rather 
than those earned through defending the merits of the action. 59 
5. Recovery of damages, costs and attorney fees occasioned by the 
temporary restraining order is limited to the amount of the bond.60 
C. Standard on Award of Attorney Fees - Prevailing Party. 
l. In order to recover attorney fees under Idaho Code · 12-1 20(3) a party 
must prevail in the civil lawsuit at issue.61 
2. A detennination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the 
trial court.62 Thus, this Court must: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion 
(2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the consideration of an award, and (3) reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason.63 
3. The fact that a party receives no affirmative relief does not prohibit a party 
from being deemed a prevailing party.64 This Court may, in its discretion, conclude that a 
party prevailed in part, and apportion the resulting costs and fees accordingly.65 If neith r 
59 Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho l , 3, 713 P.2d 437, 439 (Ct. pp. l 985) 
60 McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, inc., 113 Idaho at 402, 744 P.2d at 130. 
6 1 Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
62 Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 7 16, 718, 117 P.3d 130. 132 
(2005). 
6" Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915 204 P.3d l 114, 11 26 (2009). 
64 Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.Jd 864, 867 (2003). 
65 Burns v. Boundary County, 120 ldaho at 626, 818 P.2d at 330; Smith v. Mitton 140 Idaho 893,903, 104 
P.3d 367, 377 (2004). 
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party "predominantly prevailed" in relation to each other, the Court may decline to award 
costs or fees. 66 
D. Standard of Review - Reasonableness of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
I. The factors to be considered in determining an award of attorney fees as 
set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(e)(3), include: 
(a) the tim and labor required· 
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(c) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 











the prevailing charges for like work; 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstance of 
the amount involved and the results obtained; 
the undesirability of the case; 
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
awards in similar cases; 
the reasonable cost of automated legal research. if the court finds it 
was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and 
66 Smith v. Mitton, l40 Idaho at 903, 104 P.3d at 377; Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho at 9 16, 204 P.3d at 
1125. 
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(1) any oth r factor which the court deems appropriate in the part icular 
case.67 
2. Although a court must consider the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when determining the amount to award in attorney fees, 
the court need not demonstrate how it employed any of the factors in reaching an award 
amount. 68 The court need not specifically addr ss each of the factors as long as the 
record indicates that it considered them all .69 
E. Standard on Cost Award. 
1. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(A) requires the award of costs as a 
matter of right when one party prevails over another. 
2. When neither party prevails, a Court's determination as to a cost award is 
discretionary. 70 
3. Discretionary costs may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice 
be assessed against the adverse paity. 71 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Substitution of the Estate as a Party Defendant. 
Ini ti ally, Watkins objects to the substitution of the Estate and argues that since no 
"claims" remain in this case, there is no basis to substitute the Estate into the lawsuit in 
67 Idaho Ru le of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). 
68 In re Univers ity Place/Idaho Water Center Project 146 Idaho 527,544, 199 P.3d 102 l 19 (2008). 
69 Id . 
70 Idaho Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)( l )(B). 
7 1 Idaho Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)( l)(D). 
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the place of Storms. 72 Although attorney fees for prevailing over the opposing party in 
certain civil lawsuits are not separate and distinct "claims," attorney fees are nonetheless 
recoverable at the conclusion of the litigation by the prevailing party in a lawsuit based 
upon a commercial transaction. 73 
Storms, prior to his untimely death, argued that he and Brownstone prevailed over 
Watkins in this lawsuit. Should this Court agree with Storms' and Brownstone's 
prevai ling pruty argument, then they will be entitled, at this Court's discretion, to recover 
some or all of their attorney fees . Storms' and Brownstone's Motion for Fees and Costs 
was timely filed. It was not timely ruled upon due to this Court's oversight. 
Judgment has been rendered in this case. If Storms and Brownstone are 
considered the prevailing parties to this lawsuit, then their request for attorney fees has 
now matured into a claim which is over-ripe for adjudication.74 Therefore, a claim on 
behalf of Storms exists, to which the Estate may aspire. 
Next, Watkins takes the position that Storms' death extinguished his now mature 
claim for attorney fees. 75 The citation Watkins offers in support in fact runs counter to its 
position. 76 The attorney fee claim now before the Court arises out of the contract dispute 
between the parties. As such it survives the death of Storms and may be pursued by the 
Estate. 
72 Watkins' Objection to Substitution, at pp. 1-3 . 
73 Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
74 See. e.!!..: We tern World, inc. v. Prater 121 ldahoh at 873 828 P.2d at 902 ("the right to costs. and an 
a_ward for attorney tees, would mature anew when an amended judgment was enLered' ). 
7 Watkins Objection to Substitution, at p. 3. 
76 See id. 
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For these reasons, Stonns' and Brownstone' s Motion for Substitution shall be 
granted. The Estate shall be substituted into this lawsuit as a party defendant in place of 
Michael Storms. 
B. Attorney Fees Over and Above the Amount of the Bond. 
As this Court previously found, Rule 65( c) limits recovery of any damages or fees 
incurred as the result of a wrongfully issued preliminary injunction bond. 77 Storms' and 
Brownstone's attorney fees, incurred between October 1, 2010 and November 24, 2010, 
were considered as damages suffered by Storms and Brownstone as a result of having 
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 78 The fees requested by Storms and Brownstone 
do not include any fees generated prior to December 1, 2010. 79 
The vast majority of the pretrial and trial issues in this matter dealt with Watkins' 
claims for breach of the covenant to repair in the Lease, unjust enrichment, and waste. 
Those issues were not related to the temporary restraining order. Instead, the temporary 
restraining order involved Watkins ' fears that Storms and Brownstone would remove 
furnishings and fixtures from the Premises that should remain with the Premises. 
A fractional portion of the parties' issues, after resolution of the temporary 
restraining order, involved Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaims for damages caused 
by Watkins' wrongful restraint of Storms' and Brownstone's efforts to vacate the 
Premises. That portion of the litigation fell squarely under the auspices of the bond and 
cannot be recovered. 
77 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 91-
78 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 98. 
79 Affidavit in Suppo11 of Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs, The Watkins Company, LLC v. 
Storms, Bonneville County case no. CV-20 I 0-5958 (filed December 3, 20 14) (hereinafter the 
"Brandstetter Affidavit"), at attachment, p. 1. 
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Although Storms and Brownstone did not clarify the precise amount of time 
devoted to their counterclaim, this Cami is very fan1iliar with the pleadings filed and the 
issues tried in this lawsuit. Not more than ten percent (1 0%) of the pleadings, arguments, 
and trial evidence pertained to Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim. The vast 
majority of the time, effort and evidence in this case centered upon Watkins' claims for 
dan1age under the covenant to repair in the pa11ie ' Lease. Indeed, this Court's analyses 
of Storms' and Brownstone's counterclaim accounts for approximately ten percent of the 
105-page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Therefore, Storms' and 
Brownstone's fee request shall be reduced by ten percent in recognition of the time spent 
on Stonns' and Brownstone's counterclaim, which time necessarily fell under the 
auspices of the temporary restraining order bond. 
C. Storms and Brownstone Prevailed at Trial. 
Watkins argues that since both sides prevailed on some issues this Court should 
decline to award attorney fees to Storms and Brownstone.80 But Watkins recovered only 
$699.64 (or 2.56%) of the $27 339.19 he demanded for breach of the covenant to repair 
and for unjust enrichment. 
Storms and Brownstone were found entitled to recover $17,015 .88 ( or 81 % of 
the $21 ,078 .39 they counterclaimed. They ultimately recovered only $10,000.00 (or 
47%) which was the amount of the bond. However, they prevailed on over ninety-seven 
per-cent (97%) of Watkins claims against them. 
Based upon this Court's knowledge of the parties' pleadings and arguments, and 
its observation of the witnesses and evidence admitted at trial, and in light of its Findings 
80 Watkins ' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 7. 
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court finds that Storms and Brownstone is the 
prevailing party in this lawsuit. 
D. Storms' and Brownstone's Attorney Fee Request is Reasonable. 
Watkins argues that Storms' and Brownstone's claimed attorney fees should b 
reduced, based upon Rule 54, for a number of reasons. First Watkins argues that 
$720.00 of Storms' and Brownstone's request was not itemized and therefore should be 
denied. 81 This discrepancy is dealt with in the Brandstetter Affidavit, however. Fees and 
costs incurred by Storms and Brownstone tlrrough November 20 2014 amounted to 
$79,406.50.82 Storms and Brownstone incurred the additional $720.00 in preparing their 
Motion for Fees and Costs, which Motion was filed on December 3, 2014. 83 
Next, Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone were "net losers" because they 
only recovered the amount of the bond on their counterclaim. 84 This position ignores the 
fact that Storms and Brownstone defeated the vast majority of Watkins ' claims against 
them. 
Finally, Watkins argues that Storms and Brownstone should not recover the thirty 
(30) hours of attorney time which Mr. Brandstetter did not charg as a courtesy to his 
clients.85 Mr. Brandstetter did not include the courtesy discounts in the attorney fee he 
requests from Watkins.86 In other words, Watkins received the same "discount" in 
St01ms' and Brownstone's fee request as did Storms and Brownstone. 
81 Watkins' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 9. 
82 Brandstetter Affidavit, at attachment, p. 10. 
83 Brandstette r Affidavit, at p. 4 '1f l S. 
84 Watkins ' Briefre: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 9. 
85 Watkins' Brief re: Objection to Fees and Costs, at p. 10. 
86 Brandstetter Affidavit, at p. 3, '1f 3. 
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A for the Rule 54(e)(3) factors , the time and labor Mr. Brandstetter required to 
prepare for and defend this lawsuit which consumed over four years was commensurate 
with the vast number of issues Watkins raised. While the questions at bar were not novel 
they were complex and detailed. The skill required to perform the legal s rvices 
necessary was moderately high, as the volume of claims pursued by Watkins required 
experienced organization and thorough investigatory skills. Mr. Brandstetter showed the 
requisite ability and skill in his representation of torms and Brownstone. 
Mr. Brandstetter's hourly fee of $225.00 falls within the range of highly 
experienced litigators in southeast Idaho. His fixed fee for his work is typical for civil 
defense in this area. 
Although time limitations were not a factor in this case the time and labor 
necessary to answer all of Watkins' issues necessarily consumed a vast amount ohime 
investigation and skill. Mr. Brandstetter obtained very favorable results for his clients. 
Mr. Brandstetter did not find the action undesireable.87 Mr. Brandstetter has represented 
Storms and Brownstone since 20 10 in other proceedings and matters.88 
The attorney fee requested by Stonns and Brownstone is similar to other cases 
involving multiple claims of damage to a building. 
Mr. Brandstetter incurred $220.57 in electronic legal research fees .89 Given the 
nature and complexity of this lawsuit, such fee is reasonable. 
Based upon the foregoing analyses Stonns' and Brownstone's request for 
attorney fees in the amount of $80,347.07 is reasonable under the circumstances 
87 Brandstetter Affidavit, at p. 3, 1 12. 
88 Brandstetter Affidavit, at p. 3 1 11 . 
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presented in this lawsuit. This amount shall be decreased by ten percent (10%), as 
discussed above, for a total attorney fee recovery of $72,312.36. 
E. Costs. 
Storms and Brownstone also request the $500.00 fee they paid to the mediator. 90 
As the prevailing party, Stonns and Brownstone are entitled to recover their costs as a 
matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l)(A). The mediator's fee is not enumerated as one of 
the costs as a matter of right, however. 91 Thus, it falls within the ambit of a discretionary 
cost. 92 
Mediation is ordered in most civil lawsuits in Idaho. As such, the mediator 's fee 
is not an exceptional cost. Storms and Brownstone do not offer any reason why this cost 
should be assessed against Watkins. Accordingly, this cost shall be denied. 
VI. CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings and analyses, the following conclusions are 
appropriate: 
1. The Estate is entitled to recover attorney fees, if any, awarded on behalf of 
Storms. 
2. Storms and Brownstone are entitled to recover attorney fees above the 
amount of the bond. 
3. Storms and Brownstone are the prevailing paiiies to this lawsuit. 
89 Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs, The Watkins Company, LLC v. Storms, Bonneville County 
case no. CV-2010-5958 (filed December 3, 20 14), at p. l. 
90 Id. 
9 1 See: Idaho Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)(l)(C). 
92 See: Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D). 
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4. The amount of $72,312.36 meets the standard for reasonable attorney fees 
based upon the considerations outlined in Rule 54. 
Vil. ORDER 
Accordingly, the Estate is hereby substituted into this lawsuit as a party defendant 
in place of Michael Storms. 
The Estate and Brownstone are entitled to recover attorney fees in the amount of 
$72,312.36 from Watkins. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this \~ay of September 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Substituting the Estate of Michael Storms and Granting Attorney Fees and Costs was 
delivered to the parties listed below by first class mail with prepaid postage and/or hand 
delivered and/or sent by facsimile this ~ day of September 2015, to : 
BJ. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & 
AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Ave. 
P .O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER,CHARTERED 
510 "D" Street 
P.O. Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 
D Courthouse Box D Facsimi le 
~ Mail D Courthouse Box DFacsimi le 
RONALD LONGMORE, Clerk of the Court 
~('{JJ1iWL1k2'.]~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an 










THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL STORMS, ) 
an individual, KATHY BURGGRAF, an ) 
individual, and BROWNSTONE ) 
COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho Corporation; ) 
collectively doing business as ) 





------- -------- .) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-5958 
FIRST AMENDED 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
(hereinafter "Watkins") shall take nothing by its allegations against defendant Kathy 
Burggraf, an individual. 
Watkins shall take nothing by its breach of the ''New Lease" claims against the 
defendants. 
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Watkins' request for injunctive relief against the defendants is denied as moot. 
Watkins' shall take nothing by its request for an accounting under the "New 
Lease." 
Watkins ' request for the defendants ' eviction is denied as moot. 
Watkins shall recover $699.64 from defendant The Estate of Michael Storn1s, an 
individual (hereinafter the "Estate"), and defendant Brownstone Companies, Inc. , an 
Idaho Corporation (hereinafter "Brownstone") for repairs to the premises located at 455 
River Parkway, Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereinafter the "Premises") necessitated by Michael 
Storms' and Brownstone's breach of the expectations of their at-will tenancy with 
Watkins or, in the alternative, for waste to the Premises. 
Watkins shall take nothing by its claim of unjust enrichment against the Estate 
and Brownstone. 
The Estate and Brownstone shall recover the full amount of the $10,000.00 bond 
given by Watkins for the Temporary Restraining Order on their counterclaim against 
Watkins. 
The Estate and Brownstone shall recover attorney fees m the amount of 
$72,312.36 from Watkins. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
. ·-n+ 
DATED this 1S day of September 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that onUtptlmter /tg c),D/?f served a true copy of the 
foregoing First Amended Judgment on the pai1ies listed below by deposit into the U.S. 
mail, by deposit into the attorney's courthouse mailbox, or by facsimile transmission. 
B.J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & 
ASSOCJA TES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
~ D Courthouse Box 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. rv 
COX, OHMAN & ~ ai l D Courthouse Box 
BRANDSTETTER, CHARTERED 
510 "D" Street 
P.O. Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 




B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB #7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone : (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Email: bjd@eidaholaw.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liabil ity company, 
Plaintiff /Counterdefendant/ Appellant, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 
BROWNSTONE RESTAURANT AND BREWHOUSE, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Respondents. 
and 
KATHY BURGGRAF, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-10-5958 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL STORMS and BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC., 
Defendants/Counterclaima~ts/Respondents, and DEAN C. BRANDSTETTER, 
ESQ., THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD; and TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT; 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named plaintiff/counterdefendant /appellant, THE WATKINS 
COMPANY, LLC (" WATKINS" ), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Seventh 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 
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Judicial District Court's Judgment entered November 20, 2014; First Amended Judgment 
entered September 15, 2015; and from the Order Substituting The Estate of Michael 
Storms and Granting Attorney Fees and Costs entered September 15, 2015, in the 
above-entitled action, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, presiding. 
2. Watkins has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
judgments and order described in paragraph one above are subject to appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule ll(a). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which Watkins intends to 
assert on appeal are the following, provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the appellant from asserting othe.r issues on appeal: 
case; 
a. Did the district court commit reversible error by apportioning and 
awarding the respondents 90% of their attorney's fees where the memorandum 
of costs and underlying attorney time entries did not isolate fees recoverable on 
the contract defense from the fees that were not recoverable on the 
counterclaim? 
4. There has been no or-der entered sealing any portion of the record in this 
5. Watkins does not request a transcript; 
6. Watkins requests the following documents be included in the clerk's 
record, which request is more limited than the st andard record under Idaho Appellate 
Rule 28: 
a. Register of actions; 
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b. The original an.d all amended complaints; 
c. The original and any amended answers to the complaints; 
d. The original and any amended counterclaim; 
e. The original and any amended answer to a counterclaim; 
f. The original fin.dings of fact and conclusions of law filed in 
chambers on November 19, 2014, but listed as filed on November 20, 2014, on 
the register of actions from the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository for the 
case; 
g. The original judgment fi led in chambers on November 19, 2014, 
but listed as filed on November 20, 2014, on the register of actions from the 
Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository for the case; 
h. The defendan!:s' motion for attorney fees and costs filed 
December 3, 2014; 
i. The defendants' memorandum of attorney's fees and costs filed 
December 3, 2014; 
j. The defendants' affidavit in support of memorandum of 
attorney's fees and costs file_d Deo~mber 3, 2014; 
k. The plaintiff's motion to disa llow costs and attorney's fees f il ed 
December 17, 2014; 
I. The pla int iff's brief. in support of motion to disallow costs and 
attorney's fees filed Decemb'_er 17, 2014; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
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m. The order substituting the estate of Michael Storms and granting 
attorney fees and costs filed September 15, 2015; and 
n. The First Amended Judgment filed September 15, 2015. 
7. Watkins does not req_uest any additional documents, charts, or exhibits 
to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
(a} That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: None. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the 
estimated fee for preparatior ofthe reporter's transcript because none has been 
requested. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid . 
(d) That the appeJlate filing fee has been paid; and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this c:9,f day of Sep':ember, 2015. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: - ~- ~ ............... ~ -~ ........,...._ .... _ __ _ 
L J.Drisc~-
Attorneys for Appellant 
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( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this §?;!day of September, 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a 
sealed envelope and depositing in the Unit ed States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD 
P.O. Box 51600 
510 "D" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
District Judge ' 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 N. Maple, #310 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
Ronald Longmore 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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[~ S. Mai l 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] ,,Overnight Del ivery 
[\;/J Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appel !ant, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, lNC.,an ldaho 
corporation- collectively doing business as 

















Case No. CV-20 l 0-5958 
Docket No. 43649 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
_ _ _ _________ _ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exh ibits were marki::<l for 
identification and offered in evidence admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its 
determination: please see attached sheets. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1- Defendant Michael Storms and Brownstone Companies, Jnc. Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of [nterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, dated January 30, 2013. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2- Defendant's Supplemental A nswers to Discovery, dated January 30, 2013 . 
And 1 further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
this J 7 day of December, 2015. 
-- ''''"'""""'''' ,,,,''.,o\CIA[. 1111,,,. 
~ · ),)~-;:;:.;u··N···r··-/Jh, \. 
~ ~ · ••• v-, y ... u.). ~ 
~" l q.;:..._ ~ ~ 
~ I \o~ = i BONNt:111, , _ i -1 : = i - .. "J..E i ; - -~ . -
~ ;"\ \ . ..,_ C i $ .... ~ . 1:- ~ .. ~ 
'%,u1/· ... OF\tl~ . ...-~ ~ 
/,,,: /:/1.c············, \0' ~ 
l'./1111 T cov ,,,,, ,,,,,11, 1111 \\\\\ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS-1 
RONALD LONGMORE 
C lerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an fdaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/ Appellant, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC.,an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 

















________ _ _________ _ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Case No. CV-2010-5958 
Docket No. 43649 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete 
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly 
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (ifreq uested) and 
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this 
/ 7 day of December, 2015. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liabi lity company, 
P laintiff/Counterdefendant/ Appel !ant, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS, an individual, and 
BROWNSTONE COMPANIES, INC.,an Idaho 
corporation; collectively doing business as 

















Case No. CV-2010-5958 
Docket No. 43649 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the fl_~ day of December, 2015, l served a copy of the Reporter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
BJ. Driscoll 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Dean C. Brandstetter 
PO Box 51600 
Idaho Falls ID 83405-1600 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me. 
CLERK'S CERTLFICATE OF SERVICE- I 
